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Abstract 
 
Neural interface devices are artificial devices that are controlled by the human mind. Neural 
interface systems encompass sophisticated technology that enables integration of machine 
with the human brain and body. The complexity of the brain and neural system is so great 
that full understanding of how these work is still being discovered through neuroscientific 
research. Interfacing with the human brain and neural system is far from perfect so the ways 
in which they work and the limitations of neural interface devices must be recognised when 
a dispute comes before a court of law. 
 
The research hypothesis tested in this thesis is that when a person who has a neural 
interface device is involved in circumstances where harm to another person or another 
person’s property occurs, the Australian law will require re-evaluation and adaptation to 
resolve subsequent civil action. Complexity will arise because of the existence of the neural 
interface device and what might be regarded as a merging of mind and machine. This will 
make it difficult to determine factual causation and as a result, the law will need to adapt to 
these circumstances. Thomas Kuhn’s concept of revolutionary science, involving paradigm 
shift, is applied to determine this hypothesis. 
 
While doctrinal methodology is applied in the analysis of the law, policy considerations that 
will impact on the judicial decision making and legislative action are also discussed. Delphi 
Method research has been undertaken to obtain the insight of legal experts regarding the 
legal issues that will arise in the context of civil disputes and how the current law will address 
these issues. The information upon which the participants in the Delphi Method research 
based their responses purposely excluded malfunction of the neural interface device. While 
malfunction of the device is considered when analysis of manufacturer liability is undertaken, 
the law will have most difficulty determining liability when the device does not malfunction.  
 
In the analysis of the legal issues, scenarios have been introduced to better assess the 
application of the law and identify the difficulties that will require re-evaluation and adaptation 
of the law. While the facts that arise in disputes differ, identification of the difficulties the 
current law will have in resolving a dispute based on the scenarios presented in this thesis 
will provide insight for future civil proceedings where the person with a neural interface 
device is involved. Throughout this thesis, the person with the neural interface device is 
regarded as a defendant in a civil proceeding. The issues involving neural interface devices 
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are multifactorial, so while neuroscientist and engineers develop neural interface devices, 
lawyers, academics and politicians must consider the ethical, legal and social frameworks 
within which innovation can exist and thrive. This thesis concludes with recommendations, 
based on the legal issues identified and analysed, to assist the judiciary, the legislature and 
the legal profession with this new area of technological advancement.  
 
The challenges that the melding of mind and machine through neural interface present at 
law are analysed throughout this thesis. This thesis seeks to provide a substantial 
contribution to the legal literature that is both innovative and pioneering. This new, 
developing field of inquiry provides the opportunity for ground breaking advances in legal 
analysis of the existing legal frameworks that, in particular circumstances, will require re-
evaluation and adaptation. 
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I CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW  
 
A Abstract 
 
Neural interface devices are artificial devices that are controlled by the human mind. The 
research hypothesis tested in this thesis is that when a person who has a neural interface 
device is involved in circumstances where harm to another person or another person’s 
property occurs, the Australian law will require re-evaluation and adaptation to resolve 
subsequent civil action. Complexity will arise because of the existence of the neural interface 
device and what might be regarded as a merging of mind and machine. This will make it 
difficult to determine factual causation and as a result, ‘the law, marching with medicine but 
in the rear and limping a little’,1 will need to adapt to these circumstances. Thomas Kuhn’s 
concept of revolutionary science,2 involving paradigm shift, is applied to determine this 
hypothesis. While doctrinal methodology is applied in the analysis of the law, policy 
considerations that will impact on judicial decision making and legislative action are also 
discussed. Delphi Method research has been undertaken to obtain the insight of legal 
experts regarding the legal issues that will arise in the context of civil disputes and how the 
current law will address these issues. The information upon which the participants in the 
Delphi Method research based their responses purposely excluded malfunction of the neural 
interface device as the law will have most difficulty determining liability when the device does 
not malfunction.  
 
In the analysis of the legal issues, scenarios have been introduced to better assess the 
application of the law and identify the difficulties that will require re-evaluation and adaptation 
of the law. While the facts that arise in disputes differ, identification of the difficulties the 
current law will have in resolving a dispute based on the scenarios presented in this thesis 
will provide insight for future civil proceedings where the person with a neural interface 
device is involved. Throughout this thesis, the person with the neural interface device is 
regarded as a defendant in a civil proceeding. The issues involving neural interface devices 
are multifactorial, so while neuroscientist and engineers develop neural interface devices, 
lawyers, academics and politicians must consider the ethical, legal and social frameworks 
within which innovation can exist and thrive. This thesis concludes with recommendations, 
                                            
1 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383, 395 (Windeyer J). 
2 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (The University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed, 1970). 
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based on the legal issues identified and analysed, to assist the judiciary, the legislature and 
the legal profession with this new area of technological advancement.  
 
B Introduction 
 
The use of prosthetics is not a new medical development, however, the ability of the human 
brain to instruct and control these devices is fast becoming a reality. These new mind-
controlled devices are called neural interface devices. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
words ‘mind’ and ‘brain’ are interchangeable. This is not intended to diminish the different 
factual definitions of both but to incorporate terms that have been reinforced in academic 
authorship on the topic of neural interface.3 With all innovation comes new opportunities, 
new accomplishments and new challenges. For neural interface devices, the degree to 
which the devices are becoming incorporated into the human being may be to the extent 
that melding of mind and machine occurs. As this integration becomes more prevalent, the 
law will experience difficulty in establishing where liability for injury, damage or loss to the 
property or person of another should lie. Determination of whether liability should be placed 
solely on the person with the neural interface device, solely on the manufacturer of the neural 
interface device or shared between the two, will be a challenge within the context of the facts 
of each case. The thesis examines the issues the law will experience as the merging of mind 
and machine becomes an integral part of civil proceedings. For example, causation in a 
negligence action will need to be determined, so the role of both the neural interface device 
and the person’s brain will be important.  
 
The human senses of sight, sound and touch play an integral role in facilitating the 
interaction between people and electronic devices such as computers, scanners and 
multifarious mobile devices.4 ‘But remove those senses from the equation, and electronic 
devices can become our eyes and ears and even our arms and legs, taking in the world 
around us and interacting with it through man-made software and hardware’.5 Dr Jens 
                                            
3 For example, see Ray Kurzweil, ‘The Coming Merging of Mind and Machine’ (2009) Scientific American 
(online) <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/merging-of-mind-and-machine/>; Maartje Schermer, 
‘The Mind and the Machine. On the Conceptual and Moral Implications of Brain-Machine Interaction’ 
(2009) 3 (3)  NanoEthics, 217; Raya Bidshahri, How Will Merging Minds and Machines Change Our 
Conscious Experience? (12 April 2018) SingularityHub< https://singularityhub.com/2018/04/12/how-will-
merging-minds-and-machines-change-our-conscious-experience/>; Lara Fernandez, How brain–computer 
interface is merging mind and machine (2017) Deakin University <https://this.deakin.edu.au/innovation/is-
netflix-shrinking-australias-film-and-television-industry>. 
4 Jens Clausen, ‘Man, machine and in between’ 457 (2009) Nature 1080. 
5 Ibid. 
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Clausen assures us that this has already happened6 and according to Emory University 
Neuroscience Professor, Dr Michael Crutcher, ‘anything can happen’ in this innovative field 
of neurology.7 
 
Neurosurgeon, Eric Leuthardt, said ‘I saw neuroprosthetics in the very early, seminal stages 
and I thought, this is it. This is the future.’8  
 
Leuthardt was not alone. The field was already thick with speculation that scientists could 
craft a neural augment for people with paralysis. In 1998, an Irish researcher named Philip 
Kennedy demonstrated that he could endow a man paralyzed from the neck down with a 
rudimentary control of a computer program. One year later, the German researcher, Niels 
Birbaumer, used EEG to enable similarly impaired patients to control basic word processing 
software, and by 2001 one of the field’s titans, a neuroscientist named John Donoghue, 
cofounded Cyberkinetics, a neurotechnology company aimed at developing commercial 
brain-computer interfaces.9 
 
This field of neurology is different from the advances in robotics where researchers strive to 
make robots more like human beings. In 2011, Professor of Robotics at Carnegie Mellon 
University in Pittsburgh USA, Dr Reid Simmons, stated that ‘in five or ten years robots will 
routinely be functioning in human environments’.10 Commonly known as androids, these 
new generation robots are designed ‘to function not as programmed industrial machines but 
as increasingly autonomous agents capable of taking on roles in our homes, schools, and 
offices previously carried out only by humans’.11  
 
In contrast, neural interface systems include devices that sense brain signals, a signal 
processor or decoder and a device to effect action, in clinical terms - an ‘assistive 
technology’.12 For the purposes of this thesis, a neural interface device composes of a neural 
sensor, decoder and assistive device, as shown in Figure 1.1 below. Neural interface 
                                            
6 Ibid. 
7 Anne Hammock, ‘The future of brain-controlled devices’ CNNTech (4 January 2010) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/12/30/brain.controlled.computers/index.html>. 
8 Malcolm Gay, The Brain Electric (Text Publishing, 2015) 15. 
9 Ibid 15-16. ‘EEG’ means Electroencephalogram. 
10 Chris Carroll, ‘Us. And them’ (2011) 222(8) National Geographic 66, 72. 
11 Ibid. 
12 John P Donoghue, ‘Bridging the Brain to the World: A Perspective on Neural Interface Systems’ (2008) 
60(3) Neuron 511. 
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devices incorporate technology that sense, record and interpret neural activity and then send 
a command to an assistive device such as a computer, neuroprosthetic device, exoskeleton 
which may be attached or to a robot that is separate from the person but is connected by 
thought alone. 
 
Figure 1.1. Design of a Neural Interface Device13 
 
Source: Adapted from John P Donoghue, ‘Bridging the Brain to the World: A Perspective on Neural 
Interface Systems’ (2008) 60(3) Neuron 511, 512. 
This innovative technology is being achieved through brain–computer interface research 
and development. The assistive devices connect with the brain through the nervous system, 
and operate on neural impulses alone, in the absence of muscular or other physical 
movements of the body.14 For the purposes of this thesis, the neural interface device 
integration with the human body is such that communication flows between the brain and 
neural processor that instructs the assistive device. However, the assistive device also 
communicates with the brain by sending information through the neural processor or 
decoder, as outlined in Figure 1.2 and discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
 
                                            
13 Adapted from Donoghue, above n 12, 512. 
14 Alejandra Martins and Paul Rincon, ‘Paraplegic in robotic suit kicks off World Cup’ BBC News (online), 
12 June 2014 <http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-27812218>; Bridie Smith, ‘Human trials for 
Australian-made bionic spine to start next year’ The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 9 February 2016 
<http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/human-trials-for-australianmade-bionic-spine-to-start-next-
year-20160202-gmjqdj.html>. 
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Figure 1.2 Neural Interface System 
 
 
This research examines the civil liability of persons with neural interface devices who 
allegedly cause property damage or personal injury to another. The ability of the law to 
address this currently unique situation will have a fundamental impact on all of those 
concerned with the incident, including society at large. The current law will have difficulty 
resolving the civil liability issues that will arise in these circumstances as the integration of 
neural interface devices with the human mind moves well beyond the current law. Where 
difficulties arise, recommendations for both common law and legislation may assist in 
providing a legal framework in which these innovative devices can be used safely for the 
benefit of those in need.  
 
The thesis is ground breaking as the law has yet to address the civil liability of a person with 
a neural interface device. This is evidenced by the lack of cases and legal literature in the 
area. The legal principles of negligence provide a platform on which to build credible legal 
analysis of liability of individuals with, and manufacturers of, neural interface devices. These 
legal principles will be applied to the current environment in which neural interface devices 
exist. Chapters 4 and 5 provide analysis of negligence and manufacturer liability, 
respectively. In fact, there are a myriad of legal issues that will arise in this field. While 
extensive analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis, chapters 1 and 6 
introduce some of these. Chapter 3 provides the results of Delphi Method research that 
involved engagement with legal experts regarding legal issues in this field.  
 
The contribution to legal literature will be substantial, innovative and pioneering. This new, 
developing field provides the opportunity for ground breaking advances in legal analysis. 
Information sent to the 
processor 
Neural impulses command sent to 
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C This Thesis 
 
1 The Hypothesis  
 
The research hypothesis analysed in this thesis is that when a person who has a neural 
interface device is involved in circumstances where harm to another person or another 
person’s property occurs, the Australian law will require re-evaluation and adaptation to 
resolve subsequent civil action. No assumption is made that the hypothesis is correct and 
the research was undertaken to determine the validity of the hypothesis. 
 
2 The Chosen Theory for Hypothesis Determination 
 
Determination of the research hypothesis requires a test that recognises deviations from the 
norm. For adequate resolution of civil disputes there must be the application of both 
procedural and substantive law to arrive at a determination. The doctrine of precedent 
requires the application of authority to the case at hand, ensuring the court’s decision is 
consistent with the authority and avoiding conflict with existing law. In this way, a paradigm, 
or framework through which knowledge is filtered, develops.15 The common law evolves as 
matters come before the courts that challenge the application of the current law or make it 
difficult for the current law to be as strictly applied. This legal evolution was evident in the 
case of Donoghue v Stevenson (‘Donoghue’).16. In Donoghue, Ms May Donoghue drank 
from a bottle of ginger beer purchased by a friend of hers and manufactured by Mr David 
Stevenson. The bottle, unbeknownst to Ms Donoghue, had a snail in it. Ms Donoghue 
subsequently became ill and took legal action against Mr Stevenson. At that time, the courts 
looked to the existence of a contract when determining if there was a relationship upon which 
a duty of care would arise. There was no contract between Ms Donoghue and Mr Stevenson 
which presented the court with the difficulty of providing a remedy based on the existing law. 
 
In 1932 there was no general principle of duty of care. However, in the opening of his 
Honour’s judgment, Lord Thankerton stated, ‘The action is based on negligence.’17 
                                            
15 Patricia Leavy, Research Design: Quantitative, Qualitative, Mixed Methods, Arts-Based, and Community-
Based Participatory Research Approaches (Guilford Publications, 2017) 11. 
16 [1932] AC 562. 
17 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 601. 
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After summarising Ms Donoghue’s case, Lord Thankerton stated: 
 
There can be no doubt, in my opinion, that equally in the law of Scotland and of England it 
lies upon the party claiming redress in such a case to show that there was some relation of 
duty between her and the defender which required the defender to exercise due and 
reasonable care for her safety. It is not at all necessary that there should be any direct 
contract between them, because the action is not based upon contract, but upon negligence; 
but it is necessary for the pursuer in such an action to show there was a duty owed to her by 
the defender, because a man cannot be charged with negligence if he has no obligation to 
exercise diligence: Kemp & Dougall v. Danakil Coal Co. 1909 SC 1314, 1319 , per Lord 
Kinnear; see also Clelland v. Robb 1911 SC 253, 256, per Lord President Dunedin and Lord 
Kinnear. The question in each case is whether the pursuer has established, or in the stage 
of the present appeal has relevantly averred, such facts as involve the existence of such a 
relation of duty.18 
 
Liability of manufacturers was recognised by the courts in certain clearly-defined cases.19 
Lord Macmillan considered the application of the law giving rise to a duty, as it was at the 
time, and determined that as there was no contractual relation between the manufacturer 
and Ms Donoghue, so a duty would only arise if the circumstances fell into one of the two 
exceptional cases: Whether the ginger beer was inherently dangerous, or whether it was 
known by the manufacturer to be dangerous.20 His Honour then stated the law: 
 
The appellant in the present instance asks that her case be approached as a case of delict, 
not as a case of breach of contract. She does not require to invoke the exceptional cases in 
which a person not a party to a contract has been held to be entitled to complain of some 
defect in the subject-matter of the contract which has caused him harm. The exceptional case 
of things dangerous in themselves, or known to be in a dangerous condition, has been 
regarded as constituting a peculiar category outside the ordinary law both of contract and of 
tort. I may observe that it seems to me inaccurate to describe the case of dangerous things 
as an exception to the principle that no one but a party to a contract can sue on that contract. 
                                            
18 Ibid 602. 
19 Ibid 579-80 (Lord Atkin). For example, Lord Atkin referred to the decision of Brett MR in Heaven v Pender 
(1883) 11 QBD 503, 509. 
20 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 602. 
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I rather regard this type of case as a special instance of negligence where the law exacts a 
degree of diligence so stringent as to amount practically to a guarantee of safety.21 
 
Lord Atkin proposed the neighbour principle, ‘the rule that you are to love your neighbour 
becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour’.22  
 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee 
would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer 
seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought to have 
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or 
omissions which are called in question.23 
 
Lord Atkin considered cases that involved liability for negligence and sought principles from 
the decided cases that could be extended by analogy to provide authority for the finding of 
a remedy for Ms Donoghue.24 The neighbour principle, based on principles that were 
believed to be accepted by society in general,25 provided the basis for the ratio on the liability 
of manufacturers26 upon which the court could award a remedy to Ms Donoghue.  
 
A manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to 
reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility 
of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in 
the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer's life or 
property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.27 
 
Lord Atkin also argued that this was common sense28 and that if no remedy could be 
awarded in circumstances where a manufacturer, through negligence in the manufacture of 
the product, had injured a consumer, then the consumer would have no recourse against 
                                            
21 Ibid 611. 
22 Ibid 580. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid 584-587. 
25 Ibid 583, 599. 
26 Ibid 599. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid 583, 599. 
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anyone.29 Lord Atkin, Lord Thankerton and Lord Macmillan found in favour of Ms Donoghue 
while Lord Buckmaster and Lord Tomkin dissented.  
 
A characteristic of the common law is the binding nature of prior decisions regarding the 
interpretation and application of the law.30 In this way, it could be argued that over time, 
paradigms are developed for the different causes of action and these need to be robust 
because future decisions that may test and apply the paradigms, must ultimately be made 
in the same way as past decisions. Despite the facts of each case being different, the legal 
principles for the relevant cause of action are applied to resolve the dispute.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is argued that the court will experience substantial difficulty 
applying existing legal principles to the new and unique facts of a dispute where the 
defendant has a neural interface device. As a result, the court will need to consider the 
application of the current law to this novel legal issue, like that experienced in Donoghue,31 
where the application of the current law cannot be applied without re-evaluation or 
adaptation of the existing law, or application of a new principle in order for the court to 
provide the remedy it believes is appropriate. While what will occur could not be described 
as a paradigm shift, it will be a development of common law principles applied to 
circumstances not previously envisaged. The House of Lords in Donoghue32 considered the 
issue of duty of care but the analysis of the current law undertaken in this thesis considers 
all elements of negligence and attribution of liability. Determination of the research 
hypothesis requires a theory of reasoning that recognises the effect of tension on existing 
legal principles. For this reason, the theory of revolutionary science as enunciated by 
Thomas Kuhn,33 is applied to the analysis of the legal issues throughout the thesis.  
 
                                            
29 Ibid 582-3. 
30 Alastair MacAdam and John Pyke, Legal Institutions and Method (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2010) 
163 [4.5]. 
31 [1932] AC 562. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Kuhn, above n 2. 
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Law is not science, but Morris Raphael Cohen argued convincingly that the functions of 
deduction in scientific method are prevalent in the law: 
 
First. It enables us to develop the implications of propositions and thus find out their true 
meaning. Knowledge grows most rapidly when we can properly utilize previous knowledge. 
Those who know make the most discoveries. 
 
Second. Deduction helps to make our assumptions explicit and this makes possible a critical 
attitude towards them, and  
 
Third. Deduction enables us to deal, not only with the actual, but with the possible. It thus 
liberates us to explore the field of possibility where there are to be found many things better 
than the actual.34  
 
Cohen states that, for example, ‘A deductive system which enables us to derive many legal 
rules from a few principles makes the law more certain, so that people can better know their 
rights.’35 However, unlike science that can ‘suspend judgment where adequate knowledge 
is wanting, the law is under the necessity of making immediate decisions.’36  
 
When describing normal science, as opposed to revolutionary science, Kuhn stated that a 
network of commitments - conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and methodological, 
encourages the scientist to further articulate the theories being challenged by ‘pockets of 
apparent disorder’.37 This network of commitments ‘is a principal source of the metaphor 
that relates normal science to puzzle-solving.’38 Kuhn recognised that rules within a 
specialisation may have shortcomings but ‘rules, I suggest, derive from paradigms, but 
paradigms can guide research even in the absence of rules.’39 Kuhn then identifies crises 
that are results anomalous to the applicable paradigm. He believes that these crises ‘are a 
necessary precondition for the emergence of novel theories.’40  
 
                                            
34 Morris Raphael Cohen, ‘Law and Scientific Method’ in Scott Brewer (ed), Scientific Models of Legal 
Reasoning (Routledge, 2013) 231, 235. 
35 Ibid 236. 
36 Ibid 239. 
37 Kuhn, above n 2, 42. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid 77. 
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In response to these crises and their impact on the current paradigm, Kuhn states in respect 
of scientists that:  
 
Though they may begin to lose faith and then to consider alternatives, they do not renounce 
the paradigm that has led them into crisis … The act of judgment that leads scientists to reject 
a previously accepted theory is always based upon more than a comparison of that theory 
with the world. The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to 
accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both 
paradigms with nature and with each other.41 
 
Over time, the anomalies become fully congruent within the new paradigm.42 Kuhn regarded 
the long period of time it took before there was acceptance of Newton’s laws of motion and 
gravitation by scientists as examples of the time required for the paradigm to be universally 
accepted.43 
 
When, for these reasons or others like them, an anomaly comes to seem more than just 
another puzzle of normal science, the transition to crisis and to extraordinary science has 
begun. The anomaly itself now comes to be more generally recognized as such by the 
profession. More and more attention is devoted to it by more and more of the field’s most 
eminent men.44 
 
Within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships 
one with the other ... What had previously been meant by space was necessarily flat, 
homogeneous, isotropic, and unaffected by the presence of matter. If it had not been, 
Newtonian physics would not have worked. To make the transition to Einstein’s universe, the 
whole conceptual web whose strands are space, time, matter, force, and so on, had to be 
shifted and laid down again on nature whole.45 
 
This process of paradigm shift is the essence of revolutionary science. Revolutionary 
science involves the existence of an accepted paradigm, the occurrence of anomalies that 
conflict with the paradigm giving rise to a crisis that requires the acceptance of a new 
                                            
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid 77-8. 
43 Ibid 78. 
44 Ibid 82. 
45 Ibid 149. 
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paradigm.46 Legal reasoning is not identical to scientific method, however, the application of 
the concept of revolutionary science will enable a determination of whether the current law 
will be challenged when applied to a civil dispute where the defendant has a neural interface 
device. The difficulty in applying the current law may result in, what Kuhn regards as, a crisis 
and this may in turn require acceptance of new law. In determining the research hypothesis, 
the theory of revolutionary science was applied. 
 
3 Methodology 
 
The methodology conducted in the thesis engaged both doctrinal research methodology47 
and empirical research methodology using a systematic, interactive forecasting technique 
known as the Delphi Method.  
 
(a) Doctrinal Research  
 
The research undertook a thorough review of the literature. There is substantial literature 
about the legal principles of negligence, including manufacturer liability, but there is no 
discussion of these legal principles in the context of neural interface devices. The thesis 
examines the civil legal issues that arise in connection with the use of neural interface 
devices by focussing on negligence.  
 
Taking the legal proposition that the conventional application of the law of negligence is 
inadequate to fully resolve civil liability issues with neural interface devices, the doctrinal 
research has provided a methodological explanation of the rules governing these areas of 
law, an analysis of the relationship between these rules, an explanation of the areas of 
difficulty and insight into future changes in the law to accommodate neural interface 
innovation.  
 
This approach included legal analysis of authoritative decisions, legislation and secondary 
material. The principal jurisdiction considered was Australia and where relevant, the analysis 
included the United States of America, Canada and the United Kingdom because a 
                                            
46 Ibid 208. 
47 Pearce D, Campbell E and Harding D, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (AGPS, 1987), [9.10] – [9.15].  
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comparative analysis of these common law jurisdictions is in keeping with Australian courts’ 
recognition of these decisions as persuasive.48  
 
The literature enabled the research to:  
 
• Identify a specific neural interface device or range of devices that exist or are currently 
being researched and developed.  
• Investigate the legal issues that arise in the use of neural interface devices.  
• Examine judgments that have resolved disputes based on these issues or analogous 
issues. 
• Determine the degree to which the current law can adequately resolve these issues, 
in particular, liability where the device and human element are virtually 
indistinguishable. 
• Where the legal issue cannot be completely resolved within the current legal 
framework, suggest changes that will assist in the resolution of the legal issue. 
• Determine the extent to which manufacturers of neural interface devices can 
minimise their liability for adverse events. 
 
The relevant literature has been included in the analysis provided in each chapter. 
(b) The Delphi Method Research 
 
The Delphi Method was used to provide the doctrinal research analysis with some 
verification. The Delphi Method research was used as a qualitative, community based 
participatory technique49 to predict the legal issues that will arise and the possible solutions 
to those issues in the context of civil proceedings when there is a combination of human 
being and neural interface device. The Delphi Method research was an effective way of 
benefiting from the knowledge and judgment of legal experts in the judiciary, legal profession 
and university law schools without seeking statistical validity as required by quantitative 
                                            
48 Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘Global Influences on the Australian Judiciary’ (Paper presented at the 
Australian Bar Association Conference, Paris, 8 July 2002) 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/gleesoncj/cj_global.htm>; Kit Barker 
et al, The Law of Torts in Australia (Oxford University Press, 5th edition, 2012), 14 (in relation to UK 
decisions). 
49 Leavy, above n 15, 20-21. 
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research techniques.50 The Delphi Method research undertaken, by its very nature, was 
original and the results are provided and analysed in chapter 3.  
 
Norman Dalkey of the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California developed the Delphi 
Method in the 1950s for use in a United States commissioned military project51 that was then 
used and analysed in further research which he undertook.52 The method elicits and refines 
group judgments based on the rationale that ‘two heads are better than one … when the 
issue is one where exact knowledge is not available.’53 Linstone and Turoff define the Delphi 
Method as ‘a method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is 
effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem.’54 
From their vast experience in using the Delphi Method at the University of Calgary in 
Canada, Skulmoski and Hartman have witnessed how the method has ‘evolved into a 
flexible research method’ making it an appropriate mechanism for a wide variety of 
research.55 Skulmoski and Hartman are of the opinion that the ‘Delphi Method works 
especially well when the goal is to improve our understanding of problems, opportunities, 
solutions, or to develop forecasts.’56 They have recorded many research projects that used 
the Delphi Method, including one ‘to identify the principle legal issues facing the computer 
forensics discipline within the Australian context.’57  
 
The Delphi Method research undertaken is provided in chapter 3. In summary, a ‘stimulus’, 
that is, the information provided to participants to ensure the legal experts would understand 
the research questions sufficiently to accurately address the issues was developed. In 
                                            
50 Harold A Linstone and Murray Turoff, ‘Introduction’ in Harold A Linstone and Murray Turoff (eds) The 
Delphi Method: Techniques and Application (Linstone and Turoff, 2002) v, 4. 
51 Gregory Skulmoski and Francis Hartman, ‘The Delphi Method for Graduate Research’ (2007) 6 Journal of 
Information Technology for Education 1, 2. 
52 Norman Dalkey, The Delphi Method: An Experimental Study of Group Opinion (The Rand Corporation, 
1969). 
53 Ibid v. 
54 Linstone and Turoff, above n 50, 3. 
55 Skulmoski and Hartman, above n 51, 1. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid 7. That project was Angela Brungs and Rodger Jamieson, ‘Identification of legal issues for computer 
forensics’ (2005) 22(2) Information Systems Management 57. In addition, the Delphi Method has been used 
in the following legal research: Chris Evans, ‘Unravelling the mysteries of the oracle: using the Delphi 
methodology to inform the personal tax reform debate in Australia’ (2007) 5(1) eJournal of Tax Research, 
105; Chris Evans, Professor of Taxation at the University of New South Wales was successful in obtaining a 
2007-08, ARC Linkage International (Delphi study) (with B Tran-Nam and R Bird); Glenn Ross and Bernie 
Tucker, Inquiry into law enforcement integrity models 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/aclei_ctte/completed_inquiries/2008_10/lawenf
mod/submissions/sub015_pdf.ashx>. 
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Round 1 of the Delphi Method research, participants were provided with the stimulus and 
asked specific questions. The participants provided answers to those questions and 
identified the legal issues that would arise. The participants also anticipated how the current 
law would resolve the legal issues they had identified. In Round 2, participants were 
provided with the legal issues identified by the participants in Round 1 and they allocated 
some value of importance to each of the legal issues.  
 
The results of the Delphi Method research provided a foundation upon which legal analysis 
was undertaken58 and provide a valuable contribution to knowledge in this rapidly evolving 
field. 
 
4 The Framework of this Thesis 
 
The foundation upon which the analysis in this thesis is built is the current Australian law, 
both common law and legislation, and the operation of neural interface devices. There are 
other legal issues introduced in this chapter that might arise but are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. These are strict liability, discrimination, privacy, data protection and wireless 
interception. Chapter 2 examines the technical aspects of neural interface devices while 
chapter 3 deals with the Delphi Method research undertaken where legal experts provide 
insight to the legal issues that will arise with the use of neural interface devices and the ways 
the law could address these issues. The civil liability principles of negligence, including 
manufacturer liability, are examined in relation to the development and use of neural 
interface devices and are analysed in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 provides 
recommendations and, like chapter 1, introduces further research opportunities beyond the 
scope of this thesis. These are neuroethics, neurolaw and neuroscientific evidence. For the 
purposes of the thesis, the person with the neural interface device is taken to be a defendant 
in all the causes of action. This enables the applicable legal principles to be applied to the 
person with the neural interface device to determine whether or not liability can be 
established. In circumstances where the manufacturer of the neural interface device might 
also be a defendant, attribution of liability is considered. Particular scenarios involving a 
person with a neural interface device are provided to assist in applying the current law to 
the dispute, consequently in determining the research hypothesis. A more comprehensive 
introduction to the contents of each chapter follows. 
                                            
58 See chapters 4 and 5. 
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Chapter 2 examines the technology underlying the operation of neural interface devices and 
their limitations, both of which impact on the application of the current law. Chapter 2 
explains how the human brain communicates with every part of the body by sending neural 
impulses through the central nervous system. Chapter 2 also explains that neural interface 
devices include a technical system that enables the recording of neural impulse, 
interpretation by a neural processor or decoder of what the brain is asking the specific body 
part to do and then the neural processor instructs the assistive device, such as an artificial 
neuroprosthetic limb, to operate in the way the brain intended.59 In advanced neural interface 
devices the neural processor or decoder can also interpret feedback from the assistive 
device and communicate this feedback to the brain.60 The recording and interpretation of 
neural impulses can be done through a sensor that is either placed inside the body through 
invasive surgery, such as a brain implant,61 or applied to the outside of the body, such as a 
peripheral electromyography sensor.62  
 
A neural impulse is targeted communication from the brain to a specific body part. It is not 
muscle movement in an arm, for example, that is being interpreted but the neural impulse 
to the body part. The neural impulses sent from the brain are sensed at the nerve endings 
in the arm.  
 
Neural interface devices such as the bionic eye or bionic ear, pictured below in Figures 1.5 
and 1.8, respectively, send information to the brain through the nervous system to enable 
the person to see or hear more clearly. Advanced neuroprosthetic limbs send sensory 
messages to the brain that enable the person to pick up objects without damaging the object. 
Communication from the neural processor to the assistive device occurs either by direct 
wiring or wirelessly. Wireless connectivity might enable the person greater freedom to move 
and is necessary to communicate with a robotic exoskeleton, for example, the Bionic Spine 
shown in Figure 1.7. The interpretation of neural impulse by the neural processor or decoder 
is a complex, scientific process that is yet to be fully mastered,63 so this will impact on liability 
                                            
59 See Figure 1.1. Design of a Neural Interface Device. 
60 See Figure 3.2 Neural Interface System. 
61 For example, BrainGate Co, About BrainGate (2018) <https://www.braingate.org/about-braingate/>. 
62 Biometrics Limited, Surface EMG (2015) 
<http://www.biometricsltd.com/semg.htm?gclid=CN763taZ49UCFY8kvQodteUHBA>. 
63 Warren M Grill, Sharon E Norman and Ravi V Bellamkonda, ‘Implanted Neural Interfaces: Biochallenges 
and Engineered Solutions’ (2009) 11 Annual Review of Biomedical Engineering 1, 10. 
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in civil proceedings such as negligence.64 However, development will help to avoid 
misinterpretation of neural impulses and the resulting unwanted action. 
 
There will be more opportunities for the connection of the human brain with neuroprosthetic 
and robotic devices in the future. There are many other neural interface devices that are 
now being used and outcomes of research efforts may produce many more including the 
development of vision prosthesis using lasers.65  
 
Such sophisticated technology and integration of machine with the human body raise legal 
issues. Clausen believes that ‘[m]elding brain and machine makes the latter an integral part 
of the individual’.66 Søren Holm and Teck Chuan Voo believe that legal issues arise if it 
becomes impossible to distinguish between the will of the person and the operation of the 
technology, where the natural neural system assimilates with the technology.67 This thesis 
contributes to the sparse amount of literature on legal liability in this area of technological 
innovation. 
 
In chapter 3, the Delphi Method research, as discussed above,68 provides the platform for 
the legal analysis undertaken69 by seeking insight from legal experts in the judiciary, the 
legal profession and university law schools throughout Australia.70 This original research 
provides outcomes that inform the analysis in chapters 4 and 5 and adds support to 
recommendations advanced in chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses the application of the three elements of negligence: Duty of care, breach 
and damage, to a person with a neural interface device. The research considers whether 
neural interface devices and their incorporation with the human body is so radically different 
or unique from other circumstances previously considered by the courts, that the law should 
recognise a different or unique application of the law of negligence. Of particular interest is 
                                            
64 Mijail Serruya and John Donoghue, ‘Design Principles of a Neuromotor Prosthetic Device’ in Kenneth W 
Horch and Gurpreet S Dhillon (eds), Neuroprothetics: Theory and Practice (World Scientific Publishing Co, 
2004) 1158, 1158. 
65 Brad Collis, ‘Bionic eye hope from a touch of light’ (2011) July Swinburne 16, 16. This research is 
undertaken by researchers at Swinburne University of Technology. 
66 Clausen, above n 4, 1080. 
67 Søren Holm and Teck Chuan Voo, ‘Brain-Machine Interfaces and Personal Responsibility for Action – 
Maybe Not As Complicated After All’ (2010) 4(3) Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology, Article 7, 2-3. 
68 Under the heading ‘(b) The Delphi Method Research’. 
69 See chapters 4 and 5. 
70 See chapter 3. 
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the standard of care when determining whether there has been a breach of the duty of care 
and factual causation71.  
 
The analysis considers whether the standard of care applied to the person with a neural 
interface device will be different from that applied to a person without such a device. Civil 
Liability Legislation72 now provides the factors that are used to establish the standard of care 
reflecting what, in common law, is that of a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in the 
same, or similar, circumstances.73 The standard of care of a person with a neural interface 
device, analysed in chapter 4,74 might ultimately be:  
 
(a) Higher than that for a person without such a device because of the expertise that 
might be necessary to facilitate the safe use of the neural interface device, that is, 
the user has undertaken extensive training in the operation of the neural interface 
device;  
 
(b) The same as a person without such a device (in an environment where the 
existence of the neural interface device might not be known so the individual should 
be regarded as a reasonable person without the device); or  
 
(c) Lower than that for a person without such a device - but this creates problems for 
the public so there would need to be compelling reasons for this change. 
 
The impact of Civil Liability Legislation on negligence in the context of a person with a neural 
interface device is considered throughout chapter 4.75 Whether or not the inference of 
negligence (res ipsa loquitur) applies when the defendant is a person with a neural interface 
                                            
71 See analysis in chapter 4 under the headings ‘1 Standard of Care’ and ‘1 Factual Causation’, respectively. 
72 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) (‘CLWACT’); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (‘CLANSW’); Civil Liability 
Act 2003 (Qld) (‘CLAQ’); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) (‘CLAS’); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) (‘CLAT’); 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) (‘WAVIC’); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) (‘CLAWA’); (‘Civil Liability Legislation’). The 
Northern Territory does not have similar legislation but the Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 
(NT) applies to personal injuries. The Long Title states ‘An Act to modify the law relating to the entitlement to 
damages for personal injuries, to clarify principles of contributory negligence, to fix reasonable limits on 
certain awards of damages for personal injuries, to provide for periodic payments of damages for personal 
injuries, and for related purposes.’ 
73 Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448, 454; Bolton v Stone [1951 AC 850, 860; Paris v Stepney 
Borough Council [1951 AC 367, 384. See also Carolyn Sappideen, and Prue Vines, (eds), Fleming’s The 
Law of Torts (Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia, 10th edition, 2011), 123 [7.10]. 
74 See under the heading ‘1 Standard of Care’. 
75 Particularly under the heading ‘B Statutory Modification of the Common Law’. 
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device is discussed76 and thorough analysis on the determination of causation is also 
provided.77 The complexity of ascertaining whether or not the cause of the accident was 
solely that of the individual or of the neural interface device is explored. It is recognised that 
the courts will have difficulty establishing the degree to which the neural interface device 
can be attributed to the injury because of its integration with the brain of the person. For this 
reason, the issue of liability of the manufacturers of these devices and attribution of liability 
between the person and the manufacturer of the device is considered in chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 5 analyses manufacturer liability with respect to neural interface devices. This 
includes analysis of the product certification process through the law administered by the 
Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA).78 The research examines the extent to which the 
certification obligations will impact on attribution of liability to the manufacturers of neural 
interface devices and the recipients of these devices. Chapter 5 also considers manufacturer 
liability if the neural interface device is considered to operate beyond what is traditionally 
regarded as a tool.79 
 
Chapter 6 presents the determination of the research hypothesis. Informed by the 
discussion, analysis and findings in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, it comprises of recommendations 
to assist in the application of the common law and legislation in the resolution of civil 
proceedings involving a party with a neural interface device. Recommendations regarding 
neural interface accreditation by the TGA are also provided. Chapter 6 also acknowledges 
that there are a vast number of legal, ethical and public policy issues that are beyond the 
scope of this thesis but provides an introduction to further research opportunities in 
neurolaw, neuroethics and neuroscientific evidence. 
 
D Other Considerations Outside the Scope of this Thesis 
 
Australia is the jurisdiction upon which the current law is assessed. While other common law 
jurisdictions have been considered where appropriate, the outcomes of the research are 
applicable solely to the Australian jurisdiction. It is anticipated that other common law 
jurisdictions will be able to draw some value from this thesis where similar law exists. 
                                            
76 See chapter 4 under the heading ‘4 Whether the Inference of Negligence (res ipsa loquitur) Applies’. 
77 See chapter 4 under the heading ‘D Causation’. 
78 See under the heading ‘1 TGA Approval’. 
79 See under the heading ‘2 Neural Interface Device Beyond Being a Tool’. 
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The research focusses on the civil liability of a person with, and where appropriate, the 
manufacturer of, a neural interface device. Those involved in the training of a person with 
the neural interface device or those who may impact on the effective operation of the device 
are identified but not included in the analysis. Product liability80 through the application of 
the Australian Consumer Law (ACL)81 is also excluded as manufacturer liability is analysed 
where the neural interface device operates as it should without any safety defect or 
malfunction. The research focussed on the neural interface device working according to the 
manufacturer’s specifications as this provides a more compelling analysis than one that 
involves malfunction of the device. For this reason, malfunction or a safety defect is 
expressly excluded in the Delphi Method research.  
 
Ethical considerations will impact on the medical profession when neural interface devices 
are sought by individuals to enhance human abilities. There may be many other ethical 
considerations that arise with respect to the provision and use of neural interface devices 
but these fall outside the scope of this thesis.82 It is acknowledged that the civil causes of 
action examined in this thesis are determined by the courts in a very fact specific 
environment and so outcomes of legal analysis using the scenarios selected will be limited 
in application to civil disputes. The outcomes of this thesis will, however, provide insight and 
recommendations that will assist the resolution of civil disputes where the defendant has a 
neural interface device.  
 
Neural interface devices differ in construction and operation so the specificity of the neural 
interface device considered in legal analysis throughout the thesis, and the Delphi Method 
research, is grounded in the fundamental, operational characteristics of neural interface 
devices that interpret neural impulse and communicate feedback to the brain. It is 
acknowledged that the specific technical attributes of the neural interface device involved in 
the dispute will be of importance in determination of liability, but the legal analysis 
undertaken in this thesis will assist future investigations.  
 
The assistive device that constitutes part of a neural interface device might be robotic but 
the analysis of robotics is beyond the scope of this thesis. The primary focus of analysis is 
                                            
80 See explanation in chapter 5 under the heading ‘A Introduction’. 
81 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (‘Australian Consumer Law’). 
82 See the introduction of neuroethics in chapter 6 under the heading ‘1 Neuroethics’. 
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the neural interface aspect of the neural interface device as it is the interpretation of neural 
impulse by the decoder, the resulting instructions sent to the assistive device and the 
feedback provided to the brain from the device that will be of primary importance in 
determining liability for harm. While interfacing with an external computer or robot is 
possible, the focus of the thesis is on neural interface devices that are fully integrated with 
the human body to the extent that they no longer exist as a separate and independent 
device. It is upon this basis that existing law regarding tools, which are not integrated with 
the human body, cannot be adequately or appropriately applied. It is acknowledged that the 
operation of robots through neural impulse, including the degree of autonomous functionality 
that the robot possesses, will present further facts that might be considered in future civil 
disputes. However, these types of robots are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Although doctrinal methodology was applied in the legal analysis, policy considerations were 
introduced where relevant. It is acknowledged that while judicial reasoning often includes 
policy considerations, application of the established legal principles ensures the courts are 
resolving disputes on the basis of legal principles. The policy considerations discussed will 
also inform the legislature, however, the analysis of policy considerations in the context of 
political implications is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Finally, the legal issues arising with neural interface devices include negligence, and 
manufacturer liability, are analysed in chapters 4 and 5, respectively. However, there are a 
number of other issues that are beyond the scope of this thesis. These issues include 
changes to the legislative framework that impact on neural interface devices with respect to 
strict liability, compulsory third party insurance, discrimination, data protection, privacy and 
wireless interception. These legal issues were considered early in the research and, despite 
them being beyond the scope of this thesis, a summary of these issues highlights the 
breadth of impact neural interface devices will have on different areas of law. The summary 
also provides insight into the opportunity for future research. 
 
1 Strict Liability  
 
Strict liability has traditionally been applied in situations where the activity being undertaken 
is seen to present extraordinary risk to others but society decides to tolerate the activity ‘on 
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condition that it pays its way regardless of whether it is carried out with due care or not’.83 
However, Sappideen and Vines believe strict liability has been, and remains, ‘unorganised 
and fragmentary in application’, as the Australian courts have ‘openly endorsed it only in 
cases where the non-negligent creation of risk arises from an abnormal activity’.84 Activities 
for which strict liability has been applied include product liability,85 aviation86 and dangerous 
things that escape such as electricity,87 gas,88 oil,89 fire explosives90 and acid smuts91. 
Workers’ compensation and road accidents are the dominant areas of activity in which strict 
liability is applied through legislation.92  
 
While it could be argued that the integration of a neural interface device with a human being 
is currently abnormal, it is difficult to conclude that a person living and moving with such a 
device is actually engaged in abnormal activity. Consequently, strict liability is unlikely to be 
applied to such a person unless it is in unison with compulsory third party liability insurance, 
as is the case with motor vehicles.93 
 
Despite strict liability being beyond the scope of this thesis, inference of negligence94 is 
considered in chapter 4 in the analysis of negligence and neural interface devices. 
 
2 Compulsory Third Party Insurance 
 
In recognition of the possible dangers in the use of neural interface devices, as discussed 
in chapters 2 and 4, parliament might consider introducing legislation requiring persons with 
these devices to obtain compulsory third party liability insurance.95 This would be to protect 
                                            
83 Sappideen and Vines, above n 73, 380 [14.20].  
84 Ibid 381 [14.20].  
85 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). 
86 Damage by Aircraft Act 1999 (Cth). 
87 Eastern & S African Telegraph v Cape Town Tramways [1902] AC 381. 
88 Batcheller v Tunbridge Wells Gas Co (1901) 84 LT 765. 
89 Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Cth); Smith v Gt W Rly (1926) 135 LT 112. 
90 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones (1994) 179 CLR 520. 
91 Halsey v Esso Petroleum [1961] 1 WLR 683. See also Sappideen and Vines, above n 73, 390 [15.30]. 
92 Each State and Territory throughout Australia has workers compensation and motor vehicle accident 
legislation. See also, Sappideen and Vines, above n 73, 381 [14.20]; 382-91 [14.30]-[15.30].  
93 Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510, [129], [130], [180], [181] (Kirby J). 
94 Res ipsa loquitur. See chapter 4 under the heading ‘4 Whether the Inference of Negligence (res ipsa 
loquitur) Applies’. 
95 Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510, [129], [130], [180], [181] (Kirby J). 
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the public from damage or injury caused to their property or person, similar to the compulsory 
third party insurance required of motor vehicle owners. If this was to happen throughout 
Australia, it could be argued, as Kirby J in Imbree v McNeilly (Imbree)96 did, that the 
legislation is to inform the content of the common law rule when deciding that the person’s 
standard of care to the public. 
 
The latter invite attention to the statutory context in which the common law duty of care owed 
by a driver on a public road in Australia falls to be defined. That context includes the universal 
operation of compulsory third party insurance of broad similarity operating throughout the 
nation. It is well past time, in this special context, that this reality should be acknowledged as 
affecting the existence and content of the duty of care owed by the driver of a motor vehicle 
to others reliant on that driver’s skill.97 
 
Third party insurance was raised by two of the legal experts in the Delphi Method research 
and is subsequently mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, however, full analysis of public policy 
factors, coherency of the law, indeterminate liability and social utility, that might influence 
the court’s consideration of this type of insurance, is not undertaken.  
 
3 Discrimination 
 
The objects of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)98 are to protect individuals from 
discrimination on the basis of their disability. The legislation ensures that persons with 
disabilities have the same fundamental rights as the rest of the community. ‘Disability’ is 
defined to include loss of physical and mental functions99 within which a person with a neural 
interface device would be included. Even if it could be argued that the person with a neural 
interface device no longer has the physical disability, the definition ensures that the disability 
includes one that has ‘previously existed but no longer exists’.100  
 
Disability also includes a condition that ‘is imputed to a person’. A person with a neural 
interface device could be considered to have a disability because the device is not a 
biological part of the human body and may not function in the identical manner as the body 
                                            
96 Ibid 549 [129], 549 [130], 563-4 [180] and 564 [181]. 
97 Ibid 564 [181]. 
98 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 3. 
99 Ibid s 4. 
100 Ibid s 4(i) under the definition of Disability. 
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party it is replacing.101 Behaviour of a person with a neural interface device that is a 
‘symptom or manifestation’ of having the device is regarded as a disability.102  
 
On the basis of having a disability, a person with a neural interface device might be 
discriminated against in many and varied environments and circumstances, including sport, 
work but analysis regarding discrimination is beyond the scope of the thesis. Further 
research could be undertaken to explore the role of governments to ensure compliance with 
anti-discrimination legislation. This could include communication to employers, sporting 
organisations and the public informing of the operation of neural interface devices and the 
ways in which those individuals with the devices can be ensured freedom from 
discrimination. In addition, people who are seeking to obtain these innovative neural 
interface devices might also experience discrimination in breach of the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) but analysis regarding this discrimination is beyond the scope 
of the thesis. Further research could be undertaken to examine the impact on compliance 
with anti-discrimination legislation if the government were to monitor the particulars of 
individuals who seek to receive neural interface devices ensuring that restrictions on receipt 
of the device are solely on legally valid grounds, such as age and capacity to give informed 
consent. 
 
4 Data Protection/Privacy 
 
Neural interface devices will interpret commands from the person in the form of neural 
impulses which will be matched to previously recorded and coded instructions. The 
technology involved is discussed in chapter 2. The recording of the instructions and 
operation of the device will be retained to enable the developers to monitor the use of the 
neural interface device. The developer might use this data to refine the accuracy of the 
device in interpreting the commands sent to the device by the person and improve the 
technology in future development. 
 
The permitted uses of the data collected from the device should be carefully considered and 
it may be necessary to ensure that consent for the use of that data has been received from 
the person with the neural interface device. The data would be regarded as personal 
                                            
101 Ibid s 4(k) under the definition of Disability. 
102 Ibid s 4. 
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information as it is recording the actions of the person.103 This in turn is recording how a 
person is living and moving.  
 
For example, through the use of a mobile phone and other GPS devices it is now possible 
to track the location of persons with Alzheimer's disease and dementia and to chart their 
movement over a period of time.104 Similar technology is being used to track different bodily 
functions in order to better treat people with conditions such as epilepsy and diabetes.105 An 
examination of the data may provide a deep insight into the life of the person with the device. 
Significant privacy concerns arise, and where this data is viewed by individuals other than 
those who require it for the treatment of the person with the device or improvement of the 
device, unintended consequences might occur. For example, the data may be used by 
marketers, health insurance providers, law enforcement and others in a way that may 
compromise the privacy and rights of the person with the neural interface device. Therefore, 
consent from the neural interface device recipient should be required in any agreement that 
deals with the supply, maintenance and replacement of the device regarding: 
 
• Access to the information in the device. 
• The ways in which the information in the device can be used. 
• The organisations and individuals to whom the information in the device can be 
provided. 
• The specific information that can be provided to other organisations and individuals. 
 
Not only is there a question of who accesses the data stored in the neural interface device 
but how it is accessed and what use is made of the information. In addition, incidental 
disclosure of private information, unintended data leaks and malicious data theft pose 
threats to privacy of the person with a neural interface device.106 Further research could be 
                                            
103 Personal information is defined in Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6: 
Information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable: 
(a) whether the information or opinion is true or not; and 
(b) whether the information or opinion is recorded in a material form or not. 
104 Alzheimer’s Australia, Tracking and Monitoring Devices (27 July 2017) 
<https://www.fightdementia.org.au/files/NATIONAL/documents/GPS-tracking-and-monitoring-devices.pdf>. 
105 Epilepsy Foundation, The Role of Seizure Alerts (10 April 2015) 
<http://www.epilepsy.com/learn/impact/mortality/sudep/role-seizure-alerts>. Dario Health, Dario Blood 
Glucose Management System (2018) <http://intro.mydario.net.au/?gclid=CLa3tfmO-NMCFdWkvQod6-
4FYg>. 
106 Marcello Ienca, ‘Brain Machine Interfaces, Artificial Intelligence and Neurorights’ (2017) 3 BrainInsight 
<https://brain.ieee.org/newsletter/2017-issue-3/brain-machine-interfaces-artificial-intelligence-neurorights/>. 
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undertaken to assess the issues of access to, and use of, information stored in neural 
interface devices and whether this should be prohibited, subject to compliance with the 
Australian Privacy Principles107 and the consent from the neural interface device recipient. 
Following the work of Professor Jack Balkin of Yale Law School, the possible recognition of 
the existence of a fiduciary duty owed to the recipient of the device by those who have 
access to the information in a neural interface device could also be examined.108 
 
5 Wireless Interception 
 
The technical operation of a neural interface device is discussed in chapter 2. The neural 
impulse is recorded and decoded by the neural processor that then sends instructions to the 
assistive device, such as a neuroprosthetic arm. Privacy issues may also arise if the 
instructions being sent from the neural processor to the assistive device can be intercepted 
wirelessly. It may also occur if the neural interface device has been incorporated into the 
human body through the use of invasive surgery, in a procedure similar to the implantation 
of a heart pacemaker, and where the neural processor can be monitored or altered 
wirelessly. For example, the Cochlear Baha 4 Sound Processor is a wireless-enabled, fully 
programmable head-worn digital sound processor for the Baha Implantable Bone 
Conduction Hearing System.109 
 
The interception of telecommunication signals by carrier services are controlled by the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth). The interception of wireless communication between 
a neural processor and assistive device could constitute a carriage service under the Act if 
the communication is regarded as electromagnetic energy.110 Through the wireless 
communication with the assistive device, a third party may be able to control the movement 
of the neural interface device independent from the person to whom the device is connected. 
This may result in unwanted, unnecessary or dangerous activity for which the person with 
the neural interface device should not be held accountable. Manufacturers should 
endeavour to provide security and to restrict such access, however, this may not always be 
possible so protection mechanisms, such as emergency shutdown or shut off may be 
                                            
107 The Australian Privacy Principles are contained in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1. 
108 Jack Balkin, ‘Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment’ (2016) 49(4) UC Davis Law Review 1183. 
109 Australian Government, Prostheses List 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/health-privatehealth-prostheseslist.htm>.  
110 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 7. 
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incorporated in the neural interface device. Analysis of wireless interception in the operation 
of neural interface devices is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 highlights research being undertaken including a National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) grant that has been provided to Dr Leigh Hochberg to develop the wireless capabilities 
of a neural interface device, BrainGate, discussed below.111 Further research could be 
pursued to examine the possibility that the neural interface device incorporated into the 
human body through invasive surgery might be able to be monitored or altered wirelessly. 
That research could consider specific legislative provisions to prohibit the unauthorised 
interception of wireless communication in a neural interface system, an advanced concept 
of hacking. 
 
E Application of this Thesis 
 
The application of this thesis will be most significant when a dispute comes before the court 
and the defendant has a neural interface device. Contribution to the knowledge in the 
application of the current law to this developing technology will assist the courts, the legal 
profession and the legislature to anticipate re-evaluation and adaptation of the current law 
to enable resolution of disputes. Neural interface devices are becoming a reality, as the 
following examples confirm, and it is only a matter of time before a civil action is commenced 
against a person with a neural interface device.  
 
The creation of ‘neurotechnologies to evaluate and treat nervous system disorders and to 
restore lost neural functions’ is occurring ‘at the intersection of neuroscience, computer 
science, engineering and medicine’.112 There are a broad range of neural interface devices 
being developed, each modified to the task of utilising neural impulses to command an 
assistive device. One neural interface device, which is currently undergoing clinical trials in 
the United States, is a brain implant called BrainGate, see Figure 1.3.113 BrainGate has been 
developed for people who cannot move or communicate. The technology upon which this 
                                            
111 David Orenstein, Brown, partners earn NIH BRAIN grant for wireless neural interfaces (9 October 2015) 
News from Brown <https://news.brown.edu/articles/2015/10/braingategrant>. 
112 John P Donoghue, above n 12. 
113 BrainGate Co, Thought (2009) <http://www.braingate.com/thought/>. 
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neural interface device was created is the ‘ability to sense, transmit, analyse and apply the 
language of neurons.’114  
 
Figure 1.3 BrainGate’s Neural Sensor115 
 
Source: Allison McCann, Mind Over Matter: Envisioning a World of Thought-Controlled Computing 
(2012) Scienceline <http://scienceline.org/2012/01/mind-over-matter/>. 
 
BrainGate enables individuals who cannot move to use a computer or control a wheelchair, 
telephone and many other assistive devices using thought alone.116 For example, in 
research, captured in Figure 1.4, a recipient of BrainGate could direct a modular prosthetic 
arm known as ‘Mobius Bionics’ LUKE117 arm’ (LUKE arm) and a robotic arm (DLR 
                                            
114 Ibid. 
115 Allison McCann, Mind Over Matter: Envisioning a World of Thought-Controlled Computing (2012) 
Scienceline <http://scienceline.org/2012/01/mind-over-matter/>. 
116 Office of Media Relations, Brown University, ‘Brown Scientist John P. Donoghue Wins Major 
Neuroscience Award’ (Press Release, 20 August 2007) 
<http://news.brown.edu/pressreleases/2007/08/neuroscience-award>. 
117 Mobius Bionics, The LUKE Arm (2018) <http://www.mobiusbionics.com/>. 
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Lightweight Robotic Arm)118 to grasp a cup enabling the person to drink coffee in the way 
she had not been able to do since becoming paralysed fourteen years earlier.119 
 
Figure 1.4 BrainGate and the DLR Lightweight Robotic ArmOperating in Unison120 
 
Source: Leigh R Hochberg et al, ‘Reach and Grasp by People with Tetraplegia Using a Neurally 
Controlled Robotic Arm’ (2012) 485 Nature 372, 372. 
                                            
118 DLR is the Institute of Robotics and Mechatronics of the German Aerospace Center. See DLR Institute of 
Robotics and Mechatronics <https://www.dlr.de/rm/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-8017>. 
119 Leigh R Hochberg et al, ‘Reach and Grasp by People with Tetraplegia Using a Neurally Controlled 
Robotic Arm’ (2012) 485 Nature 372, 372. 
120 Ibid. 
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The LUKE arm is a neuroprosthetic arm, that can also operate robotically and has been 
commercially available since late 2016, see Figure 1.5.121 Both BrainGate and the LUKE 
arm are examined in chapter 2.122 
 
Figure 1.5 The LUKE Arm 
 
Source: Mobius Bionics, ‘The LUKE Arm’ <http://www.mobiusbionics.com/luke-arm/>; Anon, Mobius 
Bionics to Bring DEKA’s LUKE Prosthetic Arm to Market: Mobius Bionics announces the launch of 
its groundbreaking prosthetic arm beginning late 2016 (8 July 2016)’ BusinessWire 
<http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160708005511/en/Mobius-Bionics-Bring-
DEKA%E2%80%99s-LUKE-Prosthetic-Arm>. 
 
Another neural interface device is the bionic eye that has been developed by Bionic Vision 
Australia, see Figure 1.6.123 The bionic eye will enable individuals with vision impairment 
caused by diseases such as retinitis pigmentosa and age-related macular degeneration to 
                                            
121 Mobius Bionics, ‘The LUKE Arm’ <http://www.mobiusbionics.com/luke-arm/>; Anon, Mobius Bionics to 
Bring DEKA’s LUKE Prosthetic Arm to Market: Mobius Bionics announces the launch of its groundbreaking 
prosthetic arm beginning late 2016 (8 July 2016)’ BusinessWire 
<http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160708005511/en/Mobius-Bionics-Bring-DEKA%E2%80%99s-
LUKE-Prosthetic-Arm>. 
122 See analysis under the heading ‘1 Invasive Neural Interface Devices’. 
123Bionic Vision Australia, Bionic Vision Australia Ceases Operations (2016) <http://bionicvision.org.au/>. 
Bionic Vision Australia was a consortium of some of Australia’s leading universities and research institutes, 
and funded by the Australian Research Council from 2010, ceased operations on 31 December 2016. The 
technologies developed by the consortium are now being commercialised by Bionic Vision Technologies Pty 
Ltd (BVT). See Bionic Vision Technologies, Bionic Vision Technologies <www.bionicvis.com>. 
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regain a sense of vision.124 Continuing scientific research will improve the technology to 
provide a clearer picture of the world.  
Figure 1.6 The Bionic Eye125 
 
Source: Anthony Burkitt, ‘Bionic Vision: The Fight for Sight’ The Conversation (2011) 
<http://theconversation.com/bionic-vision-the-fight-for-sight-236>. 
Dr Mark Humayun, Professor of Ophthalmology at the University of Southern California, 
together with colleagues, has developed a system called Argus which enables patients who 
have lost their sight through retinitis pigmentosa, to see edges and shapes.126 Using a 
complex array of video signals, electrical impulses and interface with the brain, success was 
achieved and the technique is being developed.127  
 
                                            
124 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc (IEEE), Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society 
(2018) Neural Engineering <http://www.embs.org/about-biomedical-engineering/our-areas-of-
research/neural-engineering>. 
125Anthony Burkitt, ‘Bionic Vision: The Fight for Sight’ The Conversation (2011) 
<http://theconversation.com/bionic-vision-the-fight-for-sight-236>. 
126 Josh Fischman, ‘bi-on-ics’ (2010) January National Geographic 34, 51. 
127 Ibid. 
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Of particular interest to people with severe back injuries, including those with paralysed 
limbs, is the development of the Bionic Spine, see Figure 1.7, that interfaces with a robotic 
exoskeleton to provide movement of a person’s paralysed legs. Robotic exoskeletons are 
technological skeletons that surround the body and enable movement directed by the 
person’s thoughts. The Bionic Spine commenced clinical trial in 2017 and is being developed 
by neurologists and biomedical engineers from the Royal Melbourne Hospital, Melbourne 
University and the Florey Institute of Neuroscience and Mental Health.128  
 
Figure 1.7 The Bionic Spine129 
 
In relation to the Bionic Spine, the helical structure, pictured on the right above, is the stent-
based electrode that is positioned on the brain that records and interprets neural impulse and 
then sends commands to a transmitter in the chest of the person that connects wirelessly to 
an exoskeleton, pictured on the left, facilitating movement of people with paralysis.130 
Source: Jane Gardiner, ‘Moving with the Power of Thought’ (2017) Pursuit 
<https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/moving-with-the-power-of-thought>. 
Other mind-controlled exoskeletons are being developed. At the World Cup 2014 in São 
Paulo, Brazil, Juliano Pinto, who is a paraplegic, wore a mind controlled exoskeleton, 
                                            
128 Jane Gardiner, ‘Moving with the Power of Thought’ (2017) Pursuit 
<https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/moving-with-the-power-of-thought>. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
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developed by the Duke University Center for Neuroengineering,131 and made the ceremonial 
kick off.132 See Figure 1.8. 
Figure 1.8 Juliano Pinto using mind-controlled exoskeleton at the World Cup 2014 in 
San Paulo133  
 
Source: Neurogadget, Paraplegic Man in Mind-Controlled Robotic Suit Kicks Off World Cup 2014 
(2014) <http://neurogadget.net/2014/06/13/paraplegic-man-mind-controlled-robotic-suit-kicks-
world-cup-2014-video/10434>. 
                                            
131 Miguel A L Nicolelis, ‘Mind in Motion’ (2012) 307(3) Scientific American 58. 
132 Martins and Rincon, above n 14. SuperRoboHead, Paraplegic Wearing Robot Suit Kicks Off World Cup in 
Brazil (13 June 2014) YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=inCvbDLfXBo>. 
133 Neurogadget, Paraplegic Man in Mind-Controlled Robotic Suit Kicks Off World Cup 2014 (2014) 
<http://neurogadget.net/2014/06/13/paraplegic-man-mind-controlled-robotic-suit-kicks-world-cup-2014-
video/10434>. 
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The Australian bionic ear (or cochlear implant), see Figure 1.9, manufactured by Cochlear 
Ltd is providing restored hearing capabilities for those with hearing difficulties.134  
 
Figure 1.9 The Bionic Ear135 
 
Source: Med-El, Understanding Cochlear Implants 
 <http://s3.medel.com/downloadmanager/downloads/maestro_2013/en-GB/20329.pdf>. 
                                            
134 Cochlear Ltd, Cochlear’s Range of Solutions (2018) 
<http://www.cochlear.com/wps/wcm/connect/au/home/discover>. 
135 Med-El, Understanding Cochlear Implants 
<http://s3.medel.com/downloadmanager/downloads/maestro_2013/en-GB/20329.pdf>.  
 
How a Cochlear Implant System Works 
Cochlear implant systems convert everyday sounds into coded electrical pulses. These 
electrical pulses stimulate nerve fibres in the cochlea. The auditory (hearing) nerve 
transmits the signals to the brain where they are interpreted as sound. The implant 
continuously stimulates at very high speed. As the brain receives sound information 
instantaneously, sounds are heard as they occur. 
1. Sounds are picked up by the microphone in the audio processor. 
2. The audio processor analyses and codes sounds into a special pattern of digital 
information. 
3. This information is sent to the coil and is transmitted across the skin to the implant. 
4. The implant interprets the code and sends electrical pulses to the electrodes in the 
cochlea. 
5. The auditory nerve picks up the signals and sends them to the auditory centre in 
the brain. The brain recognises these signals as sound. 
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Essentially, neural interface devices provide an opportunity for individuals who have suffered 
some physiological or neurological disease, disorder or injury to interact with the world 
around them. While products being developed by neuroscientists are currently to assist 
those individuals who require the product for medical reasons, there is the possibility of 
incredible advancements that give rise to both excitement and trepidation for the community. 
There are neuroscientists who believe that brain implants to facilitate the merging of minds 
and machines will become the norm.136 The legal frameworks that exist will be challenged 
by these circumstances so the analysis provided in this thesis seeks to address these 
challenges. These include the difficulties of determining the commands, in the form of neural 
impulse, that were sent by the individual to the neural sensor and decoder. This will impact 
on the instructions that are subsequently sent to the assistive device.  
 
In relation to the complexity of the neural interface devices, it is possible that through the 
efforts of software engineers and computer scientists, cognitive computing may produce a 
neural interface device that can “think” for itself.137 With cognitive computing the operation 
of the computer is not confined to a lineal process dictated solely by the algorithms. The 
computer moves beyond the algorithms, and like the human brain,  accesses information 
from many sources simultaneously to determine the best decision to the challenge 
presented.138  
 
The difficulty for law and policy makers is to develop or modify the current legal and social 
frameworks to enable the benefits of neural interface devices to be enjoyed by society rather 
than to hinder or prohibit such technological innovation. This thesis is a concerted effort to 
anticipate the future as there is a lack of civil case law specifically on the research topic. It 
is for this reason that the Delphi Method has been employed and chapter 3 provides insight 
gained through the Delphi Method research from legal experts on the legal issues that might 
arise. Existing case law and regulatory frameworks provide a platform from which 
recommendations for the development of the law are possible. The legislature should also 
consider the legal issues that could arise from the use of neural interface devices. However, 
the legal experts involved in the Delphi Method research advise against legislative 
                                            
136 Malcolm Gay, The Brain Electric (Text Publishing, 2015) 28, 30. 
137 Jerome Pesenti, ‘Cognitive Computing’ (Speech delivered at TEDx, Bermuda, 4 December 2014) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8zYp4yH4PoQ>. 
138 Ibid. 
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interference in this innovative field for fear of adverse impact on device development and 
availability.  
 
There exists a tension between the common law and legislation. While legislation can be 
swiftly enacted, there can be adverse effects on the common law. On the other hand, 
legislation may address legal issues that would take the common law many years to 
effectively establish principles in order to fully address the legal issue. Those tensions were 
recognised, for example, when the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) proposed 
in 2014 a new statutory cause of action in tort, ‘serious invasion of privacy’.139 Barbara 
McDonald, who led the ALRC inquiry, believed that breaches of privacy will arise in civil 
actions and legislation would be the preferred mechanism to deal with these breaches. If left 
to the courts,  ‘[a] difficult case will come up and it may well be that the law will then develop 
more strictly than some people would like.’ 140 However, Attorney-General George Brandis  
said that ‘The government has made it clear on numerous occasions that it does not support 
a tort of privacy’.141  
 
Further tension between the common law and legislation was considered in 2016, when 
Brandis requested the ALRC to conduct an inquiry on the encroachment of common law 
rights by Commonwealth legislation.142 The Terms of Reference for the inquiry were to 
‘identify Commonwealth laws that encroach upon traditional rights, freedoms and privileges’ 
and ‘to critically examine those laws to determine whether the encroachment was 
appropriately justified.’143 President of the ALRC, Rosalind Croucher, said:  
 
By reading down laws to minimise possible encroachments on rights and freedoms, the 
common law – through statutory interpretation – plays a role in protecting them ... This has 
become known as the principle of legality … [but it] does not, however, constrain legislative 
power.144 
 
                                            
139 Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Discussion Paper 80 
(2014) 62-3 [4.42]. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Chris Merritt, ‘Brandis Rejects Privacy Tort Call’ The Australian 4 April 2014, 27. 
142 Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by 
Commonwealth Laws, Report No 129 (2015). 
143 Rosalind Croucher, ‘Encroachments on Freedoms – The ALRC Freedoms Inquiry’ (Speech delivered at 
the NSW Bar Association, Sydney, 10 November 2016) <https://www.alrc.gov.au/news-media/speech-
presentation-article/encroachments-freedoms#>. 
144 Ibid. 
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The ability of legislation to qualify or extinguish rights and freedoms by clear words exists 
but parliament can be held politically accountable and can be voted out of power.145 The 
ALRC looked at justification through two lenses, procedural and substantive, and ‘concluded 
that proportionality tests offered a valuable way of structuring critical analysis, particularly 
as part of that rights-mindedness that should become the normal way of thinking.’146 The 
ALRC identified many laws that put rights or principles at risk ‘including freedoms of speech, 
religion, association and movement, property rights, non-retrospectivity of laws, fair trial and 
procedural fairness, burden of proof, right to silence, privilege of legal communications and 
the right to judicial review.’147 
 
It is likely, therefore, that parliament will be reluctant to interfere with the current law that will 
apply to neural interface devices because of the political difficulty and possible adverse 
repercussions. Government interference in common law litigation has had mixed results. 
The Accident Compensation Scheme in New Zealand is an example of where a plaintiff 
does not get as much as they might be awarded by the court and the political and social 
costs are undesirable.148 It is a no-fault compensation scheme for injury resulting from an 
accident that is not limited to motor vehicle accidents149 but extends to sexual violence or a 
condition caused by work.150 The scheme design is similar to Australian state-based workers 
compensation schemes.151 A 2007 PriceWaterhouseCoopers review of this scheme 
concluded that it ‘adds considerable value to New Zealand society and the economy and 
performed very well in comparison to alternate schemes in operation internationally’.152 
However, by 30 June 2010, the scheme was $10.3 billion in debt. Morrison identified the 
predicament of the New Zealand government, ‘No government wants to be in a position 
where a poor choice of scheme model results in major unfunded liabilities which must be 
corrected, ultimately through taxpayer funds.’153  
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While government policy initiatives might focus on producing a balance of what is good for 
everyone versus just the individual, arguing that it is problematic where the focus in society 
is on ‘self’, the decisions made will have political repercussions. Analysis throughout this 
thesis provides opportunities for the legislature and the legal profession to consider whether 
or not the development of law regarding neural interface devices should be through common 
law or legislation.  
 
To some degree there will be trial and error, as is often the case in terms of the development 
of new technology. The case law will evolve. It is highly likely that with this new technology, 
government will pursue a light touch regulatory approach to avoid interfering with the 
application of the current Civil Liability Legislation by the court. 
 
Through neuroscientists, engineers, lawyers, academics and politicians working together, 
this exciting world of technological advancement and innovation can be realised. 
 
At their most ambitious, efforts to compensate for damaged or destroyed sensory organs 
have come to involve the invention, manufacture and implantation of bionic counterparts for 
eyes and ears. These connect the conscious mind and the vibrant, colourful, noisy external 
world - with life changing consequences for recipients. 
 
Once the stuff of science fiction, the bionic enterprise of today is built on a realisation that 
has transformed human innovation during the past decade; that no single discipline in 
science, engineering or medicine is up to the task. Instead, each specialist field has mastered 
some of the components needed to solve an overall problem, whether related to vision, 
hearing or any other among a spectrum of healthcare challenges.154 
 
The challenges that the melding of mind and machine through neural interface present at 
law are analysed throughout this thesis. This thesis seeks to provide a substantial 
contribution to the legal literature that is both innovative and pioneering. This new, 
developing field of inquiry provides the opportunity for ground breaking advances in legal 
analysis and the evaluation of the existing legal frameworks that, in particular circumstances, 
will require re-evaluation and adaptation. 
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II CHAPTER 2 NEURAL INTERFACE SYSTEMS AND DEVICES: THE FRAMEWORK 
 
A Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the development of neural interface devices. Chapter 
2 provides an insight into the technical framework upon which neural interface devices 
operate. This chapter highlights the fact that there are serious limits to our knowledge of 
how the brain operates. Our technical ability to record, decode and replicate neural impulse 
is also limited so the integration of neural interface devices into the human being will 
challenge the application of the current law when determining civil liability for damage to 
property or injury to another.  
 
For the purposes of the legal research and analysis in chapters 3, 4 and 5, it is important to 
have a basic understanding of the physiological dimensions of the human brain together 
with the technical specifications of neural interface devices. Accordingly, this chapter 
introduces the complexity of research in the area of neural interface devices in an effort to 
understand how they operate. The chapter discusses the current parameters of neural 
interface systems whereby the brain communicates with biomechanical machines to 
address and facilitate physical and neurological challenges faced by humans throughout the 
world.  
 
The chapter then outlines the technical principles upon which these neural interface devices 
are based so that the limitations of the devices can be understood. The limitations of the 
neural interface devices play a fundamental role in challenging the application of the current 
law, so chapters 3, 4 and 5 will research and analyse that impact leading to 
recommendations and conclusions in chapter 6.  
 
The following terms will be used: 
 
“Neural interface system” means the successful sensing of neural activity to provide 
a command signal to control computers, machines, or any of a range of prosthetic 
devices that span from physical to biological elements.155 
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“Neural interface device” is synonymous with “neural interface system” in that the 
components include a neural sensor, a neural processor or decoder and an assistive 
device, as illustrated below in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Design of a Neural Interface Device156 
 
B Neural Interface Systems and Devices 
 
The neural interface device that is the focus of this thesis has the full circle of communication 
between the brain and assistive device, as outlined in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 Neural Interface System 
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However, the technical analysis in this chapter will focus on the components of a neural 
interface device identified in Figure 2.1 to enable the identification of the technical framework 
within which all neural interface devices operate. The neural interface devices that are the 
focus of this thesis have this technical framework but also the capability to send feedback 
to the brain 
 
 Before the brain can be used to direct an assistive device, the brain itself ‘needs to be 
assembled, a remarkable feat of bioengineering’.157 ‘[The] brain starts as nothing more than 
a layer of little round stem cells,’ and its construction and renewal is ‘a process known as 
neurogenesis.’158 In his efforts to determine the cause of a patient’s epilepsy, neurosurgeon, 
Eric Leuthardt inserted sensors into the patient’s brain, seeking:  
 
the electric current of thought itself: the millions of electrical impulses, known as action 
potentials, that continuously volley between the brain’s estimated 100 billion neurons. Those 
neurons are connected by an estimated 100 trillion synapses, the slender electrochemical 
bridges that enable the cranium’s minute universe of cells to communicate with one another. 
Like an exponentially complicated form of Morse code, the cells of the brain exchange 
millions of action potentials at any moment, an electric language that physically underlies our 
every movement, thought, and sensation. These are not sentient thoughts, per se, but in sum 
this mysterious and crackling neural language is what makes consciousness possible – a 
sort of quantum programming code that remains all but unrecognizable to the consciousness 
it creates.159 
 
To better understand how the brain works, research is being conducted throughout the 
world. For example, the Allen Institute for Brain Science in Seattle, USA is compiling the 
Allen Brain Atlas, a map of the brain’s molecular machinery, charting the activity of protein-
coding genes throughout the brain.160 ‘The Allen Institute aims to answer some of the biggest 
questions in neuroscience and accelerate research worldwide through public releases of 
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new data, knowledge and tools.’161 At the Allen Institute, Clay Reid is seeking to understand 
‘how information is encoded and processed in neural networks of the visual system, using 
behaviour, anatomy and physiology’ and recently ‘used a combination of imaging and 
anatomical approaches to investigate how the structure of neural connections relates to 
functional brain circuitry.’162 
 
Jeff Lichtman, a neuroscientist at Harvard University, and his colleagues are generating, ‘in 
collaboration with others, a complete map of the neural connections in the brain—known as 
the “connectome”’.163 Lichtman has stated that: 
 
The cerebral cortex of the human brain contains more than 160 trillion synaptic connections. 
Each neuron receives synaptic connections from hundreds or even thousands of different 
neurons, and each sends outputs to a similar number of target neurons, spread out over a 
large distance. Thus, establishing the complete wiring diagram of even one type of neuron in 
the cortex poses enormous challenges.164 
 
At the Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging in Boston, USA, Van Wedeen unveiled the 
grid structure of the brain in 2012 and found that ‘far from being just a tangle of wires, the 
brain's connections turn out to be more like ribbon cables — folding 2D sheets of parallel 
neuronal fibers that cross paths at right angles, like the warp and weft of a fabric.’165 
 
If grid structure guides connectivity similar to the lane markers in a highway, then navigation 
would be reduced from a general 3D problem to a far simpler question of when to exit. In the 
brain, fibers growing in any axis would have a choice at each moment of just the four 
orthogonal directions perpendicular to their course. Grid structure would increase the efficacy 
of path orientation as a mechanism of axonal path-finding. Simultaneously, this structure 
supports incremental modification of connectivity by geometric modification within broad 
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continuous families of parallel paths. Thus, the grid organization of cerebral pathways may 
represent a “default connectivity,” on which adaptation of structure and function can both 
occur incrementally in evolution and development, plasticity, and function.166 
 
Despite this complexity and lack of knowledge, the ability to interface with the brain through 
brain computer interface, brain-machine interface and neural interface devices is being 
achieved. 
 
It’s a union whose potential beggars the imagination: an unprecedented evolutionary step-
effectively digitizing the body’s nervous system - that conjures images of not only mental 
access to everyday objects like computer networks, appliances, or the so-called Internet of 
things but also telekinetic communication between people and cyborg networks connected 
by the fundamental language of neural code.167 
 
Neural interface devices, through efferent and afferent communication168 between the 
device and the brain, will enable the human mind to instruct and control assistive devices.169 
Throughout this thesis, the terms that will be used regarding communication between the 
different parts comprising the neural interface system will be: The brain sends ‘commands’ 
to the signal processor or decoder, that sends ‘instructions’ to the assistive device, that 
sends ‘communication’ back to the human brain via the signal processor/decoder.170 
 
In relation to the terminology in the developing field of neural interface, John Donoghue and 
his co-authors stated: 
 
Devices that transform a neutrally based motor intention into a command signal that can 
operate physical systems have been called brain–computer interfaces (BCIs), brain machine 
interfaces (BMIs), and neuromotor prostheses (NMPs), among other names. No single term 
has yet been established in this emerging field. We use the term neural interface system here 
because all of these systems rely on successful sensing of neural activity to provide a 
command signal to control computers, machines, or any of a range of prosthetic devices that 
span from physical to biological elements. Thus, a sensing NIS is agnostic to whether the 
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detected signal is used to control a wheelchair, a prosthetic limb, a computer, or biological 
elements including voluntary muscles or viscera such as bowel and bladder.171 
 
Some ailments may limit a person’s ability to move some or all of their limbs. These include 
disabilities sustained by a stroke, Alzheimer’s disease, tetraplegics and other spinal cord 
injuries, neurofibromatosis 2, muscular dystrophy, cerebral palsy, amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis (ALS), Parkinson’s disease and other motor neuron diseases.172 Despite sustaining 
physical disability, persons with these ailments maintain cerebral function which could be 
harnessed and benefited through neural interface devices.173 One of the major goals of a 
neural interface system is to work as ‘a kind of replacement part, or prosthesis, for the motor 
system’174 that offers a physical means to reconnect action intentions to the world.  
 
The ability for a neural interface device to interpret neural impulses and instruct an assistive 
device to respond as directed by the brain requires incredibly complex technology. The 
neural interface systems upon which neural interface devices operate include devices that 
sense brain signals, a signal processor or decoder and an assistive device to effect action, 
as illustrated in Figure 2.1 above.175  
There are several neural interface devices that have been developed to assist people with 
ailments such as those stated above. ‘Brain-machine interfaces are clinically well 
established in restoring hearing perception through cochlear implants.’176 A computer cursor 
can be activated by patients with tetraplegia who can also use the neural interface device to 
control physical devices.177 Development of technology that interfaces the brain with 
devices, such as the exoskeleton Mindwalker,178 will assist accident victims, war veterans 
and individuals with ALS, Parkinson’s disease and other neurological disorders that ‘disrupt 
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motor behaviours that impede arm reaching, hand grasping, locomotion and speech 
production.’179 
 
The development of a neural interface device in combination with a robotic assistive device 
is also possible. The robotic assistive device could be any number of different computerised 
equipment including a wheelchair, artificial arm or indeed, a robot that may assist with 
specific tasks.180 These types of robotic assistive devices controlled by the mind would be 
of assistance to those individuals who are unable to activate the device through functional 
stimulation, ‘such as those with ALS or muscular dystrophy.’181 Robotic wheelchairs will use 
‘decoded neural activity’182 while robotic assistants, often called telerobots, can be controlled 
at a distance.183 ‘Semiautonomous telerobots could retrieve objects or perform other tasks 
for patients for whom wheelchair use is impractical.’184  
 
The neural interface devices being developed take the form of invasive or non-invasive 
application. ‘Invasive procedures implant electrodes directly into the brain’ while 
‘noninvasive techniques use electrodes placed on the scalp to measure electrical activity.’185 
 
1 Invasive Neural Interface Devices 
 
An example of an invasive neural interface device is that used for deep brain stimulation 
(DBS) to treat people with end-stage Parkinson’s disease.186 ‘Worldwide, more than 30,000 
implants have reportedly been made to control the severe motor symptoms of this 
disease’.187 DBS is an invasive technique that enables the adjustment of activity in specific 
circuits in the brain.188 ‘The method involves inserting a small electrode through the skull 
and placing its narrow tip adjacent to the desired circuit. The activity of the circuit can then 
be boosted or diminished by applying a small electric charge.’189 
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Bionic Vision Australia are developed an artificial retina that allows those with degenerative 
vision loss to regain a sense of vision.190 Signals are sent from a camera, as an assistive 
device, to the implanted retina microchip.191 The microchip produces small electrical 
currents, stimulating cells in the retina that are still functioning correctly, and then the optic 
nerve carries the information to the brain which interprets the information as an image.’192 
The Bionic Spine, introduced in chapter 1, involves a stent placed on the motor cortex of the 
brain and a mind controlled exoskeleton.193  
 
The invasive neural sensor, Electrocorticography (ECoG), measures neural impulses from 
beneath the skull but above the cortex. ECoG grids do not pierce the brain but sit just below 
the tough outermost membrane enveloping the brain, known as the dura mater. Like 
electrodes, ECoG rest on the surface of the brain.194 With Electrocorticograms, ‘the 
electrodes are embedded in a thin plastic pad which is placed directly over the cortex, 
beneath the dura mater.’195 The neural impulse is more clearly received the closer to the 
motor cortex the sensor is located. Close proximity of the neural sensor to the motor cortex 
can minimise incorrect decoding of the neural impulse command. 
 
Electrocorticography (ECoG) has recently gained attention as a recording technique for use 
in brain–computer interfaces. ECoG involves recording electrical signals from the surface of 
the human brain, typically in patients being monitored prior to surgery. ECoG is less invasive 
than neuronal recordings since the brain is not penetrated and has a much higher signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) than [Electroencephalography] EEG, as well as higher spectral and spatial 
resolution.196 
 
The cochlear prosthesis is a neural interface device that directly stimulates the auditory 
nerve through electrodes placed along the nerve.197 In addition, Dr Mark Humayun, 
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Professor of Ophthalmology at the University of Southern California, together with 
colleagues, has developed a system called Argus which enables patients who have lost their 
sight through a disease known as retinitis pigmentosa, to see edges and shapes.198 Using 
a complex array of video signals, electrical impulses and interface with the brain, success 
was achieved and the technique is being developed further with a device called “Orion I 
Visual Cortical Prosthesis” (Orion I).199 
 
Implanted on the surface of the visual cortex located within the occipital lobe of the brain, 
Orion will bypass the retina and optic nerve altogether. This potentially offers hope for treating 
patients with nearly all forms of blindness where the optic nerve or retina is completely 
damaged, as in glaucoma, diabetic retinopathy, retinal detachments, trauma, infection, and 
others.200 
 
BrainGate, is also an invasive neural interface device that is implanted on the brain.201 
 
(a) BrainGate 
 
The work done by John P Donoghue, director of the Brain Science Program at Brown 
University, Providence, Rhode Island USA, has resulted in BrainGate, that has ‘allowed 
people with paralysis to move a computer cursor, to read email, control a television, play 
video games, control a wheelchair or operate a robotic arm – using thoughts alone.’202 
BrainGate consists of an implantable sensor and external processors that record and 
decode brain signals from the motor cortex, turning these signals into movement commands 
that can control assistive devices.203 The technology is now owned by BrainGate Co204 and 
clinical trials of BrainGate2 are being conducted at four different locations in the United 
States.205  
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The BrainGate sensor ‘consists of a silicon array about the size of a baby aspirin that 
contains approximately one hundred electrodes, each thinner than a human hair.’206 
BrainGate Co is working on development of thought controlled robotic devices and believe 
that ‘next generation products may be able to provide an individual with the ability to control 
devices that allow breathing, bladder and bowel movements.’207  
 
In the current BrainGate™ System, a bundle consisting of one hundred gold wires connects 
to a pedestal which extends through the scalp. The pedestal is connected by an external 
cable to a set of computers in which the data can be stored for off-line analysis or analyzed 
in real-time. Signal processing software algorithms analyze the electrical activity of neurons 
and translate it into control signals for use in various computer-based applications.208 
 
In 2015, members of the BrainGate team, Leigh Hochberg and Arto Nurmikko, were 
awarded a National Institutes of Health (NIH) grant of $US1.64m to research ‘high-
bandwidth wireless interfaces for continuous human intracortical recording.’209 This research 
will ‘push the envelope with BrainGate to make a fully implanted medical treatment system, 
freeing patients from externally tethered components, and giving them greater control over 
their home environments and daily lives.’210 The project commenced on 30 September 2015 
and will continue through to 30 June 2020.211 
 
2 Non-Invasive Neural Interface Devices 
 
EEG involves placement of electrodes on the scalp to measure neural activity and is non-
invasive.212 There are many other neural interface devices that are now being used and 
outcomes of research efforts may produce many more including the development of vision 
prosthesis using lasers by researchers at Swinburne University of Technology.213  
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Dominic Rowe, neurologist at Macquarie University Hospital, has identified the perils for 
individuals with motor neuron disease who are unable to communicate or move despite their 
cognition, vision, hearing and senses being intact.214 In response, a non-invasive neural 
interface device known as the NeuroSwitch device, created by Peter Ford, allows individuals 
with motor neuron disease to connect to the world through a computer by using 
electromyography (EMG) control.215 In the development of NeuroSwitch, Ford made contact 
with Stephen Hawking, who had motor neuron disease, and Hawking used NeuroSwitch to 
communicate with the world.216 NeuroSwitch is now used by many other individuals 
including United States veterans with acute spinal cord injuries.217 In Australia, Ford has 
been collaborating with Peter Abolfathi, a bioengineer in Sydney, who has done some 
extraordinary work with another non-invasive neural interface device, an exoskeleton 
rehabilitative robotic glove.218 
 
In 2012 the Duke University Center for Neuroengineering predicted that the light exoskeleton 
they were working on would envelop the legs of a paraplegic enabling them to become 
mobile, to walk and to perform the first ceremonial kick of the 2014 World Cup.219 Indeed, 
‘Juliano Pinto, a 29-year-old with complete paralysis of the lower trunk, performed the [2014 
World Cup] symbolic kick-off at the Corinthians Arena in Sao Paulo’.220 Neural impulses 
were sensed by a cap on Pinto's head and instructions were then sent to the exoskeleton.221 
 
The development of mind controlled exoskeletons is also being undertaken in other parts of 
the world. For example, researchers throughout Europe have developed Mindwalker:222  
 
The system implements BNCI (brain-neural-computer interface) technology, which can be 
used to convert either EEG signals from the brain, or EMG signals from patient’s shoulder 
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muscles, into electronic commands. The electronic commands are then used to control an 
exoskeleton attached to the user’s legs. … The Mindwalker system also utilizes an innovative 
“dry” technology developed by Berlin-based company eemagine Medical Imaging Solutions, 
to read the EEG signals. This forgoes the need for invasive electrodes placed into brain 
tissue, or an awkward “wet” cap, in favour of a cap which is covered in electrodes. The cap 
can be fitted and worn without discomfort.223 
 
Mindwalker has been tested at the universities of Delft and Twente in the Netherlands and 
continues to be refined.224 ‘In addition to people who suffer from spinal cord injuries, the 
research could also eventually be used to assist the rehabilitation of stroke victims, and to 
help astronauts rebuild muscle mass after prolonged periods in space.’225 
 
Other non-invasive neural interface devices that can sense and interpret peripheral EMG 
signals or potentials include a range of myoelectric prosthetics by Ottobock,226 the Endolite 
Lynx,227 Steeper’s bionic hand that is now owned by Ottobock,228 Mobius Bionics’ LUKE 
Arm229 and Touch Bionics’ i-limb quantum myoelectric hand.230 
 
(a) The DEKA or LUKE Arm 
 
Touted as the bionic arm, the DEKA arm was developed by Dean Kamen of Segway and 
then DEKA Research & Development Corp, together with over 300 scientists, and was 
commissioned by the United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA).231 A remarkable attribute of this neuroprosthetic arm is that the person can, 
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through the neural impulses from the brain (efferent) and signals sent to the brain (afferent), 
pick up a grape or raisin and know the difference without looking.232  
 
In February 2008, the DEKA Arm was preparing for clinical trials233 and then it was the first 
advanced, integrated prosthetic arm the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved for 
commercialisation.234 It was reported that the device operated in the following way: 
 
Control of the fully functioning hand is directed by a patient’s nervous system since the nerves 
that come from the spinal cord are still available in the shoulder. As an amputee simply thinks 
about moving their missing hand, the brain fires electrical impulses that are detected by 
electrodes in the prosthesis. So there is no real learning curve for the amputee. Additional 
control over the arm is generated by pressing buttons built into the patient’s shoes. So the 
DEKA Arm both recognizes signals from the brain (efferent) and relays signals back to the 
brain (afferent).235 
 
The DEKA arm is now trade marked as the LUKE (Life Under Kinetic Evolution) Arm236 and 
is being sold by Mobius Bionics LLC.237  
 
There are a range of input devices that will operate the LUKE arm: 
 
The LUKE arm has a very flexible control system that allows the arm to be controlled by a 
variety of input devices. Familiar input devices may be used such as surface EMG electrodes 
and pressure switches.238 In addition, the LUKE arm may be controlled by intuitive wireless 
IMUs (inertial measurement units) that are typically worn on top of the shoes. The clinical 
team and the client work together to develop the input configuration that best meets the 
client's needs.239 
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3 Combination of Neural Interface Devices 
 
BrainGate is an invasive neural interface brain implant that enables recipients to control a 
variety of assistive devices. The LUKE arm is a non-invasive neuroprosthetic arm that can 
be controlled by surface EMG electrodes or by wireless communication. Individually, they 
enable individuals to move from their physical or neurological limitations while together they 
may enable interaction with the world beyond the patient’s expectations. 
 
BrainGate and the DEKA arm were used in combination to enable a person to give herself 
a drink of coffee for the first time since becoming paralysed almost 15 years earlier.240 As a 
result of the research conducted through to 2012, participants in the BrainGate2 pilot clinical 
trials with tetraplegia, were able to communicate with the LUKE arm through BrainGate to 
achieve three-dimensional reach and grasp movements of the LUKE arm.241 One of the 
participants was able to control the LUKE arm ‘to reach for and pick up a bottle of coffee, 
and then drink from it through a straw and place it back on the table’.242 The research 
showed: 
 
That two people with no functional arm control due to brainstem stroke used the neuronal 
ensemble activity generated by intended arm and hand movements to make point-to-point 
reaches and grasps with a robotic arm across a natural human-arm workspace.243  
 
Neural interface devices will enable those who have restricted movement capabilities to use 
assistive robotic devices to provide physical independence.244 The neural interface devices 
discussed above are a small sample of the innovative research outcomes that are occurring. 
For the purposes of legal analysis, the technology upon which these devices operate is 
important.  
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C Neural Interface Device Technology 
 
The possibility of an effective connection between neural tissue and computers has inspired 
scientists and engineers to develop new ways of controlling and obtaining information from 
the nervous system. These applications range from ‘brain hacking’ to neural control of 
artificial limbs with brain signals. Notwithstanding the significant advances in neural 
prosthetics in the last few decades and the success of some stimulation devices such as 
cochlear prosthesis, neurotechnology remains below its potential for restoring neural function 
in patients with nervous system disorders. One of the reasons for this limited impact can be 
found at the neural interface and close attention to the integration between electrodes and 
tissue should improve the possibility of successful outcomes.245 
 
Neural interface technology to record neural activity has existed since the 1840s, ‘since Du 
Bois-Reymond discovered the neural action potential more than 160 years ago,’246 and has 
assisted in improving the treatment of neurological injuries and disorders.247 It has enabled 
the development of the Hodgkin-Huxley model,248 microwire-array technology249 and micro- 
machined electrode-array technology. 
 
Other researchers were using electrodes to unlock the brains of monkeys. In one headline-
grabbing experiment, Duke University’s Miguel Nicolelis, connected the motor cortex of a 
rhesus monkey to a robot arm in the next room. Using only its thoughts, the animal harnessed 
the arm to play a simple video game. ‘At that moment,’ Nicolelis wrote, ‘the cumulative years 
of research and the hopes of thousands of severely paralyzed people who dreamed of one 
day regaining some degree of their former mobility became deeply intertwined.250 
 
To achieve a connection between the nervous system and the neural interface device, an 
understanding of the nervous system is required. Neural interface devices primarily interface 
with either the central nervous system or the peripheral nervous system. The central nervous 
system ‘consists of the brain and spinal cord and is essentially the central processing unit 
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for the body.’251 The brainstem, that is located at the base of the brain, is responsible for 
controlling respiration and other basic functions.252 ‘Emotional response to stimuli, memory 
formation and temperature regulation’ are controlled by the ‘thalamus, hippocampus, basal 
ganglia and other deep structures,’ which are located above the brainstem.253  
 
In the lower back of the brain is the cerebellum that ‘receives motor and sensory input and 
appears to be responsible for posture and motor coordination.’254 On the surface of the brain 
is the cerebral cortex that consists of six layers and various domains, ‘such as the visual 
cortex, auditory cortex, somatosensory cortex and motor cortex, primarily responsible for 
the initiation, execution, or processing of certain functions.’255 The spinal cord carries both 
sensory and motor information involving interneurons and motor neurons that interact with 
a number of different cells within the central nervous system.256 This interaction of cells is 
involved in neural interface devices.257 
 
Many of the devices that interface with the central nervous system primarily use voluntary 
control of brain activity.258 These ‘are controlled by components of the 
electroencephalogram’ including ‘sensorimotor-rhythm (SMR) or μ-rhythm,’ some of which 
are distinct brain rhythms directing hand and foot movement.259 Interfacing with the central 
nervous system is now a major focus of neuroengineering research in an effort to correct or 
alleviate the symptoms of neurological dysfunction or to enable brain-computer interface.260 
 
In Neuroprosthetics: Theory and Practice,261 the authors provide an explanation of the 
complex anatomy and physiology of the central nervous system and the neurological basis 
upon which the brain can communicate, through the nervous system, with a neuroprosthesis 
or artificial body part. In this way, the authors capture the technical principles of neural 
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interface devices that enable the development of many different devices. These included 
cochlear implants, deep brain stimulation and neuromotor prostheses. In relation to 
neuromotor prosthetic devices, Mijail Serruya and John Donoghue provided a detailed 
analysis of the design principles.262 The general technical principles are as follows: 
 
NMP [Neuromotor prostheses] are a type of BMI [brain-machine interface] that seek to extract 
signals from the central or peripheral nervous system and deliver them to control devices. A 
brain-machine interface is necessary to detect activity that can be voluntarily modulated for 
use as a motor control signal. It is generally accepted that electrical potentials are the most 
valuable sources of information. Neural commands for voluntary movement are essentially 
issued as electrical signals produced by the spiking (action potentials) and synaptic input of 
individual neurons; both can be recorded with varying degrees of fidelity and difficulty. The 
goal is to be able to detect signals that have the largest amount of information about 
movement and that change about as rapidly as movement commands themselves change. 
Clearly, recording at the source of the motor commands most readily fulfils these 
requirements, but indirect recordings of surrogate signals can provide an alternative or 
supplemental source, if one can learn to make indirect signals mimic motor commands. The 
decoding methods for use in neuromotor prostheses are the culmination of many years of 
basic research on the motor system. Whereas recovering movement dynamics and 
kinematics from neural activity alone comprises a feat of basic science, their use as a control 
signal marks a shift to applied neuroprosthetics. 
 
Three overarching components are necessary for any NMP. First, an interface with the 
nervous system must be developed. This brain machine interface must provide a means to 
detect or inject signals, be safe, last for long periods of time. The interface may contain only 
passive components, but active signal processing may be required for weak or noisy 
electrical signals. For devices that are implanted into the body, both the interface and 
attached processing units must be biocompatible, immune to tissue damage, and sufficiently 
compact to fit into or onto the body.  
 
The second essential design component is signal decoding. Once signals are acquired, 
subsequent instrumentation must further process signals into a form appropriate for 
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mathematically-based decoding algorithms. The output of the second processing stage is in 
a form that can be used by physical or biological devices that produce intended actions. In a 
sense this component is a decoder that translates brain language into machine language.  
 
The third component required for an NMP are devices that make effective use of the neural 
control signals. This includes not only the identification of devices that serve practical 
purposes, but also the engineering of interfaces that can allow safe, meaningful use of the 
control signals. Such devices include computer point-and-click type interfaces, the person’s 
own muscles, robotic arms, or even semiautonomous robots.263 
 
Grill, Norman and Bellamkonda also provided insight into the science and technology 
underlying both implanted and peripheral neural interfaces.264 In relation to communication 
with the nervous system, electrical stimulation can put information into the nervous system 
while recording of neural activity provides information.265 In this way, the central nervous 
system, comprising of the brain and spinal cord, can communicate with the periphery 
nervous system which receives and outlays information to muscles and joints.266 
 
Neural interface sensors can be either intracortical267 or extracortical268 and provide the 
source signal to the neural interface system incorporating a neural interface device.269 
Intracortical sensors are invasive neural interface sensors that are in direct contact with the 
functional parts of the human body, such as the brain or central nervous system. 
Extracortical sensors are non-invasive neural interface sensors that are in contact with 
external parts of the human body, such as the skull or the skin. As a result, the intracortical 
neural interface sensors are able to record a greater range of neural signals than 
extracortical sensors.270 Neural recording has enabled ‘the study of coding properties of 
peripheral sensory neuron and the recovery of nerve population activity for command and 
feedback signals to control prosthetic devices.’271  
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The mechanism that decodes the neural impulse and then instructs the assistive device to 
operate as intended is different from the neural sensor and is a complicated part of the 
neural interface device. The decoder may or may not be located in close proximity to the 
neural sensor but its proximity to the neural impulses does not impact on the accuracy of 
the decoding. It is the location of the neural sensor that determines the strength of the neural 
impulse received. Research has been undertaken in relation to point-and-click computer 
cursor control with an intracortical neural interface system.272 ‘A key component of this 
system is a multi-state probabilistic decoding algorithm that simultaneously decodes neural 
spiking activity of a small population of neurons and outputs either a click signal or the 
velocity of the cursor.’273 To achieve some appreciation of the complexity of the 
mathematical computations and modelling required to be performed by the decoder to 
enable this, see Appendix 2.1.274 
 
Despite the complexity of neural interface systems, research has enabled neural impulses 
to be decoded to instruct an assistive device, whether that be a computer cursor or other 
assistive device.275 Research in the field is being undertaken throughout the world.276 The 
sale of neural interface devices for use by consumers will be well controlled by government 
entities. In the United States, it is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and in Australia 
                                            
272 Kim et al, above n 177. 
273 Ibid 193. 
274 Appendix 2.1 provides a segment of a decoding model employed in a neural interface device. 
275 Ibid. 
276 For example, an international project known as The Virtual Brain is a computer program that simulates 
the human brain and is use by medical practitioners, neuroscientists and researchers. Williams, above n 
223; Semeniuk, above n 157, A11; The Virtual Brain Foundation, The Virtual Brain 
<http://www.thevirtualbrain.org/tvb/zwei>; The Virtual Brain Foundation, Download the Virtual Brain for Free 
<http://www.thevirtualbrain.org/tvb/zwei/brainsimulator-software>. 
In the United States, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) funds research in this area and in 2016 grants 
totaled more than $US150 million included funding in next generation human invasive devices, non-invasive 
neuromodulation and understanding neural circuits. US Department of Health and Human Services, The 
BRAIN Initiative (11 April 2018) <https://www.braininitiative.nih.gov/>; National Institutes of Health, BRAIN 
2025: A Scientific Vision (5 June 2014) <https://www.braininitiative.nih.gov/pdf/BRAIN2025_508C.pdf>; 
National Institutes of Health, What is the BRAIN Initiative? <https://www.braininitiative.nih.gov/>; 
<https://braininitiative.nih.gov/funding/fundedAwards.htm>.  
Some of the research being undertaken in the United States includes:  
The Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging at Massachusetts General Hospital is researching 
advanced biomedical imaging technologies: Harvard University, Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical 
Imaging, <http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/about/overview>. 
In Australia, interdisciplinary collaborative research on the brain is being undertaken at the Brain and Mind 
Research Institute at the University of Sydney: University of Sydney, Brain and Mind Centre 
<https://sydney.edu.au/brain-mind/>; and the at Queensland Brain Institute: The University of Queensland, 
Queensland Brain Institute <http://www.qbi.uq.edu.au/>. 
65 
 
it is the TGA277 who are responsible for accreditation of medical devices including neural 
interface devices. The application of existing certification processes to accreditation of 
neural interface devices is discussed in chapter 5.  
 
D Limitations of Neural Interface Device Technology 
 
Despite the advances made in neurotechnology with the development of neural interface 
devices, there remain many opportunities for improving the neural interface components, 
decoding of neural impulses and knowledge of how the brain functions. Brain-computer 
interface still has a long way to progress before it can ‘rival the elegance and diversity of 
biological movement.’278 ‘However, the underlying principles also create fundamental 
biophysical and biological challenges.’279 The following identify some of the limitations of 
neural interface device technology.  
 
1 Unreliability 
 
Whilst neurons have been accessed for information, they can also be unreliable.280 The 
mechanical network and mechanical waves that move along nerves and play a role in 
communication from the brain are so small, 10 micrometres,281 that there exists difficulty in 
researching the phenomenon.282 This presents interfacing challenges for the technology. 
One of the challenges involves ‘the ability to collect signals from and send stimulation to a 
portion of the neuron-dense brain.’283  
 
The brain carries information that has regional specificity to certain functional areas, and yet 
sometimes this information may be coordinated over distances that are large relative to 
implant size; it is against this background that we are presented with the trade-off between 
invasiveness and spatial resolution. The application of a neural interface will typically dictate 
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what level of invasion can be tolerated and what level of spatial resolution will be required to 
achieve a given goal.284 
 
The complexity of decoding the neural impulses results in a degree of inaccuracy. In 
addition, communication from the assistive device to the brain may also be less than 100 
per cent accurate, which contributes to a degree of unreliability. This will impact on the 
application of current law and the certainty of evidence, which is discussed in the following 
chapters. 
 
2 Instability and Poor Biocompatibility of the Neural Sensor 
 
The brain, like the rest of the body, ‘abhors foreign objects, and while the platinum sensors 
create a close union between mind and machine, it may often be short-lived.’285 The main 
reasons for instability and poor biocompatibility of invasive neural sensors are  ‘failure of the 
encapsulation material after 3-12 months, destruction of the surrounding nerve tissue 
through collateral damage from a thin microphage layer on the implant and immune system 
reactions to wires and connectors.’286  Weak signals and recording failure may also be 
caused by inflammation and gliosis surrounding the neural interface.287 In addition, the 
restoration of sensory damage to the area around the implant is yet to be resolved.288 
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Figure 2.3 Multi-Electrode Array Technology 
 
Two examples of multi-electrode array technology that can be implanted on the cortex of 
the brain, the central nervous system and the peripheral nervous system and sense neural 
impulse, are provided in Figure 2.2. Developed by Dr Richard Normann at the University of 
Utah, the Utah array is pictured in the lower left photo while the array can be seen at the 
upper left with a connector and wires in the photo above.289 The lower right photo shows a 
metal array developed collaboratively by MIT and Brown University.290 The upper right photo 
shows the array, connector and wires.291  
 
‘One problem with implanted electrode arrays, however, is that they can fail to record reliably 
neural signals for long periods of time. Another problem with the neural interface is the 
mismatch of the mechanical properties between electrode and tissue.’292 In addition, 
implanted electrodes move. ‘For example, an electrode for a prosthetic forearm implanted 
in the vestigial limb can be jolted away from its target neuron by sudden body movements.’293 
Brain implants are also vulnerable to movement primarily as fibrous tissue grows around 
them.294 However, BrainGate has been able to survive for more than five years after 
implantation295 so longevity is being improved as researchers and engineers craft highly 
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sensitive, accurate interface that will not degrade over time.296 Instability and poor 
biocompatibility of neural sensors impact on the accuracy of neural recording which will 
hamper the operation of the neural interface device. Critically, this will impact on the 
application of the current law with regard to negligence and manufacturer liability, an 
analysis of which is undertaken in chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
 
3 Inaccurate Recording and Decoding of Neural Impulses 
 
Neural sensors placed on the outer part of the human body, such as EEG, provide:  
 
Only a hazy portrait of the electrical storm raging inside the skull. Placed directly on the scalp, 
EEG electrodes cannot always differentiate between the electricity inside the brain and the 
electrical pulses that animate the scalp. It leads to a muddy signal, adulterated with muscular 
electricity and even surrounding electronics.297  
 
The integration between electrodes and tissue is critical to ensure the success of the 
neurotechnology, otherwise the neural interface device will have limited impact in achieving 
successful outcomes.298 As electrodes connect to many cells it is difficult to target a signal 
without receiving or creating interference.299 Limited knowledge of brain function also plays 
a role in the recording and decoding of neural impulse accuracy. 
 
The neural matrix is wildly complex. We understand very little of even the brain’s most basic 
functioning, and its three pounds of neural tissue do not readily yield their secrets to the 
system of 1s and 0s Leuthardt and his cohorts would use to reveal its mysteries. And that’s 
to say nothing of the more basic biological problem researchers encounter when they try to 
join the hard stuff of electrodes to the squishy tissue of the brain.300 
 
The goal of advanced neural-recording interfaces has been to support fundamental 
neuroscience activities, such as understanding how functions of interest are encoded in 
various neural signals [e.g., single-unit activity, multiunit activity, local field potentials (LFPs), 
and brain-wave activity]. However, since scientific experiments performed to date have 
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typically been short term (i.e., on the order of months to a year or two), the emphasis of 
engineering activities supporting this work has not been directed toward improving the long-
term reliability of neural-interface systems, but rather the development of real time data 
acquisition and processing systems. As a result, it is not surprising that technologies presently 
used for neural interfaces have demonstrated an inability to maintain a consistently high level 
of performance for very chronic time periods in healthy and active animal models up to and 
including nonhuman primates.301  
 
Cognitive computing, that might become part of the neural interface system, is not yet as 
powerful as the human brain. Jerome Pesenti, the lead developer of IBM Watson which 
operates on cognitive computing, acknowledged that the human brain is 100,000 times more 
powerful than the current cognitive computer capacity. On 2 December 2014, Pesenti 
estimated it will take up to 25 years before computers will operate as powerfully as the 
human brain.302 Cognitive computing, involving machine learning, will be used in the 
decoder where decoding algorithms not only interpret neural impulse but also instruct the 
assistive device.303 Machine learning and cognitive computing will enable the decoder to 
become more accurate over time but the ability for computer scientists to know exactly what 
the decoder has done will impact on the available evidence in civil disputes. 
 
Combined with the technical shortcomings of neural sensors and decoders and limited 
understanding of the functioning of the brain means neural interface devices are imperfect. 
When developing the technology, careful consideration of patient acceptance of the 
shortcomings and error rates should occur. ‘Unless appropriate functional targets are set 
beforehand much time, money, and effort could be wasted, and many more patients will go 
through life without enjoying the envisioned benefits.’304 Product accreditation by Australia’s 
TGA will determine the acceptable error rates. This is discussed in chapter 5 together with 
the required product disclosure requirements. 
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4 Neural Interface Power Needs are Challenging 
 
Implantable neural interface devices are becoming a key enabling technology.305 This 
technology requires: 
 
Extremely low power, small, low noise, highly parallel, and distributed electronic 
microsystems, which interface with the brain using biocompatible microelectrode arrays to 
provide high cell yield recordings, large channel counts and access to spike data and/or field 
potentials with high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). The system constraints impose strict 
limitations on size and power dissipation, requiring highly integrated approaches, and the 
allocation of signal processing and computational resources, in both analog and digital 
domains, to maximize efficiency across all major hardware components such as analog 
signal conditioning, digital signal processing and wireless communication circuits.306 
 
The complex powering requirements for neural sensors that are implanted is of high 
importance and researchers are seeking to develop devices that require extremely low 
power.307 Shortcomings that might arise in the powering of neural interface device will play 
a role in determining liability for resulting accidents. This is discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
5 Appropriate Application and Use of Neuroscientific Research Outcomes 
 
Research being undertaken to discover how the brain functions will make an impact on the 
correct operation of neural interface devices and overcome some of the shortcomings. This 
will impact on the decoding of neural impulse and the communication between the neural 
interface device and the brain. There is a danger, however, that conclusions drawn by the 
researchers from the outcomes of neuroscientific research go beyond what is validly 
supported by the results.308 For this reason, care in accepting the conclusions drawn by 
researchers must be exercised by those involved in the development of neural interface 
devices. The research outcomes will also impact on the ethical and just decisions in the 
legal system. The resources provided by organisations such as the Massachusetts General 
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Hospital Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior assist lawyers and judges in understanding 
neuroscience and its application to the law,309 reinforcing the appropriate use, by the legal 
profession, of these neuroscience research outcomes. Neuroscience and the law, including 
neurolaw and neuroscientific evidence, are discussed further in chapter 6. 
 
E Summary 
 
Neural interface systems encompass sophisticated technology that enables integration of 
machine with the human brain and body. The complexity of the brain and neural system is 
so great that full understanding of how these work is still being discovered through 
neuroscientific research. Interfacing with the human brain and neural system is far from 
perfect so the ways in which they work and the limitations of neural interface devices must 
be recognised when a dispute comes before a court of law. To identify these limitations, this 
chapter has introduced the technical principles upon which neural interface devices operate 
and current parameters of operation. Many issues will flow from the melding of mind and 
machine through neural interface devices and some are identified throughout this thesis. 
This chapter provides the technical basis for analysis in chapters 3, 4 and 5, leading to 
recommendations and conclusions in chapter 6. Chapter 3 provides the outcomes of Delphi 
Method Research involving legal experts who identified legal issues and the impact of neural 
interface devices on the law.  
 
Neuroprosthetic devices, or brain-machine interfaces, will also allow scientists to do much 
more than help the disabled. They will make it possible to explore the world in revolutionary 
ways by providing healthy human beings with the ability to augment their sensory and motor 
skills. In this futuristic scenario, voluntary electrical brain waves, the biological alphabet that 
underlies human thinking, will manoeuvre large and small robots remotely, control airships 
from afar, and perhaps even allow the sharing of thoughts and sensations of one individual 
with another over what will become the collective brain-based network.310 
 
Nicolelis believes that ‘eventually, brain implants will become as common as heart 
implants’.311 As a result of neural interface devices that augment human ability, Eric 
                                            
309 Massachusetts General Hospital, Massachusetts General Hospital Center for Law, Brain & Behavior 
(2012) <http://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/>. 
310 Nicolelis, above n 131, 44-6. 
311 Zimmer, above n 160, 56. 
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Leuthardt believes that ‘[e]ssentially, you’ve unleashed the brain on the world’312 and civil 
liability challenges for the law will inevitably occur. The remainder of this thesis analyses 
these challenges. 
  
                                            
312 Gay, above n 8, 25. 
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III CHAPTER 3 LEGAL ANALYSIS USING THE DELPHI METHOD 
 
A Introduction – The Delphi Method 
 
Recognising the medical advances in neural interface devices described in chapter 2, 
original research using the Delphi Method was undertaken where Australian legal experts 
identified the civil legal issues that will arise and how the law would and should address 
these issues. These legal experts included Judges of Supreme Courts, Queen’s Counsel, 
Partners and Special Counsel of top tier law firms and university law academics throughout 
Australia. This chapter provides the methodology and outcomes of this research. The Delphi 
Method was used as a qualitative technique to predict legal issues that will potentially arise 
and the possible solutions to those issues in the context of civil proceedings where there is 
a combination of human being and neural interface device with the functionality outlined in 
Figure 2.2 Neural Interface System. Analysis and discussion were conducted within the 
context of the Australian law and the research questions asked in the Delphi Method 
research test the research hypothesis.313 
 
1 The Delphi Method 
 
The Delphi Method was developed in the 1950s by Norman Dalkey of the Rand 
Corporation.314 It is a method of eliciting and refining the judgments of experts and is 
particularly valuable in more accurately predicting future concepts, paradigms and 
strategies.315 As the application of civil legal liability principles to a person with neural 
interface device has yet to arise in the courts, forecasting by legal experts was an essential 
and valuable tool in the research of the hypothesis.  
 
There were a number of reasons for choosing to use the Delphi Method for this research. 
The analysis of legal issues in the context of future proceedings does not ‘lend itself to 
precise analytical techniques but can benefit from subjective judgments on a collective 
basis.’316 The participants selected were legal experts from the judiciary, the legal profession 
and universities throughout Australia. They were unlikely to be communicating with each 
                                            
313 See chapter 1 under the heading ‘1 The Hypothesis’. 
314 Skulmoski and Hartman, above n 51, 2. 
315 Linstone and Turoff, above n 50, v. 
316 Ibid 4. 
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other on the research question and their perspectives would possibly be different. Each 
group would have a specific view point and may yield different perspectives. Qualitative 
research, unlike quantitative research that seeks at statistical overview from a large sample, 
seeks a depth of understanding from a small sample.317 
 
Bringing these participants together to discuss the research question face-to-face would 
have been extremely difficult to achieve, so the Delphi Method research instrument was 
developed and used to enable collaborative engagement in addressing the complexity of 
neural interface devices and the law.  
 
The Delphi technique is an innovative way to involve busy experts and specialists who may 
not be able to come together to brainstorm, but who nevertheless need to interact with each 
other to generate new ideas.318 
 
The number of participants was difficult to anticipate and preserving the heterogeneity and 
anonymity of the participants was of major importance to assure validity of the results, that 
is, ‘avoidance of domination by quantity or by strength of personality ("bandwagon effect").’ 
319 The advantage of having expert judgment is the ability to more accurately predict the 
legal issues that could arise from the tightly confined facts of a future event.320 
 
2 The Delphi Method Research Conducted 
 
For these reasons, the Delphi Method research was evaluated as the optimum method for 
the purposes of this thesis. The typical Delphi methodology used by Skulmoski and Hartman 
is outlined in Figure 3.1 below, however, the process can be modified to address the 
research questions.321 
 
                                            
317 Leavy, above n 15, 9. 
318 James M. Nehiley, How to Conduct a Delphi Study’ in Victorian Department of Sustainability and 
Environment, ‘Delphi Study’ <http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/effective-engagement/toolkit/tool-delphi-study>. 
319 Ibid. 
320 David McDonald, Gabriele Bammer and Peter Deane, Research Integration Using Dialogue Methods, 
(ANU E Press, 2009) 49. 
321 Skulmoski and Hartman, above n 51, 5. 
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Figure 3.1 Three Round Delphi Process322 
 
While the number of rounds is often three, one or two rounds have been used and the 
number of participants has ranged throughout research projects from 8 to 345.323 Two 
rounds were conducted and of the twenty-seven legal experts who had agreed to participate 
in the research, three members of the judiciary, four legal practitioners and five law 
academics provided responses to the Rounds 1 and 2 questions. 
 
The Delphi Method, based on the typical Delphi methodology used by Skulmoski and 
Hartman,324 was the basis for the research undertaken. The steps conducted were the 
following:  
 
1) Development of the Research Question. This was undertaken and examined in 
relation to the research hypothesis.325 
 
2) Designing the Research – The Delphi Method was used to collect the judgments and 
opinions of legal experts in the judiciary, legal profession and university law 
academia. The research questions included in the Delphi Method research were 
derived from the literature review and conceptual analysis of the research hypothesis. 
 
                                            
322 Ibid 3. 
323 Ibid 5 and 9. 
324 Ibid 3-5. 
325 The research hypothesis is stated above under the heading ‘1 The Hypothesis’. 
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3) Research Sample – The selection of research participants was determined using the 
four requirements for ‘expertise’:  
 
i) Knowledge and experience with the issues under investigation;  
ii) Capacity and willingness to participate;  
iii) Sufficient time to participate in the Delphi Method research; and 
iv) Effective communication skills.326  
 
4) The Stimulus – The stimulus was developed and tightly defined to provide the 
information to participants. This ensured that the respondents understood the 
research questions to accurately address the issues examined and to ensure that 
sufficient information was provided. The stimulus dealt explicitly with the factual 
boundaries within which the legal issues were sought and a copy is available in 
Appendix 3.2. 
 
5) Delphi Preliminary Studies –  
• Pre-test of the Stimulus. A study, including interviews, was undertaken to 
refine the stimulus, improving comprehension and removing ambiguity, 
misinterpretation and misunderstanding. A copy of the amendments to the 
stimulus is available in Appendix 3.1.  
 
• Pilot of online research instrument. This was conducted to remove 
technical and procedural problems with the operation of the online research 
instrument. 
 
6) Release Round 1 Research Instrument and Analyse Responses - The access to the 
online research instrument enabled the participants to complete Round 1 of the study. 
Participants were asked to identify and describe the legal issues they believe would 
arise in civil proceedings based on the information in the stimulus. Participants were 
also asked to identify how the law might respond and deal with these issues. The 
                                            
326 Erio Ziglio, ‘The Delphi Method and its Contribution to Decision-Making’ in Michael Adler and Erio Ziglio, 
Gazing into the Oracle: The Delphi Method and its Application to Social Policy and Public Health (Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers, 1996) 3, 14. Ziglio acknowledges on this page that ‘the definition of “experts” varies 
according to the context and field of interest in which the Delphi Method is going to be applied. Being an 
expert entails the acquisition of experience, special skill in or knowledge of a particular subject.’ 
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responses of Round 1 were then summarised and this summary is available in 
Appendix 3.6.  
 
7) Development of Round 2 Research Instrument - The Round 2 research instrument 
was based on the Round 1 responses.  
 
8) Release Round 2 Research Instrument and Analyse Responses – Access to the 
research instrument was given to the Delphi Method research participants. The 
participants were provided with the opportunity to reflect on the legal issues identified 
by all participants in Round 1 and then allocate a level of importance to each of the 
issues. Participants were asked to provide reasons for the ranking allocated and then 
identify how the law would address the legal issues. Responses received in Rounds 
1 and 2 are available in Appendix 3.7. 
 
9) Document Research Results - The Delphi Method research results were compiled for 
analysis to allow for quantitative analysis of the data. 
In summary, the development of the information (stimulus) provided to participants ensured 
the legal experts understood the research questions sufficiently to accurately address the 
issues. In Round 1 of the Delphi Method research, participants were provided with the 
stimulus and asked specific questions. The participants gave answers to those questions 
and identified the legal issues that would arise. The participants also evaluated how the 
current law would resolve the legal issues they had identified. In Round 2, participants were 
provided with all the legal issues identified by the participants in Round 1 and they allocated 
a value of importance to each of the legal issues. 
 
B Pre-test of the Stimulus 
 
The Pre-test was designed to enable identification of any potential misinterpretation or 
misunderstanding of the statements made in the stimulus. This was important as the 
stimulus contained all the information regarding the type of neural interface device that 
would be the basis upon which participants in Rounds 1327 and 2328 would answer the 
                                            
327 Round 1 of the study was conducted to facilitate the identification and description of legal issues based on 
the research issue defined in the stimulus. Participants were also asked to suggest how the law might 
address these issues. 
328 Round 2 provided participants with the list of issues that had been identified by participants in Round 1 
and all participants were asked to: 
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research questions. The stimulus was provided to each of the participants in the Pre-test 
prior to an interview. The stimulus provided parameters to limit the scope of the research so 
that all participants would be working from the same information.  
 
1 Pre-test Interviews 
 
The Pre-test involved interviewing ten participants who would not be involved in any other 
part of the Delphi Method research. None of these participants provided responses in 
Rounds 1 and 2 of the Delphi Method research. Alreck and Settle outline the effectiveness 
of interviews stressing the need to: 
 
• Locate; 
• Identify; 
• Contact; 
• Greet; 
• Qualify; 
• Interrogate; 
• Record; and 
• Terminate.329 
 
These aspects were considered in preparation of the interviews to ensure consistency 
throughout. In the Pre-test a convenience sample of participants were provided with the 
stimulus. These participants were chosen from the group of participants to be targeted for 
the online research instruments in Rounds 1 and 2, that is, legal academics, legal 
practitioners and members of the judiciary. They participated in the interview where 
questions were asked to determine their understanding of the material contained within the 
stimulus. They were also asked about the legal issues that they considered may arise in the 
area of the neural interface devices as outlined in the stimulus. Confidence intervals and a 
                                            
• Allocate a level of importance to each of the issues; 
• Provide reasons for their ranking;  
• Discuss steps the participant believed might be required in order to address each of the legal issues; 
and 
• Provide any further insight or clarification to the responses they had made in Round 1. 
329 Pamela L Alreck and Robert B Settle, The Survey Research Handbook (McGraw-Hill, 3rd edition, 2004), 
225. 
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degree of sampling errors were not calculated for the Pre-test as these would have been 
technically invalid because the convenience sampling deviated from random sampling.330 
 
The interviews presented an opportunity to obtain more information on the participants’ 
understanding of the stimulus. However, it was important to ensure that consistency of both 
the questions asked and interaction between the researcher and the participant was 
maintained. This was to ensure that random error and systemic bias would be minimal so 
that the information obtained would be reliable and valid.331 Elements of this consistency 
included the same interviewer undertaking all of the interviews, digital recording of each 
interview and exactly the same questions in the same order were asked of each of the 
participants. 
 
In preparing for the interviews it was noted that there are ‘few standard rules or common 
mythological conventions in qualitative research communities’ and there is little guidance in 
relation to questions of the method such as sample sizes, formulation of questions, coding 
of answers and statistical methods of analysis.332 Indeed, ‘there is no common procedure for 
interview research’ so it was determined that the following steps would be undertaken: 
 
1. The Pre-test involved interviewing ten participants. Each of the participants were 
provided with a copy of the stimulus, information sheet and consent form prior to the 
time of interview to enable them to read and fully understand the interview process. 
Copies of the information sheet and consent form are available in Appendix 3.3. In 
relation to the wording of the stimulus, see step 5 below. The information sheet 
provided participants with the objectives of the Pre-test, how the study would be 
conducted and the security measures to protect anonymity. The consent form 
provided the researcher with each participant’s express consent to participate in the 
Pre-test. 
 
2. There were no formal introductory statements prior to the first question being asked, 
except to ensure that participants had read the stimulus and they were asked to sign 
the consent form. 
 
                                            
330 Ibid 43. 
331 Ibid 213. 
332 Steinar Kvale, InterViews (Sage, 1995), 12-13. 
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3. The same questions, see below, were asked in the same order and no additional 
questions were asked unless clarification of the answer provided by the participant 
was needed. 
 
4. Written transcripts were produced from the recorded interviews. 
 
5. Following the first five participants, amendments to the original stimulus were 
undertaken where there appeared to be a common misunderstanding or 
recommendation of change and this amended stimulus was the basis of the five 
interviews that followed, bringing the total number of participants to ten. A copy of the 
amended stimulus is available in Appendix 3.1 and the final stimulus in Appendix 3.2. 
 
6. NVivo software333 was used in an attempt to evaluate, interpret and explain 
participant responses. NVivo was excellent for this purpose because the software 
does not favour a particular methodology334 and is designed to organise, analyse and 
find insights in unstructured, or qualitative, data such as the interviews conducted in 
the Pre-test.335 
 
The following questions were asked of each participant: 
 
1. Using your own words, can you tell me what this study is about? 
2. Is there anything which is unclear about the description? 
3. Do you have any other questions about these neural interface devices? 
4. In what ways do you consider that these neural interface devices may lead to civil 
liability? 
5. What legal issues will arise through the use of such devices? 
6. How will the law resolve these issues? 
7. What legal principles will be involved? 
8. How can I improve the statement of the research issue? 
9. Is there any other information you would like to have in developing your answers to 
the legal issues? 
                                            
333 QSR International Pty Ltd, What is NVivo? <http://www.qsrinternational.com/what-is-nvivo>. 
334 QSR International Pty Ltd, NVIVO10: Getting Started (QSR International Pty Ltd, 2013), 5. 
335 QSR International Pty Ltd, Look through different lenses <http://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo/what-is-
nvivo>. 
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10. Are there any other legal issues related to the use of these devices which would be 
of interest? 
11. Are there any other comments you would like to share with me? 
 
The interviews were conducted as a professional exchange rather than casual dialogue336 
so systematic questioning technique was used with critical attention to what was said. One-
sided questioning of the participants occurred rather than discourse between the interviewer 
and the participant to resemble the online research instruments that were created for 
Rounds 1 and 2. The interviews sought an understanding of the participants’ comprehension 
of the stimulus as well as the application of their legal knowledge to the research theme 
embodied in the stimulus. In this way, the interview was strictly structured with standardised 
questions so as to better predict the ways in which participants in the online research 
instruments for Rounds 1 and 2 would respond. 
 
Every effort was made to avoid random errors,337 such as instruction error or interpretation 
error. It was important for the participants to have time to read and consider this stimulus 
information in order to contemplate the legal issues that may be involved.  
 
The interviews were conducted between 9am and 9pm, Monday through Friday, at locations 
in which the participants were comfortable and averaged 12 minutes per interview. This 
location was primarily at the participant’s workplace and this facilitated accurate 
interrogation and recording. If an interview was interrupted by a telephone call or another 
person, the question the participant was answering before the interruption was repeated to 
ensure continuity. 
 
In analysing the interview data, it was important to recognise that the responses were to be 
regarded as ‘actively constructed narratives involving activities which themselves demand 
analysis’ because the information provided in the stimulus involved a situation which is yet 
to come before the courts.338 The participants’ experience in the practice of law was 
inevitably captured in their responses. The NVivo software provided the ability to work 
directly with the text of the transcriptions preserving the context in which the material was 
taken. It also enabled code words and context to be identified automatically. The NVivo 
                                            
336 Kvale, above n 332, 19. 
337 Alreck and Settle, above n 329, 229-231. 
338 David Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research (Sage, 2000) 36. 
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coding technique was used to allow for the identification of some specific characteristics of 
the data. ’NVivo coding uses words or short phrases from the participant’s own language in 
the data record as codes.’ 339 This enabled the matching of responses to specific topics. The 
topics chosen for the coding of responses were: 
 
• Shortcomings in the stimulus. 
• Specific legal causes of action. 
• The need to clarify or confirm the focus of the research in civil liability, not criminal. 
• Additional material or formatting in the stimulus that would clarify the information. 
 
The outcome of this coding of participant responses enabled identification of the required 
amendments to the stimulus, as provided in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Analysis of Responses from the First Five Pre-Test Participants 
Change Suggested by Pre-test 
Participant 
Change made to the Stimulus 
Participant 1  
Use headings - the car example needs a 
heading to lead into this to clarify where 
it’s going. 
Headings inserted to better indicate the 
information contained throughout the stimulus. 
The limits of the liabilities that arise, for 
example, criminal, civil, product liability 
etc. 
Definition included in the research issue to 
explain the breadth of the term ‘civil liability’. 
Knowing whether the NID are 
homogeneous, do they work the same 
way, the same brain interface. 
Heading and paragraph inserted to clarify the 
types of neural interface devices that are not 
included in the research. 
Failure of device mentioned. Heading inserted to make it clear that 
malfunction is not to be considered. 
Clear statement of the research 
question, that is, here is the research 
question I am addressing. Examples are 
good, but in the end a clear statement of 
what I’m looking for needs to be stated. 
Headings inserted at the beginning and before 
the last paragraph that make it clear what the 
research issue/question is looking for. 
                                            
339 Matthew B Miles, A M Huberman and Johnny Saldaña, Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook 
(Sage, 3rd edition 2014) 74. 
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Change Suggested by Pre-test 
Participant 
Change made to the Stimulus 
Participant 2  
When trying to explain the process, 
further clarity of the operation of these 
devices. Communication process: brain, 
device, prosthetic. 
Heading inserted to draw participants to 
examples of how these devices work. 
Have steps setting out how the neural 
interface device operates – diagram 
wasn’t helpful but confused the 
participant. 
The common steps were added to the stimulus 
preceding the diagram that symbolically 
represents the operation of the neural interface 
device. 
More specific examples of how liability 
might arise would be good. Exactly what 
types of legal actions that might arise. 
Three is enough to stimulate the participant’s 
imagination and a statement was inserted to 
emphasise this. The examples are not meant to 
cover the field. 
Participant 3  
Neuroprosthetics and interface device 
and interface system – connection 
between these. 
Sentence removed. 
Is it implanted in the brain, is the NID 
always on, can you turn it off? 
The specific technical aspects of the device are 
not important and stating one type may limit the 
issues suggested by survey participants. For this 
reason, no amendment to the stimulus. 
Define what civil liability means. Definition included in the research issue to 
explain the breadth of the term ‘civil liability’. 
As at this date, sophisticated explanation 
of how these devices work. 
Heading inserted to draw participants to 
examples of how these devices work. The 
common steps were added to the stimulus 
preceding the diagram that symbolically 
represents the operation of the neural interface 
device. 
Participant 4  
• Identify any case law if possible. None available. 
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Change Suggested by Pre-test 
Participant 
Change made to the Stimulus 
Participant 5  
Some of the examples apply to 
automatic, unintentional reactions, for 
example, Waving, but some of the other 
examples weren’t quite the same – 
interaction of artificial and mind while 
others were exactly what happens in 
normal life. 
Reinforcement added that the examples are 
limited and the participants are not confined to 
these types of scenarios. 
Provide an understanding of how they 
connect with the body, how they work 
etc. Muscle memory. However, the 
participant understood the operation of 
the NID as operating like the biological.  
Heading inserted to draw participants to 
examples of how these devices work. Heading 
and paragraph inserted to clarify the types of 
neural interface devices that are not included in 
the research. The common steps were added to 
the stimulus preceding the diagram that 
symbolically represents the operation of the 
neural interface device. 
Malfunction was mentioned a number of 
times. 
Heading inserted to make it clear that 
malfunction is not to be considered. 
Use headings: Background, Legal 
Issues, Scenarios that show how the 
issues relate to the research issue and 
Whether civil liability in all aspects or just 
particular issues. 
Headings inserted to better indicate the 
information contained throughout the stimulus. 
Reinforcement added that the examples are 
limited and the participants are not confined to 
these types of scenarios. 
 
The second five participants in the Pre-test were provided with the updated stimulus that 
incorporated the changes identified in Table 3.1. The original stimulus with the tracked 
changes made to the stimulus as a result of the Pre-test is provided in Appendix 3.1. 
Analysis of responses from the second five participants suggested no substantial changes 
to the stimulus was required. 
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C Conducting the Pilot of the Online Research Instrument 
 
After the stimulus was finalised,340 an online research instrument was prepared using 
Qualtrics Research Suite survey software.341 The pilot of the online research instrument 
involved participation of four lawyers to ensure the technical aspects of the instrument were 
operating correctly. Three of the questions were compulsory: 
 
1. The participants’ individual identification code; 
2. The professional category in which the participant was working; and  
3. Consent to participating in the Delphi Method research. 
 
D Round 1 of the Delphi Method Research 
 
Round 1 of the study was conducted to facilitate the identification and description of legal 
issues based on the research issue defined in the stimulus. Participants were also asked to 
suggest how the law might address these issues. Initially, eleven Justices of the Supreme 
Courts throughout Australia agreed to participate while there were nine legal practitioners 
who were either Partners or Special Counsel of top tier law firms, Queen’s Counsel (QC) 
and Senior Counsel (SC). Seven law academics from universities throughout Australia also 
agreed to participate.  
 
However, only 12 of these legal experts addressed the Rounds 1 and 2 material.342 These 
were three members of the judiciary, four legal practitioners and five law academics. Seven 
of the participants gave their consent for their professional category to be identified with their 
comments, so for the purposes of linking those participants to their comments, members of 
the judiciary are J1 and J2, legal practitioners are L1, L2 and L3 and law academics are A1 
and A2. The other participants who did not consent for their professional category to be 
disclosed are identified as P1 to P7 to enable credit for comments without any attribution to 
professional category. Anonymity of all the participants has been maintained. 
                                            
340 See Appendix 3.2 The Delphi Method Research Stimulus. 
341 Qualtrics Research Suite survey software was used to capture and analyse responses to the questions in 
each research instrument. The software enabled different functionality including the ability to construct 
different question types, embedded data, enable branching, display logic, quotas and email triggers. 
342 Round 1 had eight participants while Round 2 had twelve. Those who had not participated in Round 2 had 
the opportunity to address exactly the same Round 1 questions and could rank the legal issues in 
importance. 
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1 Round 1 Research Instrument 
 
The specific type of neural interface device for this research was defined and discussed in 
the stimulus. The common characteristics of every neural interface device of interest in this 
research was their ability to: 
 
• Sense neural impulses from the brain; 
• Interpret the neural impulses through the use of a signal processor; 
• Communicate with (that is, send signals to) the brain; and 
• Instruct a device to effect a specific action. 
 
The common process that occurs with these types of neural interface devices includes: 
 
• Neural impulse sent from the brain to the signal processor; 
• Signal processor interprets the bodily action intended by the neural impulse; 
• The signal processor instructs the neuroprosthetic limb or body part; 
• The neuroprosthetic limb or body part sends ‘sensory’ information back to the neural 
processor; 
• The neural processor forwards that information on to the brain; and 
• The brain receives the information and determines what further commands should be 
sent to the signal processor and on to the neuroprosthetic limb or body part. 
 
This is can be shown diagrammatically, in Figure 3.2 below. 
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Figure 3.2 Neural Interface System 
 
The scope of the research issue was clearly stated in the stimulus. Participants were asked 
to consider the civil liability of the person with, and the manufacturer of, the neural interface 
device only. They were asked to include all grounds for recovery of loss for property damage 
and personal injury other than criminal and not to consider any other third party, such as the 
medical specialists who facilitated the incorporation of the device with the person. It was to 
be assumed that the neural interface system operated in accordance with the 
manufacturer’s specifications. The facts of every case will be different, so the focus of the 
study was on the impact of the process of mind, signal processor and device on the law 
when attributing civil liability for damage to property or person of another. 
 
(a) The Questions 
 
The participants were asked the following questions in Round 1: 
 
1. In what ways do you consider that these neural interface devices may lead to civil 
liability? 
2. What legal issues will arise through the use of such devices? 
3. How will the law resolve these issues? 
4. What legal principles will be involved? 
5. Is there any other information you would like to have in developing your answers to 
the legal issues? 
6. Are there any other legal issues related to the use of these devices which would be 
of interest? 
Information sent to the 
processor 
Neural impulses command sent to 
Brain 
Signal Processor 
Receives and interprets 
neural impulses 
Device 
Neuroprosthetic arm, 
hand, leg, foot, eye etc. 
Information sent to the 
brain 
Device instructed to act 
88 
 
7. Are there any other comments you would like to make? 
 
Each of the questions provided participants with an opportunity to identify different aspects 
of the legal framework within which neural interface devices will operate. Questions 1, 2, 4 
and 6 were important to enable participants to identify the legal issues that they could 
anticipate arising with the use of neural interface devices as defined in the stimulus. These 
legal issues formed the basis for Round 2 where participants were asked to rank the legal 
issues by allocating them with a value of importance.  
 
2 Round 1 Research Outcomes 
 
From the responses by the participants,343 a summary of the legal issues is as follows:  
 
Legal Issues Identified by Participants Summarised: 
 
1. Negligence including: 
 
(a) Standard of care.  
(b) Breach of duty of care.  
(c) How courts have treated claims where a contributing factor was the 
disability of the defendant. 
(d) Reasonable foreseeability/foreseeable risk of harm. 
(e) Reasonable precautions (including insurance cover).  
(f) Reasonableness of defendant’s actions. 
(g) Training of the neural interface device user including negligence of 
the trainer, that is, nature and extent of trainer’s duty of care to third 
parties. 
(h) Neural interface device user acting beyond the limitations of the 
device – including whether volenti arises and user ought not have 
engaged in the activity.  
(i) Causation.  
(j) Misinterpretation of neural impulses by the device. 
(k) Scope of liability.  
                                            
343 See Appendix 3.7. 
89 
 
(l) Strict liability offences e.g. traffic offences. 
(m) Manufacturer liability including: 
(i) Maintenance required to ensure highest accuracy of the neural 
interface device;  
(ii) Misinterpretation of neural impulses by the device; and 
(iii) The device may itself injure the user, giving rise to an action 
by the user against the manufacturer;  
(iv) product liability including consumer protection laws and 
proportionate liability; and 
(v) Manufacturer fear of product liability might be a limiting factor 
in the development, manufacture and distribution of such 
devices. 
(n) Assuming approval by relevant government bodies, for example the 
TGA, exposure to liability of government. 
(o) Third party claims against neural interface device user and 
manufacturer. 
(p) Defences including ss 5F and 5G Civil Liability Act.344 
(q) Contributory negligence of neural interface device user. 
 
2. Other Legal Issues Summarised: 
(a) Legislative reform must be considered very carefully otherwise this will 
‘freeze’ the flexible development of the appropriate law. 
(b) Notions of the human body. 
(c) Intention. 
(d) The appropriateness of surgery etc. 
(e) Confidentiality including medical records. 
(f) Trespass. 
(g) Discrimination. 
 
                                            
344 This was the only time particular provisions of Civil Liability Legislation were identified by participants and 
both provisions are in the CLANSW. Equivalent sections in other Australian legislation are: CLAQ ss 13, 14; 
Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) ss 36, 37; CLAT ss 15, 16; WAVIC ss 53, 54; CLAWA ss 5M, 5N. No equivalent 
provisions exist in CLWACT or Personal Injuries (Liability and Damages) Act (NT). 
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E Round 2 of the Delphi Method Research 
 
1 Round 2 Research Instrument 
 
The Round 2 research instrument was created to enable each of the legal experts to 
participate in the Delphi Method research from the stage they had reached in Round 1.  
 
2 Round 2 Research Outcomes 
 
Round 2 provided participants with the list of issues that had been identified by all of the 
participants in Round 1 and all participants were asked to: 
 
• Allocate a level of importance to each of the issues; 
• Provide reasons for their ranking;  
• Discuss steps the participant believed might be required in order to address each 
of the legal issues; and 
• Provide any further insight or clarification to the responses they had made in 
Round 1. 
 
When considering the importance of each legal issue that had been identified in Round 1, 
participants were asked to consider it in the context of the relevant cause of action. If the 
participant required clarification of a legal issue, a summary of responses from Round 1 was 
provided in the research instrument. A copy of this summary is available in Appendix 3.6. 
The value of importance to be allocated to each issue was in accordance with the following 
scale: 
 
1 = Not at all important;   
2 = Slightly important;   
3 = Moderately important;   
4 = Very important; and   
5 = Extremely important. 
 
In Round 2, the way in which participants rated each of the issues is displayed in Table 3.2 
below. 
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Table 3.2 Legal Issues in Order of Allocated Importance 
 Issue Value Allocated to Issue   
  1 2 3 4 5   
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1. Breach of duty of care 0 0 0 4 8 12 4.7 
2. Negligence 0 0 1 2 9 12 4.7 
3. Reasonable 
foreseeability/foreseeable risk of 
harm 
0 0 0 5 7 12 4.6 
4. Standard of care 0 0 1 3 8 12 4.6 
5. Manufacturer/product liability - 
consumer laws 
0 0 4 1 7 12 4.3 
6. Manufacturer/product liability - 
proportionate liability 
0 0 3 3 6 12 4.3 
7. Reasonableness of defendant’s 
actions 
1 0 2 2 7 12 4.2 
8. Defences 1 0 2 3 6 12 4.1 
9. Causation 1 0 2 4 5 12 4.0 
10. Manufacturer/product liability - 
defences including ss 5F and 
5G Civil Liability Act 
1 0 4 2 5 12 3.8 
11. Misinterpretation of neural 
impulses by the device 
1 0 3 5 3 12 3.8 
12. Reasonable precautions 
(including insurance cover) 
2 0 2 3 5 12 3.8 
13. Injury to the user, giving rise to 
an action by the user against the 
manufacturer 
1 0 5 2 4 12 3.7 
14. Training of the neural interface 
device user 
1 1 3 3 4 12 3.7 
15. Neural interface device user 
acting beyond the limitations of 
the device 
1 2 1 4 4 12 3.7 
16. Third party claims against neural 
interface device user and 
manufacturer 
1 1 4 3 3 12 3.5 
17. Contributory negligence of 
neural interface device user 
3 0 1 4 4 12 3.5 
18. Scope of liability 2 2 2 1 5 12 3.4 
19. Negligence of the trainer, that is, 
nature and extent of trainer’s 
duty of care to third parties 
1 2 4 2 3 12 3.3 
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 Issue Value Allocated to Issue   
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20. Whether volenti arises and user 
ought not have engaged in the 
activity 
2 2 1 4 3 12 3.3 
21. Strict liability offences e.g. traffic 
offences 
2 0 7 2 1 12 3.0 
22. Assuming approval by relevant 
government bodies, TGA etc., 
exposure to liability of 
government 
3 1 4 4 0 12 2.8 
23. The appropriateness of surgery 
etc. to connect neural interface 
device 
4 1 4 3 0 12 2.5 
 
 
F Analysis of the Delphi Method Research Outcomes 
 
Of the twenty-seven legal experts who had agreed to participate in the research, three 
members of the judiciary, four legal practitioners and five law academics provided responses 
to the Rounds 1 and 2 questions. A copy of the participant responses is available in 
Appendix 3.7.  
 
The civil liability issues identified and discussed by participants were predominantly 
negligence and manufacturer liability. Specific issues that were raised fell under these 
categories of law and as participant P7 stated:  
 
In the absence of any special statutory regime, these matters will need to be determined in 
accordance with the ordinary principles of tort and contract and relevant statutory provisions, 
for example, the Civil Liability Act345 and the Australian Consumer Law. 
 
This was reinforced by comments contributed throughout the research. Legal practitioner L1  
identified civil liability as:  
                                            
345 Civil Liability Legislation, see above n 72. 
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Primarily, claims for breach of duty of care as a consequence of a failure to take reasonable 
steps to avoid foreseeable risk. 
 
L1 also said: 
 
Civil claims in connection with breach of duty of care made against both user and 
manufacturer of device, civil penalties against user of device including in relation to traffic 
offences. 
 
Member of the judiciary J2 said:  
 
Where the neural interface device allows the person to perform daily common place activities, 
such as driving a motor vehicle, but the manner of performing the activity by the person then 
falls short of the standard of care that applies to any person performing that activity. 
 
Participants were also encouraged to identify the legal principles that the legal profession 
and judiciary would need to apply in order to resolve the legal issue or civil liability dispute 
they had predicted. In response to further questions, some participants expanded their view 
of how further legal issues might flow from the use of the neural interface device as defined 
in the stimulus.  
 
The ranking of legal issues by importance by each professional category of participant is 
below in Tables 3.3 through 3.5. 
 
Table 3.3 Ranking of Importance of Issues by Members of the Judiciary 
 Issue Value Allocated to Issue   
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1 Negligence 0 0 0 1 2 3 4.7 
2 Standard of care 0 0 0 2 1 3 4.3 
3 
Reasonable 
foreseeability/foreseeable 
risk of harm 
0 0 0 2 1 3 4.3 
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4 Breach of duty of care 0 0 0 2 1 3 4.3 
5 
Reasonableness of 
defendant’s actions 
0 0 1 1 1 3 4.0 
6 Causation 0 0 1 1 1 3 4.0 
7 
Contributory negligence of 
neural interface device 
user 
0 0 1 1 1 3 4.0 
8 
Manufacturer/product 
liability - proportionate 
liability 
0 0 2 0 1 3 3.7 
9 
Manufacturer/product 
liability - consumer laws 
0 0 2 0 1 3 3.7 
10 
Reasonable precautions 
(including insurance cover) 
1 0 0 1 1 3 3.3 
11 Defences 0 0 2 1 0 3 3.3 
12 
Training of the neural 
interface device user 
1 0 0 1 1 3 3.3 
13 
Injury to the user, giving 
rise to an action by the 
user against the 
manufacturer 
0 0 2 1 0 3 3.3 
14 Scope of liability 1 0 1 0 1 3 3.0 
15 
Manufacturer/product 
liability - defences 
including ss 5F and 5G 
Civil Liability Act 
1 0 1 0 1 3 3.0 
16 
Assuming approval by 
relevant government 
bodies, TGA etc, exposure 
to liability of government 
1 0 1 1 0 3 2.7 
17 
Misinterpretation of neural 
impulses by the device 
1 0 1 1 0 3 2.7 
18 
Neural interface device 
user acting beyond the 
limitations of the device 
0 2 0 1 0 3 2.7 
19 
Negligence of the trainer, 
that is, nature and extent 
of trainer’s duty of care to 
third parties 
1 0 1 1 0 3 2.7 
20 
Strict liability offences e.g. 
traffic offences 
1 0 2 0 0 3 2.3 
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21 
Third party claims against 
neural interface device 
user and manufacturer 
1 0 2 0 0 3 2.3 
22 
Whether volenti arises and 
user ought not have 
engaged in the activity 
1 1 0 1 0 3 2.3 
23 
The appropriateness of 
surgery etc to connect 
neural interface device 
2 0 1 0 0 3 1.7 
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Table 3.4 Ranking of Importance of Issues by Legal Practitioners 
 Issue Value Allocated to Issue   
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1 Breach of duty of care 0 0 0 0 4 4 5.0 
2 Manufacturer/product 
liability - proportionate 
liability 
0 0 0 1 3 4 4.8 
3 
Manufacturer/product 
liability - consumer laws 
0 0 0 1 3 4 4.8 
4 
Reasonable 
foreseeability/foreseeable 
risk of harm 
0 0 0 1 3 4 4.8 
5 Negligence 0 0 1 0 3 4 4.5 
6 Standard of care 0 0 1 0 3 4 4.5 
7 
Manufacturer/product 
liability - defences including 
ss 5F and 5G Civil Liability 
Act 
0 0 1 1 2 4 4.3 
8 
Third party claims against 
neural interface device user 
and manufacturer 
0 0 1 1 2 4 4.3 
9 
Misinterpretation of neural 
impulses by the device 
0 0 1 1 2 4 4.3 
10 
Reasonableness of 
defendant’s actions 
1 0 0 0 3 4 4.0 
11 
Training of the neural 
interface device user 
0 1 0 1 2 4 4.0 
12 Causation 1 0 0 1 2 4 3.8 
13 Scope of liability 1 0 0 1 2 4 3.8 
14 Defences 1 0 0 1 2 4 3.8 
15 
Whether volenti arises and 
user ought not have 
engaged in the activity 
0 1 0 2 1 4 3.8 
16 
Negligence of the trainer, 
that is, nature and extent of 
trainer’s duty of care to third 
parties 
0 1 1 0 2 4 3.8 
17 
Reasonable precautions 
(including insurance cover) 
1 0 1 0 2 4 3.5 
18 
Neural interface device user 
acting beyond the limitations 
of the device 
1 0 0 2 1 4 3.5 
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19 
Injury to the user, giving rise 
to an action by the user 
against the manufacturer 
1 0 1 0 2 4 3.5 
20 
Contributory negligence of 
neural interface device user 
2 0 0 1 1 4 2.8 
21 
The appropriateness of 
surgery etc to connect 
neural interface device 
1 0 2 1 0 4 2.8 
22 
Strict liability offences e.g. 
traffic offences 
1 0 3 0 0 4 2.5 
23 
Assuming approval by 
relevant government bodies, 
TGA etc, exposure to 
liability of government 
1 1 1 1 0 4 2.5 
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Table 3.5 Ranking of Importance of Issues by Law Academics 
 Issue Value Allocated to Issue   
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1 Negligence 0 0 0 1 4 5 4.8 
2 Standard of care 0 0 0 1 4 5 4.8 
3 Defences 0 0 0 1 4 5 4.8 
4 
Reasonable 
foreseeability/foreseeable 
risk of harm 
0 0 0 2 3 5 4.6 
5 
Contributory negligence of 
neural interface device 
user 
0 0 0 2 3 5 4.6 
6 Breach of duty of care 0 0 0 2 3 5 4.6 
7 
Reasonableness of 
defendant’s actions 
0 0 1 1 3 5 4.4 
8 
Neural interface device 
user acting beyond the 
limitations of the device 
0 0 1 1 3 5 4.4 
9 
Reasonable precautions 
(including insurance cover) 
0 0 1 2 2 5 4.2 
10 Causation 0 0 1 2 2 5 4.2 
11 
Manufacturer/product 
liability - proportionate 
liability 
0 0 1 2 2 5 4.2 
12 
Manufacturer/product 
liability - consumer laws 
0 0 2 0 3 5 4.2 
13 
Manufacturer/product 
liability - defences 
including ss 5F and 5G 
Civil Liability Act 
0 0 2 1 2 5 4.0 
14 
Misinterpretation of neural 
impulses by the device 
0 0 1 3 1 5 4.0 
15 
Injury to the user, giving 
rise to an action by the 
user against the 
manufacturer 
0 0 2 1 2 5 4.0 
16 
Strict liability offences e.g. 
traffic offences 
0 0 2 2 1 5 3.8 
17 
Third party claims against 
neural interface device 
user and manufacturer 
0 1 1 2 1 5 3.6 
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18 
Whether volenti arises and 
user ought not have 
engaged in the activity 
1 0 1 1 2 5 3.6 
19 
Training of the neural 
interface device user 
0 0 3 1 1 5 3.6 
20 
Negligence of the trainer, 
that is, nature and extent 
of trainer’s duty of care to 
third parties 
0 0 3 1 1 5 3.6 
21 Scope of liability 0 2 1 0 2 5 3.4 
22 
Assuming approval by 
relevant government 
bodies, TGA etc, exposure 
to liability of government 
1 0 2 2 0 5 3.0 
23 
The appropriateness of 
surgery etc to connect 
neural interface device 
1 1 1 2 0 5 2.8 
 
The ranking in importance of legal issues provided in Tables 3.3 through 3.5 above, revealed 
the following with respect to the importance of specific legal issues by the different 
professional categories of experts: 
 
1. Members of the judiciary and law academics rated negligence and standard of care 
as the two most important legal issues from the 23 issues identified by participants, 
that would arise in relation to neural interface devices, while legal practitioners rated 
breach of duty of care and manufacturer/product liability – proportionate liability as 
the most important. Legal practitioners rated negligence as the fifth most important 
and standard of care, sixth. 
 
2. While defences rated highly with law academics at third most important, members of 
the judiciary rated this 11th most important and legal practitioners rated it 14th. 
 
3. Breach of duty of care rated highest for legal practitioners while members of the 
judiciary rated it fourth most important and law academics, sixth. 
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4. Members of the judiciary rated reasonable foreseeability/foreseeable risk of harm in 
relation to breach of duty of care as third most important legal issue while both legal 
practitioners and law academics rated it fourth. 
 
5. Reasonableness of the defendant’s actions rated fifth most important with members 
of the judiciary while it rated seventh for law academics and 10th for legal practitioners. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, there were legal issues that participants generally 
considered least important in the context of neural interface devices. These included: 
 
1. The appropriateness of surgery to connect neural interface devices was least 
important for members of the judiciary and law academics with legal practitioners 
rating it 21st out of 23 in importance. 
 
2. Assuming approval by relevant government bodies, for example, the TGA, exposure 
to liability of government rated least important for legal practitioners while members 
of the judiciary rated this higher at 16th out of 23 in importance and law academics 
22nd. 
 
3. Strict liability, for example, traffic offences, rated 22nd out of 23 in importance for legal 
practitioners while it rated 16th out of 23 in importance for law academics and 20th for 
members of the judiciary. 
 
4. Scope of liability rated 14th out of 23 in importance for members of the judiciary while 
legal practitioners rated it 13th and law academics rated it 21st. 
 
As discussed in chapter 1346 and above,347 this Delphi Method research enables reliance on 
the wisdom of the experts in determining what are the predominate issues because the 
predictions by the experts are far more resilient that by a sole researcher. The Delphi Method 
research conducted did not ask which legal issue would ultimately be examined by the court 
specifically, but the ranking of importance is a valuable tool to determine this. The Delphi 
                                            
346 Under the heading ‘(b) The Delphi Method Research’. 
347 In chapter 3 under the heading ‘1 The Delphi Method’. 
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Method research was not undertaken, or designed, to assess the reasons for any 
differences between the professional categories of participants. The research was designed 
to obtain the collective overall rankings in importance of the legal issues identified by the 
legal experts. This ranking provided the basis for the subsequent legal analysis undertaken 
in chapters 4 and 5.  
 
Insight provided by participants in relation to the legal principles and civil liability that might 
arise with neural interface devices as defined in the stimulus, centred on negligence. The 
many legal issues identified and ranked high in importance are related to negligence and so 
the application of the current law of negligence in relation to an incident in which a person 
with a neural interface device is involved is undertaken in chapter 4. However, without 
dividing the insight of the experts solely into the elements of negligence, the following 
discussion gives an overview of participant comments in relation to: 
 
• Civil liability of the manufacturer of the neural interface device. 
• Civil liability of the individual with the neural interface device. 
• The applicable standard of care to be applied to the individual with the neural 
interface device when they are a defendant in a negligence action. 
• Causation. 
• Civil liability of the government or product certification body. 
 
Each of these areas of insight are discussed below. The stimulus specifically excluded 
malfunction of the neural interface device so product liability and consumer protection 
legislation were not to be regarded as civil liability issues to be examined. 
 
1 Civil Liability of the Manufacturer of the Neural Interface Device 
 
In relation to civil liability of the manufacturer or supplier of the neural interface device, 
participant J2, a member of the judiciary, expressed the belief that the manufacturer of the 
neural interface device may be required to indemnify the user of such a device for any 
damage caused by the negligence of the user, as a result of using the device or to those 
who suffer property damage or personal injury as a result. Other issues raised by 
participants in relation to manufacturers included warranties, optimal use, scope of use and 
operational limits of devices. In relation to device performance representations made by 
102 
 
manufacturers, legal practitioner L2 argued that misleading and deceptive conduct against 
the manufacturer might arise. With regard to this and the legal issues identified in Round 1, 
legal practitioner L3 stated: 
 
One missing is misleading and deceptive conduct (representations that device is more 
effective/safer than it actually is ... for example). I would say this could be very important. 
Also, various other aspect of defence/analysis of defect-- adequacy of information provided, 
failure to warn of risk which materialised.. etc. Again very important. 
 
Various aspects of defence and analysis of any defect will be very important, including the 
adequacy of information provided and failure to warn of a risk that materialised. Member of 
the judiciary J2 said, ‘Negligence, sale of goods and Australian Consumer Law relating to 
the supply of goods and/or services’ will be of importance. Law academic A1 said the 
application of key concepts, such as 'acceptable quality' and 'safety defect' under the CCA 
/ ACL348 will also be important. Despite the fact that every case will turn on its own facts, 
participants stated that foreseeability in relation to breach of duty of care will be a significant 
issue. Factual causation may also be significant. Some defences may be available, such as 
contributory negligence and the ‘obvious risk’ defence under Civil Liability Legislation. 
Analysis of negligence that considers these issues is undertaken in chapter 4. 
 
Despite legal practitioners rating manufacturer liability as second most important, this issue 
did not constitute substantial discussion. Participants focussed on the liability of the 
individual with the neural interface device. Member of the judiciary J1 said, ‘I agree that 
negligence on the part of the user will be the most important issue’.  
 
2 Civil Liability of the Individual with the Neural Interface Device 
 
Many participants focussed on the actions of the individual with the neural interface device. 
Where the individual attempts an act that is beyond the limitations of the device, and the 
individual is aware of this, participants believed that legal issues will centre more on the 
concepts of reasonable foreseeability of the risk of harm and the objective 'reasonableness' 
of the individual’s actions. An example of liability for any damage caused by the failure to 
control the neural interface device was provided by participant P1. This liability will arise 
                                            
348 CCA means Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) and ACL means Australian Consumer Law. 
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where the user of the device is aware of the limits of their control over the device, or if the 
individual engaged in activities without giving consideration to any control limitations of the 
device. Participant P2 considered the situation where the person with the neural interface 
device is injured by another person and in a negligence action commenced by the device 
user, the defendant alleges contributory negligence against the user, alleging the limitations 
of the device meant the user was not taking sufficient care by doing whatever they did.  
 
An analogy provided by P1 is where a person who drives a car, knowing that they have a 
medical condition that may affect their reflexes from time to time, injures a third party whilst 
driving.349 Even though the accident is caused by the manifestation of the condition, they 
may still be liable in negligence. This scenario resembles Town of Port Hedland v Hodder 
(No 2):350  
 
I have concluded that the trial judge was wrong to assess contributory negligence without 
regard to Mr Hodder's disabilities. The proper approach to the question of whether Mr Hodder 
failed to take reasonable care for his own safety is to ask what conduct might have been 
expected from a reasonable person in Mr Hodder's situation having regard to his physical 
disabilities, including most relevantly, his visual impairment.351 
 
Participant P7 believes that the conduct a person with a neural interface device might be 
expected to take would be similar to a person with a physical disability: 
 
It seems to me that there is a clear analogy with a driver who is blind in one eye or a 
paraplegic driving a vehicle with modified controls. They will need to adapt their driving 
practices so as to reduce the risk of causing harm to others. The user of a neural interface 
device will similarly have to adapt their behaviour so as to avoid causing harm to others. 
 
3 The Applicable Standard of Care to be Applied to the Individual with the Neural 
Interface Device when they are a Defendant in a Negligence Action 
 
The standard of care to be determined in negligence was raised by four of the twelve 
participants. When identifying the legal issues that will arise, participant P4 suggested: 
 
                                            
349 South Australian Ambulance Transport Inc v Walhdeim (1948) 77 CLR 215.  
350 (2012) 43 WAR 383. 
351 Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2) (2012) 43 WAR 383; [2012] WASCA 212, [259] (Martin CJ). 
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Standard of care to be determined in negligence. Volenti - would it apply if the person with 
the device undertakes an activity knowing that there may be limitations/delayed reactions? 
 
Law academic A1 said: 
 
It is likely that the principal challenges in negligence claims against users of NIDs will be in 
relation to establishing the appropriate standard of care and determining breach… the real 
challenges will be in establishing the standard of care relevant to the user of the NID. By way of 
contrast, the principal issues for manufacturers will not involve particularly challenging questions 
of standard of care. 
 
Member of the judiciary J2 said: 
 
My thinking at this stage is that the approach to liability will still require some comparison with 
the usual standard of care expected of any person in the same situation without a neural 
interface device.   
 
However, Legal practitioner L2 stated: 
 
The only thing changed by the neural interface is the risk of imperfect translation. That won't 
affect the articulation of the existence of the duty or the identification of the standard of care, 
it will just affect assessment of risk and manner of causation.   
 
The training of the recipient of the neural interface device in the use of the device was raised 
by many of the participants as a factor to be taken into account with regard to breach of the 
duty of care. The failure to undergo and complete the necessary training in the use of the 
neural interface device will impact on the liability of the person with the device. Liability could 
also be attibuted to the trainer as the risk of harm is arguably foreseeable if a person is not 
properly trained and informed about use of the device. The stimulus limited the scope of 
liability to exclude a trainer. 
 
Participant P6 regarded the foreseeability of imperfect ‘including imprecise’ responses by 
the device and training would be crucial: 
 
The foreseeability of  imperfect (including imprecise) responses by the device would seem to 
be crucial, as would the need for a user to undertake sufficient training in the use of the 
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device, lest that shortfall in training be in itself regarded as unreasonable and therefore giving 
rise to potential liability.  Questions will therefore arise as to what level of training should be 
undertaken by potential users of such devices before they would be considered to have taken 
reasonable precautions to avoid the consequences of imprecise operation of the device. 
 
Participant P7 believed that a further question will be: 
 
Whether the user ought not to have engaged in particular activities until such time as they 
can be completely confident that they are entirely proficient and also fully aware of the 
limitations of the device.  
 
P7 suggested that the person with the neural interface device should act in accordance with 
the limitations and capabilities of the device:  
 
If the user has been appropriately trained and adhered to any limitations upon the use of the 
device, then they should be in no different position to an able-bodied person who causes 
injury to another. 
 
It can be concluded that questions will arise as to what level of training should be undertaken 
by users of such devices before it would be considered that reasonable precautions to avoid 
the consequences of imprecise operation of the device have been taken.  
 
In summary, when two participants identified standard of care as an issue that would arise, 
there was no clear identification of whether the fact that the person has a neural interface 
device should be considered when identifying the applicable standard of care. Two of the 
participants determined that the standard of care would be that of a person in the same 
circumstances, without regard to the neural interface device. Three other participants 
identified the importance of training to ensure the individual understands the ability and 
limitations of the neural interface device. The issue of standard of care and breach is 
analysed in chapter 4. In relation to the damage element of negligence, participant P7 
believed that resolution of the legal issues in relation to training and appropriate behaviour 
may give rise to difficult causation questions.  
 
For example, was the dropping of the antique china plate caused by ordinary negligence or 
was the cause something unique to the use of this device? If the latter, then matters such as 
training, adherence to restrictions on use and so forth will arise. 
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Participant P7 was not the only participant to identify causation as a legal issue that would 
arise. 
 
4 Causation 
 
Six of the twelve participants considered that the issue of causation in the damage element 
of a negligence action against a person with a neural interface device will be of importance. 
This issue was centred around the technical aspects of the neural interface device and law 
academic A1 said ‘Factual challenges will likely arise in causation’ while participant P7 
stated, ‘The questions of causation are likely to be difficult’. The technical specifications 
presented in the stimulus did not include detailed, sophisticated technical specifications but 
a general operational overview of the device. This was intended to ensure that the 
discussion by participants could be applied to a range of neural interface devices that 
function in the way specified. Otherwise, the predicated legal issues and solutions would be 
confined to only one specific neural interface device whose technical specifications are 
exactly as defined in the stimulus. 
 
Legal practitioner L2 stated that a technical issue of primary importance will be an evaluation 
of the risk caused by the imperfect translation of the brain's instructions:  
 
I analyse it in this way. First, if there were perfect translation of the brain's instructions then 
one would be analysing the issues of any injury scenario in the usual way: primarily 
negligence and if there was a prosthetic arm by an examination of whether that made any 
difference. The only thing changed by the neural interface is the risk of imperfect translation. 
That won't affect the articulation of the existence of the duty or the identification of the 
standard of care, it will just affect assessment of risk and manner of causation.  And of course, 
difficulties of proof (because the question of whether, and if so, the degree of imperfect 
translation will be something entirely within the mind of the defendant). 
 
When considering how the causation difficulties might be resolved, legal practitioner L3 said: 
 
Given the technology, I would have thought there might be data available to identify causation 
with some additional precision than contemplated above -- sort of like 'black box data' which 
could, for example, identify whether the instruction from the brain was turn left but the arm 
turned right, or not brake (pull instead of push). The availability of something like that would 
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be very helpful in the determination of causation. I think people (decision-makers) would be 
more likely to 'blame' the device maker than the (sympathetic disabled) person using it -- just 
human nature. Easier to say it malfunctioned and go for deep pocket. Of course, the factual 
situation may make this easier or harder. 
 
Participant P7 believed that the neural interface device could be considered a ‘mechanical 
device’, the use of which results in injury to another requiring the court to determine whether 
this was negligence or a defect in the device. If it is a defect or short coming of the device, 
participant P7 believed that it will be important to determine whether the defect could have 
been avoided by the person using the neural interface device or whether liability will fall upon 
the manufacturer. 
 
Law academic A1 said: 
 
Also, the act/omission distinction may be challenging … In intentional torts, the concepts of 
'intentional' and 'act' will be important. 
 
The issue of causation analysed in chapter 4 provides an opportunity for further 
consideration as neural interface devices are developed. 
 
5 Civil Liability of the Government or Product Certification Body 
 
Participants did not consider that civil liability of the government or a governmental 
certification body, such as the TGA, was a major legal issue. As outlined in Table 3.2 above, 
participants rated this as 22nd out of 23 in importance. 
 
G Resolution of the Civil Liability Issues 
 
Participants were asked how the current law will resolve legal issues that could arise with 
the use of neural interface devices as defined in the stimulus. There emerged two distinct 
arguments provided by participants:  
 
1. The current law as it now exists can be applied to resolve the legal issue; 
and  
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2. The current law will need to evolve in order to adequately determine the 
outcome of the legal issue. 
 
1 The Current Law  
 
In relation to the application of the current law, some participants believed that civil claims 
will be determined in accordance with established principles. Some participants believed 
issues of new technology will be subsumed under existing legal categories, such as torts 
law.  
 
Member of the judiciary J2 said:  
 
The law will resolve these issues by applying the tort principles and those statutory provisions 
that cover supply of goods and services.  
 
Another member of the judiciary J1 said: 
 
I agree that they will be dealt with through orthodox legal principle and applicable statute law.  
 
Legal practitioner L1 said:  
 
I expect that courts will determine civil claims … in accordance with established principles 
and will not seek to devise solutions or exemptions to 'excuse' or mitigate the liability of users 
and manufacturers. Any solution in the manner of exemptions etc will need to be driven by 
legislative reform.  
 
Law academic A2 said: 
 
Negligence and its components provides a networked approach to deciphering the legal 
issues. 
 
Participant P7 said: 
 
I cannot see any basis to take a special approach to the resolution of these issues … The 
user of a neural interface device will similarly have to adapt their behaviour so as to avoid 
causing harm to others.  
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Member of the judiciary J2 said: 
 
These questions require some imagination in making the responses. My thinking at this stage 
is that the approach to liability will still require some comparison with the usual standard of 
care expected of any person in the same situation without a neural interface device. 
 
Other participants were unsure whether the use of such devices will take the law into 
unchartered territory or require the development of new principles:  
 
I do think that the High Court, if it was required to look at this issue, would apply established 
principles to the circumstances of individual cases. Any comprehensive consideration of the 
legal issues which arise would seem to involve an amalgam of laws related, for example, to 
motor vehicle manufacturers and to those governing the introduction of new drugs. I don't 
think these legal issues are truly novel, rather they require the application of streams of law 
which seem to me to be fairly well developed. 
 
Law academic A1 said: 
 
Negligence and its components provide a networked approach to deciphering the legal 
issues … Arguably, there could be a statutory response (though it is difficult to see why this 
would be justified as the general principles are likely to be adequate to deal with civil liability 
in this context). 
 
Law academic A2 said: 
 
It does not seem to me that there is anything particularly special about this context for the 
application of duty of care and causation principles, though there will clearly be factual 
challenges in the latter.   
 
Legal practitioner L3 captured the perspective of the participants who believed the current 
law will adequately resolve civil liability disputes involving neural interface devices: 
 
It seems to me that the issues give rise to no new issue of legal principle: It’s just the 
application of the facts within existing principle. The issues which I have identified as not 
important are mostly subsumed within the issues I have identified as extremely important. 
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On the scenario in which the only flaw in the use of the device is the risk of imperfect 
translation of the brain's instructions, then the questions of what standard of care the law of 
negligence imposes will be obvious. The real issue will be breach, causation, foreseeability 
all of which will involve understanding the extent of the risk of imperfect translation and what 
should have been the reaction of the user and the person who enabled the user to use the 
device. The law's response to that will be evaluated through the aspects of the laws of 
negligence which I have highlighted and also through the analogous consumer protection 
provisions in the ACL and any statutory specific regulation. 
 
However, other participants who recognised the pressure on the current law that will be 
exerted by these innovative neural interface devices that are incorporated into the human 
body, said the current law will need to change. 
 
2 Development of Current Law  
 
Participants who raised the need for development of the current law to adequately resolve 
civil liability disputes involving neural interface devices, are relying on the common law legal 
system, together with both consumer protection legislation and Civil Liability Legislation, 
being able to adapt. Participant P6 stated:  
 
Our common law tradition, particularly in relation to negligence issues, would indicate that a 
body of relevant law will develop incrementally as the courts consider individual cases as 
they arise.  
 
Law academic A1 identified such development as a ‘principled and incremental development 
of existing principles of the law of negligence and statutory interpretation’ while law 
academic A2 said the development of the common law would occur ‘probably by a step by 
step and evolving approach’. This will include determination of ‘control’ a person will have 
over the neural interface device. Analogies will be applied such as parties who have a 
physical disability or ‘the operation of cars and other equipment.’352  
 
Training of the person to operate the neural interface device and to understand the 
limitations of the device in order to engage with the surrounding community were factors 
identified by participants that will be considered by the court when determining breach of 
                                            
352 Law academic A2. 
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standard of care. However, participant P6 said that issues of training and reasonable 
precautions: 
 
might well be tempered by 'social utility' arguments, which would propose that the benefit 
received by the use of the device warrants a level of risk taking that might otherwise be 
considered unreasonable. 
 
In relation to the development of the law, legislative intervention was discouraged by many 
participants. Participant P6 stated: 
 
I would suggest that the complexities of these questions are such that they would be best left 
to the common law to resolve, and that interested parties should be very cautious about 
seeking legislation, as this will “freeze” the flexible development of appropriate laws.  
 
Development of the law in this area will also have insurance and policy considerations. 
Participant P6 commented:  
 
The insurance issues mentioned above will probably be crucial to these decisions, as the 
courts seek to balance the social utility of such devices against the protection of third parties 
from potential 'malfunctions'. Courts will ask 'who should pay?' for any damage which arises 
and this will be a difficult decision.  
 
Participant P5 said: 
 
It may be worthwhile to think of alternatives to the courts to resolve disputes in this area - 
such as a comprehensive insurance or disability scheme - or the use of a 'manufacturers 
ombudsman' - an avenue where resolution does not rely on a legal cause of action and the 
associated cost and expense.  
 
Participant P6 said: 
 
It would seem to me that any user of such a device would be well advised to take out 
insurance to cover the possibility of imperfect performance of the device, as such a 
precaution might well be considered to be the appropriate (and therefore 'reasonable') 
response to such potential incidents. 
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3 Identification of Further Information Required 
 
Participants were also asked what further information, beyond that provided in the stimulus, 
they felt would assist in resolution of the civil liability issues identified. This was particularly 
important because a civil action against a defendant with a neural interface device as 
defined in the stimulus has yet to come before the court. In anticipation of such a case, 
information identified by the participants will be important in resolving the dispute. The 
additional information sought by participants centred on the neural interface device itself. 
The nature, predictability and frequency of inability of the neural interface device to 
accurately interpret the neural impulse, and the general reliability of individual devices, 
would be central to any such considerations. For example, member of the judiciary J2 
identified questions that may play a role in determining liability:  
 
Is there previous experience of death or serious injury or significant property damage caused 
by the lack of accuracy or the signal processor being unable to interpret neural impulses with 
100% accuracy? Are there conditions (e.g. extreme temperatures) in which the signal processor 
will be unlikely to interpret the neural impulses with accuracy and which therefore should be 
avoided by the user of the neural interface device?  
 
Legal practitioner L2 said: 
 
If the extent of risk of imperfect translation is the real issue, then information concerning the 
way in which the translation works scientifically; then information about evaluating the size of 
the risk; how that was communicated to the user; and evidence concerning the particular 
mechanics of what happened on the day of the incident: to what extent if at all did imperfect 
translation actually occur and if it did to what extent was it causative. 
 
Further, legal practitioner L1 said:  
 
Ultimately, answers to these questions will turn on the extent to which there are factors which 
'excuse' or act in mitigation so as to minimise exposure of users and manufacturers to accepted 
civil and criminal law standards. It may be important to understand the extent to which each 
category of persons understands the limitations on their ability to control the devices and how to 
manage risk through avoidance of risky activities etc. also any other ways in which risks can be 
identified and mitigated. 
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This additional information identified by participants will most likely be available when a 
matter comes before the court and will play a role in the resolution of a civil dispute involving 
a person with a neural interfaced device. 
 
Consideration by the participants of the development of the current law, therefore, provided 
support for adaptation of the common law and application of Civil Liability Legislation that 
will enable civil disputes to be resolved.  
 
H Summary 
 
Having identified legal issues that will arise as a result of the defendant having a neural 
interface device, participants appeared confident the common law would be a more 
appropriate vehicle for resolving the issues rather than the introduction of legislation that 
could stifle the development of neural interface devices or freeze the development of 
appropriate common law in this innovative field. The Delphi Method research undertaken to 
determine the legal issues that might arise with respect to civil liability and neural interface 
devices, as defined in the stimulus, identified negligence to be the dominant cause of action. 
Where a person with a neural interface device is a defendant in a cause of action in 
negligence, related factors such as causation and reasonableness of the defendant’s 
actions including training and precautions undertaken, were also identified by the experts 
as important. Product liability pursuant to consumer protection legislation and proportionate 
liability were also regarded as important issues that were likely to arise in relation to safety 
defects. However, as the stimulus excluded malfunction of the neural interface device, 
product liability, consumer protection legislation and proportionate liability are not examined. 
 
Through the use of the Delphi Method, the outcomes have captured insightful contributions 
from legal experts to more accurately predict the legal issues that will arise with the merging 
of mind and machine. The purpose of having identified these legal issues was to ground the 
importance of analysis of the issues throughout this thesis and that will assist the judiciary, 
legal profession and legislature in preparing for a corresponding civil dispute. Chapter 4 
analyses the issues raised by the participants in relation to negligence while chapter 5 
analyses liability of the manufacturer. As more sophisticated neural interface devices 
operate in the way defined in the stimulus, become available and are integrated into human 
beings, the legal issues predicted by the legal experts in this research will be determined by 
the courts. With innovation comes new challenges and it appears from this research that 
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neural interface devices will be no exception. The subsequent analysis in chapters 4 and 5 
provided support for the recommendations in chapter 6. 
 
The Delphi Method research enabled investigation of the research hypothesis that when a 
person who has a neural interface device is involved in circumstances where harm to 
another person or another person’s property occurs, the Australian law will require 
re-evaluation and adaptation to resolve subsequent civil action. Progress towards the 
determination of this hypothesis using the concept of revolutionary science developed by 
Thomas Samuel Kuhn,353 as discussed in chapter 1, was achieved. The Delphi Method 
research identified tension between legal experts regarding the participants’ belief in the 
ability for the current common law and legislation to resolve the legal issues identified. This 
could give rise to anomalous results in relation to the application of the current law in 
determining a civil dispute, most prominently in a negligence action. Approximately half of 
the legal experts in the Delphi Method research identified a need for the current law to adapt.  
 
Chapter 4 analyses the negligence issues raised by the legal experts in determining the 
standard of care that will be applied to a person with a neural interface device and the 
challenges with causation when harm occurs to the property or person of another. 
Adaptation of the current law, both common law and legislation, could enable the courts to 
better resolve civil liability proceedings that involve a party with a neural interface device.  
 
  
                                            
353 Kuhn, above n 2. 
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IV CHAPTER 4 NEGLIGENCE 
 
A Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 provided the outcomes of the Delphi Method research. Legal experts, including 
Judges of Supreme Courts, Queens Counsels, Partners and Special Council of top tier law 
firms and university law academics throughout Australia, identified the legal issues that 
would arise with respect to civil liability and neural interface devices. These legal experts 
identified negligence as the most important legal issue so this chapter provides analysis of 
the elements of negligence in the context of the research hypothesis.  
 
Negligence proceedings in Australia are determined within a fault-based, common law 
system. To succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff needs to establish, on the balance 
of probabilities, that: The plaintiff was owed a duty of care by the defendant, the defendant 
breached that duty of care, and that the breach of the duty of care was both the factual 
cause of the damage sustained by the plaintiff and that the damage is within the scope of 
the defendant’s liability.  
 
The range of circumstances in which a duty of care is owed by one to another (fellow road 
users, employer and employee and the like) is very well traversed. Whether a person has a 
neural interface device or not is unlikely to affect whether that person owes a duty to another 
in respect of existing, recognised categories. Proving a breach of duty and factual causation 
will be considerably more difficult where there has been melding of mind and machine. For 
the purposes of this analysis, it will be assumed that the defendant, who has a neural 
interface device, owes a duty of care to the plaintiff.  
 
As Delphi Method research participant law academic A2 said: 
 
It does not seem to me that there is anything particularly special about this context for the 
application of duty of care and causation principles, though there will clearly be factual challenges 
in the latter. 
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While most of the Civil Liability Legislation recognises what duty of care or negligence 
means,354 the negligence cause of action is at common law so the duty of care is also at 
common law. However, modification of the common law has occurred through the 
introduction of Civil Liability Legislation. 
 
B Statutory Modification of the Common Law 
 
In 2002, the Australian Government commissioned an examination of ‘a method for the 
reform of the common law with the objective of limiting liability and quantum of damages 
arising from personal injury and death.’355 Amongst a number of requests in the Terms of 
Reference announced on 2 July 2002, the panel of experts chaired by the Honourable David 
Andrew Ipp were to:  
 
1 Inquire into the application, effectiveness and operation of common law principles applied 
in negligence to limit liability arising from personal injury or death, including: 
(a) the formulation of duties and standards of care; 
(b) causation; 
(c) the foreseeability of harm; 
(d) the remoteness of risk; 
(e) contributory negligence; and 
(f) allowing individuals to assume risk.356 
 
The common law principles as applied in negligence were investigated and 
Recommendation 1, in the final report titled Review of the Law of Negligence – Final Report 
(‘Ipp Report’), was that each jurisdiction should introduce civil liability legislation to 
incorporate all of the recommendations of the Panel.357 The overarching Recommendation 
2 was that: 
 
                                            
354 Duty of care means a duty to take reasonable care or to exercise reasonable skill (or both duties): CLAQ 
Schedule 2; Duty means – (a) a duty of care in tort; or (b) a duty of care under contract that is co-extensive 
with a duty of care in tort; or (c) another duty under statute or otherwise that is co-extensive with a duty of 
care referred to in paragraph (a) or (b); CLAT s 3; "negligence" means failure to exercise reasonable care 
and skill: CLANSW s 5; Duty of care means a duty to take reasonable care or to exercise reasonable skill 
(or both): CLAS s 3; Negligence means failure to exercise reasonable care: WAVIC s 43; "negligence" 
means failure to exercise reasonable care and skill’: CLWACT s 40. There is no equivalent provision in the 
Northern Territory or Western Australia. 
355 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence – Final Report, (2002), ix (‘Ipp Report’). 
356 Ipp Report, ix. 
357 Ibid 35. 
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The Proposed Act should be expressed to apply (in the absence of express provision to the 
contrary) to any claim for damages for personal injury or death resulting from negligence 
regardless of whether the claim is brought in tort, contract, under a statute or any other cause 
of action.358 
 
As a result, the introduction of Civil Liability Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory 
and States throughout Australia was a modification of the common law. To the extent that 
the Ipp Report recommendations conflicted with common law principles, the legislation 
overrides the common law. As reinforced by Recommendation 2, the legislation applies in a 
common law negligence action. The Civil Liability Legislation does not create a cause of 
action so the duty of care owed by the defendant in a negligence action is at common law. 
The Civil Liability Legislation modified the common law by providing a framework to 
determine breach of the common law duty of care and in doing so, the legislation 
substantially reflected the common law.359 In a negligence action, a person cannot be held 
liable for failure to take precautions against a risk that could be described as ‘farfetched or 
fanciful’,360 however, the legislation changed the common law term of ‘farfetched or fanciful’ 
to ‘not insignificant’.361  
 
The phrase “not insignificant” is intended to indicate a risk that is of a higher probability than is 
indicated by the phrase “not far-fetched or fanciful”, but not so high as might be indicated by a 
phrase such as “a substantial risk”. The choice of a double negative is deliberate. We do not 
intend the phrase to be a synonym for “significant”. “Significant” is apt to indicate a higher degree 
of probability than we intend.362 
 
                                            
358 Ibid 36. 
359 For example, ‘The determination of factual causation under s 5D(1)(a) is a statutory statement of the “but 
for” test of causation (30): the plaintiff would not have suffered the particular harm but for the defendant’s 
negligence.’: Strong v Woolworths (2012) 246 CLR 182, 190 [18] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell 
JJ); ‘Causation is an element in the tort of negligence on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. This 
was so at common law and remains the case under s 5E of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (the Act)’: 
Strong v Woolworths (2012) 246 CLR 182, 199 [43] (Heydon J); ‘The references to “balance of probability” 
reveal that Megaw LJ is imposing a legal (ie persuasive) burden on the defendant (94). That is not the rule in 
Australia at common law (95). Nor is it the rule under s 5E’: Strong v Woolworths (2012) 246 CLR 182, 206 
[59] (Heydon J). 
360 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40. 
361 CLWACT s 43; CLANSW s 5B; CLAQ s 9; CLAS s 32; CLAT s 11; WAVIC s 48; CLAWA s 5B. 
362 Ipp Report, 105 [7.15]. 
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When applying the Civil Liability Legislation to determine breach of duty of care, the court 
will look to the common law through the lens of the legislation.363 That is, the Civil Liability 
Legislation is the statutory modification of the common law and the court now applies that 
legislation to determine breach of the duty of care.364 Arvind and Steele capture this when 
they stated, ‘Indeed, what we call “common law” itself is the product of both statutory and 
judicial action’365 and Stewart and Stuhmcke, ‘the common law of negligence provides the 
context for statutory interpretation in informing the development and application of the tort 
of negligence’.366 In this way, the standard of care and breach of that standard is determined 
through the application of the legislation. In establishing whether a person has breached the 
duty of care in terms of a failure to take precautions against the risk of harm, the risk must 
be foreseeable, that is, a risk an ordinary person foresaw, or ought to have foreseen. That 
risk must have been not insignificant and in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the 
position of the defendant would have taken the precautions.  
 
C Breach of Duty of Care 
 
1 Standard of Care 
 
Should the standard of care for a person with a neural interface device be different from the 
standard of care that normally applies? The person with a neural interface device has the 
potential to have a different objective standard of care determined through the application 
of the Civil Liability Legislation because the qualitative difference between the device and a 
biological limb or body part is such that the device cannot be considered as having the 
degree of complexity and sophistication as its biological counterpart. . Members of the 
judiciary and law academics who participated in the Delphi Method research rated 
negligence and standard of care as the two most important legal issues, that would arise in 
                                            
363 For example, ‘The determination of factual causation under s 5D(1)(a) is a statutory statement of the “but 
for” test of causation (30): the plaintiff would not have suffered the particular harm but for the defendant’s 
negligence.’: Strong v Woolworths (2012) 246 CLR 182, 190 [18] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell 
JJ). ‘…breach of duty and causation and damages are often decisively influenced by statute’: Mark Leeming, 
‘Theories and Principles Underlying the Development of the Common Law – The Statutory Elephant in the 
Room’ (2013) 36(3) UNSW Law Journal 1002, 1006. 
364 Ibid. 
365 TT Arvind and Jenny Steele, ‘Bringing Statute (Back) onto the Radar: Implications’ in TT Arvind and 
Jenny Steele (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, Statue and the Dynamics of Legal Change 
(Hart, 2013) 451, 451. 
366 Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke, ‘The rise of common law in statutory interpretation of tort law reform 
legislation: Oil and water or a milky pond?’ (2013) 21 Torts Law Journal 126, 128 (emphasis supplied). 
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relation to neural interface devices. Whether or not a different objective standard of care will 
apply to a person with a neural interface device is unclear. 
 
In Imbree, Justice Kirby outlined the common law approach to determination of the standard 
of care: 
 
The common law recognises many circumstances in which the standard of care expected of 
a person takes account of some matter that warrants identifying a class of persons or 
activities as required to exercise a standard of care different from, or more particular than, 
that of some wholly general and “objective community ideal” (125). Chief among those 
circumstances is the profession of particular skill. A higher standard of care is applied in those 
cases. That standard may be described by reference to those who pursue a certain kind of 
occupation, like that of medical practitioner, or it may be stated, as a higher level of skill, by 
reference to a more specific class of occupation such as that of the specialist medical 
practitioner (126). At the other end of the spectrum, the standard of care expected of children 
is attenuated (127). 
 
The essential question: The fundamental question for decision is whether, as this Court held 
in Cook, the content and ambit of any duty of care owed to a person in the position of the 
appellant is what is “reasonably to be expected of an unqualified and inexperienced driver in 
the circumstances”? Alternatively, is it a single, universal, objective standard of care 
applicable to all drivers (experienced and inexperienced; skilled and unskilled; licensed and 
unlicensed) when they undertake the driving of a motor vehicle on a public road?367 
 
The court now applies the Civil Liability Legislation but will look to the objective test under 
the common law when determining the standard of care in a matter.368 The court must 
establish what a person would have done in the particular situation by considering all the 
materially relevant facts of the matter at hand.369 Courts have generally been reluctant to 
consider the peculiar characteristics of the person in order to move away from the 
reasonable person, the objective standard of care.370 Moran states the theoretical reason 
                                            
367 Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510, 532-33 [69], 548 [125] (footnotes omitted). 
368 See Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448, 454; Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850, 860; Paris v 
Stepney Borough Council [1951] AC 367, 384. See also CLWACT s 43; CLANSW s 5B; CLAQ s 9; CLAS s 
32; CLAT s 11; WAVIC s 48; CLAWA s 5B. 
369 CLWACT s 43; CLANSW s 5B; CLAQ s 9; CLAS s 32; CLAT s 11; WAVIC s 48; CLAWA s 5B. See also 
Amanda Stickley, Australian Torts Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2016) 245-6 [11.3]-[11.7]. 
370 Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 474. See also Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines P (eds) Fleming’s the 
Law of Torts (10th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2011) [7.20]. 
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for this is that ‘the objective standard “eliminates the personal equation and is independent 
of the idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is in question”.’371  
 
As the common law’s tool for identifying behaviour that attracts neither censure nor legal 
liability, the reasonable person plays a central role in the law of negligence. The actions of 
the litigant (plaintiff or defendant) are compared to what the reasonable person would have 
done in like circumstances. Only those who emulate the reasonable person will be 
considered ‘faultless’ and hence believed of the consequences of their actions. In this sense 
then the behaviour of the reasonable person defines the content of the renowned objective 
standard of the law of negligence: a standard that, thou it does not demand perfection, does 
insist upon a certain level of prudence or attentiveness to the interests of others. Thus, the 
fault element or standard of care in negligence: the objective standard.372   
 
The neural interface device cannot be considered identical to a biological limb. The ability 
of the device to interpret neural impulses, whilst very good, is not functionally equivalent.373 
The general common law rule which applies in determining cases where the plaintiff is 
seeking damages for negligence, weighs against the court taking into account the specific 
characteristics of the defendant.374 However, through the application of the Civil Liability 
Legislation, differences between a defendant with a neural interface device and a defendant 
without such a device could be recognised. In relation to the common law, McTiernan ACJ 
in McHale v Watson considered whether special circumstances could be taken into account 
when determining the standard of care: 
 
It seems to me that the present case comes down to a fine point, namely whether it was right for 
the trial judge to take into account Barry's age in considering whether he did foresee or ought to 
have foreseen that the so-called dart might not stick in the post but be deflected from it towards 
Susan who was in the area of danger in the event of such an occurrence. I think that there is no 
ground for disagreeing with the conclusion of Windeyer J. on this question.375 
                                            
371 Mayo Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective 
Standard (Oxford University Press, 2003) 20-21. Attribution for the quote is provided by Moran as Glasgow 
Corp v Muir [1943] AC 448, 457 (Lord MacMillan). 
372 Ibid 18. 
373 Kengo Ohnishi, Richard F Weir and Todd A Kuiken, ‘Neural machine interfaces for controlling 
multifunctional powered upper-limb prostheses’ (2007) 4(1) Expert Review of Medical Devices 43, 43. See 
also discussion under the heading ‘D Limitations of Neural Interface Device Technology’. 
374 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691, 707-709 (Megaw LJ); McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199, 228 
(Owen J) citing Lord Macmillan in Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448; Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 
CLR 510, 544 [112] (Kirby J). 
375 (1966) 115 CLR 199, 210. 
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Windeyer J had concluded that such a particular characteristic of the defendant should be 
considered. Kitto J stated: 
 
I take this to mean that the test to be applied in determining whether the appellant's injury resulted 
from a breach of a duty owed to her by the respondent should be stated not in terms of the 
reasonable foresight and prudence of an ordinary person, but in terms of the reasonable foresight 
and prudence of an ordinary boy of twelve; and that the respondent should succeed because an 
ordinary boy of twelve would not have appreciated that any risk to the appellant was involved in 
what he did.376 
 
Kitto J discussed the development of common law principles in actionable negligence377 and 
contributory negligence378 and in concluding that the trial judge had made no error of law, 
his Honour said: 
 
Sympathy with the injured girl is inevitable. One might almost wish that mediaeval thinking had 
led to a modern rule of absolute liability for harm caused. But it has not; and, in the absence of 
relevant statutory provision, children, like everyone else, must accept as they go about in society 
the risks from which ordinary care on the part of others will not suffice to save them. One such 
risk is that boys of twelve may behave as boys of twelve; and that, sometimes, is a risk indeed.379 
 
Owen J also considered the common law development of an objective standard,380 
concluding that Windeyer J was correct and stated: 
 
For these reasons I am of opinion that Windeyer J. rightly took into consideration the fact that 
Barry Watson was only twelve years old and that he did not misdirect himself as to the degree 
of care reasonably to be expected of a boy of that age.381 
 
Circumstances like this where the courts have decided to vary the objective standard provide 
support for a different standard of care for those with neural interface devices. These include 
                                            
376 McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199, 211. 
377 Ibid 212-14. 
378 Ibid 214-15. 
379 Ibid 216. 
380 Ibid 228-234. 
381 Ibid 234. 
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not only age382 but also skill or knowledge.383 That is not to say that these different standards 
of care allow a special rule for other groups, but to show that in particular circumstances the 
court will apply a different standard of care from that applied to others without the specific 
characteristics of the person in question. Dietrich and Field considered when, as a matter of 
law, the courts ought to take into account a person’s characteristics before the standard 
ceases to be objective.384 In their opinion: 
 
[P]rovided that (1) the person whose conduct is in question possesses the capacity to act 
reasonably, and (2) the question of whether that person’s conduct was in fact reasonable can 
be answered by reference to some measurable criteria to which the reasonable person can 
relate (such as mental age or physical mobility), then the test is still at its core an objective 
one.385 
 
In comparison, the United States Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical & Emotional Harm 
§3 (2010) (Negligence), incorporating the Restatement Second of Torts §283 (Conduct of a 
Reasonable Man: The Standard), affirms that the balancing approach to the standard of 
care has been applied in a large majority of the courts throughout the United States.386 The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts also provides support for the court’s recognition of a different 
standard of care for specific classes of defendant.387 These different standards of care 
highlight the court’s willingness to consider the special circumstances that exist with a 
specific class of individuals.  
 
The standard of care could be an extension or variation of an existing standard of care, such 
as the objective standard in respect of the particular class of people with a neural interface 
device. Such a variation or extension might go so far as establishing a new or novel standard 
of care to the extent that the standard becomes that of a reasonable person with the same, 
                                            
382 See McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199. 
383 See Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
384 Joachim Dietrich and Iain Field, ‘The “Reasonable Tort Victim”: Contributory Negligence, Standard of 
Care and the “Equivalence Theory” (2017) 41 Melbourne University Law Review 602, 629-32. 
385 Ibid 629 (footnotes omitted). 
386 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (American 
Law Institute, 2012). Expressed by Judge Learned Hand in United States v Carroll Towing Co 159 F.2d 169 
(1947). 
387 American Law Institute, above n 386. In comment d. Reasonable care and the primary factors to §3, the 
following is stated: ‘These categories include cases involving emergencies (§9), cases involving actors who 
are children (§10), and cases involving actors with disabilities (§11). Section 12, addressing the specific 
knowledge and skills of the actor, and §13, concerning the role of custom also supplement the primary 
factors contained in this Section,’ that is §3. 
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or similar, neural interface device in the same, or similar, circumstances. If such an extension 
or variation does not occur, the fact that the person has a neural interface device could be 
considered when determining breach of the duty of care.388 
In determining a breach of this standard, a court will consider whether, as a result of 
extensive training in the operation of the device by a neural interface device technician, the 
person will know of the potential risks of the neural interface device not functioning in 
complete compliance with the neural impulses as intended. The risk may well be regarded 
as reasonably foreseeable and if determined to be not insignificant, then the person will be 
expected to take reasonable precautions.389 Members of the judiciary who participated in 
the Delphi Method research rated reasonable foreseeability/foreseeable risk of harm in 
relation to breach of duty of care as third most important legal issue while both legal 
practitioners and law academics rated it fourth. 
 In determining whether a defendant with a neural interface device might be considered as 
a different class from those who do not have a neural interface device, the class of people 
with skill or knowledge needs to be considered. 
 
2 Training and Expertise 
 
The functional difference between a biological limb and the neuroprosthetic limb may require 
a person who has a neural interface device integrated into his or her body to undertake a 
degree of training before using the device. This training by medical physicians, occupational 
therapists, physiotherapists, psychologists and neural interface device technicians would 
lead to the development of knowledge regarding the limitations and possible adverse 
responses the neural interface device may have.390 The liability of third parties, such as 
these trainers, is excluded from analysis undertaken.391 While legal experts in the Delphi 
Method research identified negligence of the trainer, that is, nature and extent of trainer’s 
duty of care to third parties, as a possible legal issue that could arise, it was rated 19th out 
of 23 in importance. The primary focus of the legal issues identified by the legal experts was 
on the liability of the person with the neural interface device and the training of this person 
was rated 14th out of 23 in importance.  
                                            
388 CLANSW s 5B; CLAQ s 9, CLAS s 32; CLAT s 11; WAVIC s 48; CLAWA s 5B. See also Stickley, above 
n 369, 261 [11.46]. 
389 Ibid. 
390 The Delphi Method research stimulus limited consideration of liability to that of the person with the neural 
interface device and the manufacturer of the device, so analysis of liability for others is not provided. 
391 See discussion in chapter 1 under the heading ‘Other Considerations Outside the Scope of this Thesis’. 
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The training might enable a person to achieve a level of expertise to such a degree that the 
standard of care determined by the court may be greater than a person without a neural 
interface device. The skill in operating the device could be regarded as a specialised skill. 
While the training and expertise would be far less than that required to perform specialised 
medical procedures, or tasks involving specialist training such as those undertaken by 
qualified electricians, the training undertaken by the person with a neural interface device 
would provide them with skills that a person without a neural interface device would not 
have. This might also occur where the neural interface device is such that it enhances 
human attributes, that is, provides individuals with abilities beyond those of the biological 
limb or body part. Delphi Method research participant P7 suggested that the person with the 
neural interface device should act in accordance with the limitations and capabilities of the 
device:  
 
If the user has been appropriately trained and adhered to any limitations upon the use of the 
device, then they should be in no different position to an able-bodied person who causes injury 
to another. 
 
An example of the way in which the standard of care has differed as a result of skill or 
knowledge, is with respect to medical practitioners. In Rogers v Whitaker, for example, the 
High Court held: 
 
The standard of reasonable care and skill required is that of the ordinary skilled person exercising 
and professing to have the special skill, in this case the skill of an ophthalmic surgeon specialising 
in corneal and anterior segment surgery.392 
 
This would include the provision of information by the medical practitioner to assist the 
patient in providing informed consent to the medical procedure.393 The obligation to provide 
information is now required under some of the Civil Liability Legislation.394 Likewise, many 
professions attract a different standard of care including lawyers, engineers, valuers, 
                                            
392 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 483. See Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee 
[1957] 1 WLR 582, 586. See also Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246, 258 (Lord Edmund-Davies); 
Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634, 638 (Lord Scarman). See also Civil 
Liability Legislation, for example, CLANSW s 5O, CLAQ s 22, CLAS s 41 CLAT s 22, WAVIC s 48.  
393 In Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490, the High Court held that ‘The law should recognise that a 
doctor has a duty to warn a patient of a material risk inherent in the proposed treatment.’ 
394 CLAQ s 21; CLAT s 21 and WAVIC s 50. 
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accountants, manufacturers, and builders.395 Generally, the standard is that of an ordinary 
skilled member of that profession who acts with reasonable care and skill. However, the 
relevant standard applied to a particular profession was not conclusive at common law,396 
but now Civil Liability Legislation provides a mechanism to determine whether or not a 
breach of the duty of care has occurred.397 That standard of care is applied to the facts of a 
case to enable the court to ascertain whether or not there has been a breach of the duty of 
care owed by the professional. Application of this principle to the determination of the 
appropriate standard of care to be applied to a defendant with a neural interface device is 
discussed further below under heading ‘3 Application of the Factors Determining Standard 
of Care. The analysis concludes that extensive training in the operation of the device will not 
result in a higher standard of care but will impact on determining breach of the duty of care.  
 
3 Application of the Factors Determining Standard of Care 
 
When looking at the common law through the lens of the Civil Liability Legislation there are 
circumstances in which the standard of care expected of a person takes account of some 
matter or activities that require a standard of care different from, or more particular than, that 
of some wholly general and objective community ideal.398 For example, as noted above, a 
different standard of care has been recognised by the courts for various classes of 
defendants including children, professionals, and persons with a physical disability.399 
However, the onus of establishing facts giving rise to such a special or different class or 
category will be upon the party asserting it.400 
 
                                            
395 See for example, Heydon v NRMA Ltd (2000) 51 NSWLR 1; [2000] NSWCA 374 (lawyers); Woolcock 
Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515 (engineers); Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 
831 (valuers); Hardie (Qld) Employees Credit Union Ltd v Hall Chadwick & Co [1980] Qd R 362 
(accountants); Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [1936] AC 85; 
Suosaari v Steinhardt [1989] 2 Qd R 477 (manufacturers); Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609 (builders). 
396 Florida Hotels Pty Ltd v Mayo (1965) 113 CLR 588, 593 and 601; Naxakis v Western General Hospital 
(1999) 197 CLR 269; Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
397 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 483. See also Civil Liability Legislation throughout Australia, for 
example, CLANSW s 5O; CLAQ s 22; CLAS s 40; CLAT s 22; WAVIC s 48. 
398 Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510, 527 [69]. 
399 See, for example, McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199 (children); Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 
479 (medical practitioners); Heydon v NRMA Ltd (2000) 51 NSWLR 1 and Badenach v Calvert (2016) 257 
CLR 440, D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1 and Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty 
Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592; (lawyers); South Australian Ambulance Transport Inc. v Walhdeim (1948) 77 CLR 
215; CLAS s 31(2) (physical disability). 
400 Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510, 527 [48] (Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ) citing Cook v Cook 
(1986) 162 CLR 376, 387. 
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These different standards of care are based on one or more factors, many of which were 
discussed by the High Court in Imbree401 which involved a review of the standard of care to 
be applied to an inexperienced car driver. In this case, the first respondent, Jessie McNeilly, 
was a young man of 16 years of age who did not have a learner’s permit and this was known 
by the appellant, Paul Imbree, who allowed McNeilly to drive a four-wheel drive on a wide, 
gravel road between Kings Canyon and Hermannsburg in the Northern Territory. McNeilly 
steered the vehicle to avoid debris on the road then turned sharply the other way while 
accelerating and rolled the vehicle. Imbree suffered spinal injuries that rendered him a 
tetraplegic. Imbree brought proceedings against McNeilly and the owner of the vehicle for 
damages, a sum of $9.5 million was awarded at trial, reduced by 30% on account of 
contributory negligence. On appeal, the New South Wales Court of Appeal found that 
McNeilly had not breached his duty of care, applying Cook v Cook,402 and increased 
contributory negligence to two-thirds. Imbree was granted special leave to appeal to the 
High Court arguing that McNeilly should be held to have owed him the same objective 
standard of care as a licensed driver.  
 
The difficulty for the High Court in Imbree was the necessity to decide whether, in keeping 
with Cook v Cook, the learner driver owed a different standard of care to the instructing 
passenger than the standard of care owed to everyone else in the car and around the car. 
Knowledge of the instructing passenger that the driver was inexperienced was the basis of 
earlier decisions for asserting that by placing him or herself knowingly in a dangerous 
situation, a lower standard of care is to be applied. It is the court’s discussion of the factors 
that impact on deciding what standard of care is to be applied in a negligence matter that 
assists in assessing the appropriate standard of care for a defendant who has a neural 
interface device. It is not suggested, however, that the person with a neural interface device 
is equivalent or analogous to an inexperienced driver. It is simply the analysis conducted by 
the High Court that provides a methodology that assists with the determination of any 
standard of care. 
 
                                            
401 (2008) 236 CLR 510. 
402 Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376. 
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When determining the standard of care owed by the learner driver, Gummow, Hayne and 
Kiefel JJ considered the following principles: 
 
1. The standard to be applied is objective. It does not vary with the particular aptitude or 
temperament of the individual;403 
 
2. The learner driver owes a duty of care to all other road users that requires the learner to 
meet the same standard of care as any other driver on the road. The learner will be held 
to the same standard of care as any other driver in fulfilling the learner’s duty to take 
reasonable care to avoid injuring other road users;404 and 
 
3. Knowledge of inexperience provides no sufficient foundation for applying different 
standards of care in deciding whether a learner driver is liable to one passenger rather 
than another. It is not disputed that the learner driver owes each of those persons a 
standard of care determined by reference to the reasonable driver.405  
 
When applying these principles to a person with a neural interface device, the first principle 
will be complied with if the standard of care is to be that of the reasonable person of ordinary 
prudence, with the same neural interface device in the same, or similar, circumstances, and 
this is to be applied objectively without reference to the individual’s aptitude or temperament.  
 
 In relation to the second principle, when looking at a person with a neural interface device, 
the other people with whom they are to have the same standard of care are not every other 
physically able person, but only those who have a similar neural interface device. The neural 
interface device is not equivalent to a car, it is not a “tool” in the same way that a car is 
disconnected and separate from the driver. Those individuals with a neural interface device 
are not “driving the neural interface device” in the same way as the learner driver is “driving 
the car”. It is the functioning of the neural interface system – the brain, the neural processor 
and the device – that is to be compared with that of an able person with no neural interface 
device. It is the ability of the person to act in unison with the neural interface device that will 
determine the appropriate standard of care that the defendant with a neural interface device 
owes to the public, regardless of what task is being undertaken, be it driving a car, building 
                                            
403 Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510, 528 [53]. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Ibid [54]. 
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a house, transplanting a kidney or any other task chosen. For example, as a driver of a car, 
the standard of care would be that of a reasonable driver with the same, or similar, neural 
interface device in the same, or similar, circumstances.406  
 
The courts have not applied a different standard of care for people who have psychological 
or emotional infirmities.407 The court will not apply a standard of care of a person suffering 
from that particular mental illness but will apply the objective standard expected of the 
ordinary person.408  
 
Whilst a child’s actions in a negligence claim can be judged by the objective standard to be 
expected of an ordinary reasonable child of comparable age, the action of an adult lacking 
capacity because of mental illness in a negligence claim cannot be similarly judged by any 
objective standard of an ordinary reasonable person suffering from the mental illness; if the 
mental illness has deprived the person of capacity then the person has also been deprived 
on rationality and reasonableness. The standard of care must be the objective standard 
expected of the ordinary person.409 
 
However, in situations where a person is physically handicapped, the courts have, in 
assessing contributory negligence, applied the standard of what can be expected from a 
reasonably prudent person suffering from this disability.410 The reasons for this variation are 
not particularly clear but Moran introduces Oliver Wendell Holmes Junior’s argument that 
distinct physical defects, such as blindness and youth, enable the public to recognise that 
certain precautions are impossible so adjustments to the reasonable person may be 
required.411 In South Australian Ambulance Transport Inc v Walhdeim,412 the hearing of the 
plaintiff, who was driving a car that was hit by an ambulance, was defective and the plaintiff 
was acquitted of contributory negligence in failing to hear the ambulance siren. Despite this 
different standard of care, ’the defendant may have to take correspondingly greater 
precautions in other respects to compensate for it’.413 The test of reasonable care in these 
                                            
406 Ibid 521 [27]. 
407 Adamson v Motor Vehicle Trust (1957) 58 WALR 56; Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 474. See also 
above under the heading ‘1 Standard of Care’. 
408 Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 474, 480 [8] (McMurdo P). 
409 Ibid. 
410 Sappideen and Vines above n 370, [7.70]. 
411 Moran, above n 371, 138. 
412 South Australian Ambulance Transport Inc v Walhdeim (1948) 77 CLR 215. 
413 Sappideen and Vines above n 370, [7.70]. 
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situations ’may depend on whether the defendant … embarked upon a task demanding 
alertness having regard to what he or she knew or ought to have known about the 
disability’.414 However, at the time of this case, contributory negligence was a complete 
defence at common law. Contributory negligence is no longer a complete defence as 
apportionment legislation requires the courts to consider what is just when attributing liability 
for contributory negligence.415 
 
There have been cases where physical disability has not afforded any differing of the 
standard of care.416 However, in the Western Australian Court of Appeal decision, Town of 
Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2), Martin CJ stated that the plaintiff’s visual impairment was to 
be taken into account when determining contributory negligence.417 McLure P found that the 
plaintiff’s visual impairment did not alter the standard of care.418 The case involved a 22 year 
old plaintiff, Mr Reece Hodder, who was profoundly deaf, practically blind, virtually unable 
to speak and suffered from spastic diplegia, became a quadriplegic after diving into the 
shallow end of a swimming pool in an aquatic centre.419 The trial judge had concluded that 
he was bound by authority to assess whether Mr Hodder was contributory negligent by 
failing to take adequate care for his own safety on an entirely objective basis, that is, without 
regard to Mr Hodder’s various disabilities.420  
 
Mr Hodder had sufficient visual acuity to make out the diving blocks, but insufficient to know 
the depth of the water in the pool. He had no way of knowing whether he was at the shallow 
end or the deep end of the pool, or even that there was a shallow end or a deep end. When 
                                            
414 Stickley, above n 369, 247 [11.12]. 
415 For contributory negligence for tortfeasors contribution and contributory negligence: CLWACT s 102(1); 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) s 9(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1956 (NT) s 16(1); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) s 10(1); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and 
Tortfeasors Contribution) Act 2001 (SA) ss 7(1), (2); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas) s 4(1); WAVIC s 26(1); Law 
Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors Contribution) Act 1947 (WA) s 4(1).  
For contributory negligence for apportionable claims (Does not include a claim arising out of personal injury 
or by a consumer): CLWACT s 107F(1)(a); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) s 
35(1)(a); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT) s 13(1)(a), Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) s 31; 
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors Contribution) Act 2001 (SA) s 8(2); Wrongs Act 1954 
(Tas) s 43B(1)(a); WAVIC s 24AI(1)(a); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors Contribution) 
Act 1947 (WA) s 5AK(1)(a). 
416 For example, Henderson v Public Transport Commission of New South Wales (1981) 37 ALR 29, 34 
(Gibbs CJ, Murphy and Aickin JJ) where the plaintiff had deficiency with peripheral vision. 
417 Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2) (2012) 43 WAR 383; 445 [259]; Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence and Tortfeasors Contribution) Act 1947 (WA) ss 4(1), 5AK(1)(a). 
418 Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2) (2012) 43 WAR 383; 452 [298]. The majority was Martin CJ and 
McLure P. 
419 Ibid 389 [1]-[2]. 
420 Ibid 389 [5]. 
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he responded to the invitation to dive from the block, it was reasonable for him to assume 
that it was safe for him to do so. He had no way of knowing otherwise. Substantially reducing 
Mr Hodder’s damages on the basis that he failed to take reasonable care to avoid an obvious 
risk of which he knew or ought to have known, when he was induced to think there was no 
risk and had no way of knowing otherwise, is unjust.421 
 
Martin CJ, acknowledging that the trial judge felt bound by authority to assess Mr Hodder’s 
culpability objectively without regard for Mr Hodder’s disabilities, described this injustice in 
the following terms: 
 
The harshness, injustice and unfairness in this approach is manifest. It assumes a miracle of 
biblical proportions and requires the court to assess the question of contributory negligence 
in some parallel universe in which the blind can see, the deaf can hear, the lame can walk or 
even run, and the cognitively impaired are somehow restored to full functionality.422 
 
Martin CJ provided reasons in logic, justice and public policy why different principles should 
be applied to the assessment of whether a plaintiff has failed to take reasonable care for his 
or her own safety, as compared to the principles properly applied in assessing whether a 
defendant is in breach of a duty to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable injury to 
others.423 Martin CJ also considered the Ipp Report424 in the application of the Civil Liability 
Legislation425 and stated: 
 
… the issue which the panel was addressing was the question of whether some more relaxed 
standard should be applied to the assessment of the conduct of victims of tort than that which 
is applied to putative tortfeasors. It follows that the recommendation of the panel to the effect 
that the same standard should be applied in both negligence and contributory negligence 
should be construed in that light … the section properly constructed requires that the court 
determine whether a plaintiff has failed to take reasonable care for his or her own safety by 
reference to the conduct that might be expected of a reasonable person in the position of the 
plaintiff, having any physical defects or incapacities suffered by the plaintiff, or if the plaintiff 
is a child, of the age of the plaintiff, or if the plaintiff is elderly, having regard to the infirmities 
                                            
421 Ibid 422-3 [163] (Martin CJ). 
422 Ibid 420 [156] (Martin CJ). 
423 Ibid 421-3 [159]-[164]. 
424 [8.6]-[8.13], inclusive and Recommendation 30. 
425 The court was considering CLAWA s 5K Standard of Contributory Negligence but did so in the context of 
the other civil liability legislation CLANSW s 5R; CLAQ s 23; CLAS s 44; CLAT s 23; WAVIC s 5K; 
CLAWA s 5B. There are no equivalent provisions in the legislation of the ACT or NT. 
131 
 
that would generally be associated with such an age. The objective nature of the test to be 
imposed requires the court to exclude from consideration idiosyncrasies of temperament, 
behaviour or personality.426 
 
There is a distinct possibility, therefore, that when the court is determining a negligence 
matter involving a person with a neural interface device, it will find an attenuated standard 
of care for this class of persons on the basis of physical disability. In the United States the 
objective standard of care for a person with a physical disability has been applied, for 
example, where an employee was blind.427 Dietrich and Field identify cases where the courts 
have gone further than Martin CJ in Hodder in relation to the standard of care of a plaintiff 
when determining contributory negligence428 but warn that allowances for physical disability 
are unlikely to be applied when determining the standard of care of a defendant. This is 
based on the fundamental normative distinction between ‘a plaintiff whose conduct 
endangers others, and a plaintiff whose conduct merely endangers herself’.429 
 
It could be argued that a person with a neural interface device that cannot interpret neural 
impulses as accurately as the natural body430 has a physical impairment, so this authority 
would support a different standard of care. However, it can also be argued that a person 
with a neural interface device is not physically handicapped but is different from the 
reasonable person because the person has replaced the missing or physically impaired limb 
with a neural interface device and his or her capabilities may be far beyond the person with 
a physical handicap. The neural interface device remains an artificial limb that is controlled 
by the human mind and carries with it imperfections. These imperfections could be regarded 
as a handicap but the artificial limb could also be regarded as simply having different 
operational mechanics from a biological limb. Regardless of which argument the court finds 
most convincing, the standard of care will differ from that of a person who does not have a 
neural interface device as the existence of the neural interface device will be considered. 
 
In determining a breach of this standard, a court will consider whether, as a result of 
extensive training in the operation of the device by a neural interface device technician, the 
                                            
426 Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2) (2012) 43 WAR 383; 435 [215], 439 [232]. 
427 Roberts v State of Louisiana, 396 So 2d 566 (La, 1981). 
428 Dietrich and Field, above n 384, 637, including Goldsmith v Bisset [No 3] (2015) 71 MVR 53. 
429 Ibid 638-9. 
430 Ohnishi, Weir and Kuiken, above n 373, 43. 
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person will know of the potential risks of the neural interface device not functioning in 
complete compliance with the neural impulses as intended. The risk may well be regarded 
as reasonably foreseeable and if determined to be not insignificant, then the person will be 
expected to take reasonable precautions.431 Members of the judiciary who participated in 
the Delphi Method research rated reasonable foreseeability/foreseeable risk of harm in 
relation to breach of duty of care as third most important legal issue while both legal 
practitioners and law academics rated it fourth. 
 
In summary, the neural interface device is not a “tool” as the car is, but an integral part of 
the human body. Similarly, the physically able individuals are “driving” physical limbs, for 
example, while the person with a neural interface device is “driving” something that is not a 
physical limb but a substitute. If the standard of care is to be that of the reasonable person 
of ordinary prudence, with the same neural interface device in the same, or similar, 
circumstances, and this standard requires the person to meet the same standard of care as 
any other person with the same neural interface device, this complies with the second 
principle.  
 
In compliance with principle three, again, this standard of care is determined by reference 
to the reasonable person with a neural interface device and that same standard of care is 
owed to everyone. Recognition of a different standard of care for a person with a neural 
interface device from the person without a neural interface device would have further 
support. In Imbree, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ considered circumstances where the 
common law recognises a different standard of care to be applied.432 This is where the 
standard of care expected of a person or activities is required to exercise a standard of care 
different from, or more particular than, that of some wholly general and objective community 
ideal. They identified this occurrence amongst professionals such as medical practitioners 
and specialist medical practitioners. Their Honours also recognised a different standard of 
care for those at the other end of the spectrum, namely children. They held that in all other 
cases in which a different level of care is demanded, the relevant standard of care is applied 
uniformly. No distinction is drawn according to whether the plaintiff was in a position to 
supervise, even instruct, the defendant although, if the plaintiff was in that position, a failure 
                                            
431 CLANSW s 5B; CLAQ s 9, CLAS s 32; CLAT s 11; WAVIC s 48; CLAWA s 5B. See also Stickley, above 
n 369, 261 [11.46]. 
432 Ibid 532 [69]. 
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to supervise or instruct may be of great importance in deciding whether the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent.433  
 
As was determined by the court: 
 
No amount of supervision or instruction can alter two facts: 
1. Unless the vehicle has been specially modified to permit dual control, it is the learner 
driver, not the supervisor or instructor, who operates the vehicle; and  
2. The skill that is applied in operating the vehicle depends entirely upon the aptitude and 
experience of the learner driver.434  
 
This is not the case with respect to the person with a neural interface device. That person is 
not instructing or supervising the device in the same way as the instructing driver may be 
supervising the learner driver, as they are operating the device and it is their aptitude and 
experience upon which the device is operated. Demonstration of relevant ability, however, 
is beside the point. What is at issue is the definition of a standard of reasonable care, not 
any external recognition of attaining an ability to operate the device in accordance with that 
standard.  
 
Even if the individual was required to hold a licence to certify proficiency in operating the 
neural interface device,435 for the same reasons as the court held in Imbree, to describe the 
relevant comparator as a “licensed person” diverts attention from the central inquiry: What 
would a reasonable person with a neural interface device do? Being authorised by the 
applicable law to have a neural interface device and move freely with the public is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient characteristic of the reasonable person with a neural interface 
device. The reasonable person with a neural interface device is to be identified by what such 
a person would do or not do when acting with a neural interface device, not by what authority 
a person would need to have in order to lawfully be with the public.436 
 
                                            
433 Ibid. 
434 Ibid 532 [66]. 
435 See discussion above under the heading ‘2 Training and Expertise’. 
436 Ibid 530 [58]. 
134 
 
The courts will consider these issues in determining a negligence action where the 
defendant has a neural interface device and the written judgments will guide re-evaluation 
and adaptation of the current law. When discussing the reasons for written judgments, 
Justice Susan Kiefel stated: 
 
The High Court, as the highest appellate court and constitutional court, has other dimensions to 
its role. The reasons for judgment of the court may need to explain a further step taken in the 
development of the law or, in a novel case, the development of the law and the statement of 
principle being the province of the court.437 
 
Not only will future judgments influence the adaptation of the current law, but the courts 
maintain judicial independence from the legislature and executive branches of government 
and this separation of power ensures the judiciary interprets and applies the law without 
intimidation.438 Sir Anthony Mason further defined the independent judiciary: 
 
Now the concept has wider scope and includes independence from media and other external 
“threats”. Institutional independence of courts is challenged by reliance on funding from 
government for the operation of the courts. Depriving a court of its funding could be a serious 
threat to judicial independence as changing judicial remuneration. Judicial independence can 
mean many things, including not influenced by others, this is the more common definition now. 
The object of judicial independence is to preserve impartiality, free from partisanship and 
ideological commitment.439 
 
However, independence within the judiciary can have adverse outcomes. For example:  
 
Concurring majority judgments raise a harder problem. Those which are not merely repetitive 
may introduce reasoning not found in the main judgment and may omit reasoning which is found 
in the main judgment, thus tending to make it harder to find out what the ratio decidendi is.440 
 
                                            
437 Justice Susan Kiefel, ‘Reasons for judgment: objects and observations’ (Speech delivered at the Sir Harry 
Gibbs Law Dinner, Emmanuel College, University of Queensland, 18 May 2012) 3 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/kiefelj/kiefelj-2012-05-18.pdf>. 
438 Anthony Mason, ‘Judicial Independence’ (Paper presented at the Judicial Independence in Australia 
Conference, TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland, 10 July 2015) 
<https://www.ruleoflaw.org.au/judicial-independence-australia/>. 
439 Ibid. 
440 Dyson Heydon, ‘Threats to Judicial Independence – The Enemy Within’ (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 
205, 211. 
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While there is strong pressure for single majority judgments, Heydon J warned of the 
possible infringement of judicial independence within the judiciary if single majority 
judgments and restrictions on the provision of dissenting judgments were pursued.441  
 
Thus, dissenting judgments do not create uncertainty. Nor do separate majority judgments so 
long as a ratio decidendi among the majority can be discerned. The main source of uncertainty 
is discordant dicta among members of the majority, or succeeding majorities. The solution is not 
to shun dissent or multiple majority opinions. It is to minimise dicta of all kinds.442 
 
Therefore, judicial independence enables judges to address any uncertainty in the 
application of the law that will rise when considering alleged negligence of a person with a 
neural interface device. The High Court has displayed its willingness to change the law when 
it determined that the standard of care of a learner driver to the instructing passenger is the 
same, not different from, the standard to be achieved to ensure the safety of any other 
passenger.443 
 
In addition to these principles, the following issues could be considered in determining the 
appropriate standard of care if a matter came before the courts where the defendant was a 
person with a neural interface device. 
 
 
(a) Skill or Knowledge of the Defendant. 
 
As discussed above,444 it could be argued that the defendant requires skill or knowledge to 
operate the neural interface device. This could result in a different standard of care from that 
of a person without a neural interface device in the same circumstances. The skill or 
knowledge of the person with the neural interface device will influence the probability that 
the harm would occur if care were not taken and the burden of taking precautions to avoid 
the risk of harm, both of which the court will consider when determining breach of the duty 
of care.445 Factors that will be of significant influence in the court’s determination of the 
                                            
441 Ibid 211-213. 
442 Ibid 213. 
443 Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510. 
444 Under the heading ‘2 Training and Expertise‘ 
445 CLWACT s 43; CLANSW s 5B; CLAQ s 9; CLAS s 32; CLAT s 11; WAVIC s 48; CLAWA s 5B.  
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appropriate standard of care to be applied to a defendant who has a neural interface device 
in relation to skill or knowledge include the following: 
 
1. To operate the neural interface device, the defendant will gain skill or knowledge through 
training by medical physicians, occupational therapists, physiotherapists, psychologists 
and neural interface device technicians on the procedures necessary to achieve the 
desired reaction by the neural interface device. Just as a child learns to walk and interact 
physically in the world, the defendant will also learn to operate the neural interface device 
and develop competence in the skills necessary to interact with the world around them. 
 
2. Despite the training undertaken by the defendant, there will remain a degree of 
uncertainty as to how, or if, the device will respond or operate in accurate compliance 
with the neural impulses. 
 
3. There will be an inability to anticipate reflex reactions by the neural interface device and 
this links in with sane automatism.446 
 
While it is difficult to conclude what standard of care the court will establish, that standard of 
care of a person with a neural interface device will be different from an individual without a 
neural interface device in the same circumstances as the special skill or competence in 
operating the neural interface device will impact on the standard of care applied.447 
 
(b) Policy Considerations 
 
Any social utility of the arguably risk-creating activity will need to be considered by both 
government and the courts to enable an appropriate balance between public benefit of 
neural interface devices and public risk.448 The legislature in each State or Territory could 
                                            
446 See analysis under the heading ‘2 Neural Interface Device Beyond Being a Tool’. 
447 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 487 cited the following cases as authority: Cook v Cook (1986) 
162 CLR 376, 383-384; Papatonakis v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 156 CLR 7, 36; 
Weber v Land & Business Agents Board (1986) 40 SASR 312, 316; Lewis v Tressider Andrews Associates 
Pty Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 533, 542. 
448 Social utility of a defendant’s conduct has been considered by the court since the introduction of the Civil 
Liability Legislation. The court has found the following conduct to be of social utility: Attending football 
matches (Harris v Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd (2006) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-838), floor to ceiling glass 
plate window (Bader v Jelic [2011] NSWCA 255), physical exercise (Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd (t/as Vision 
Personal Training (Crows Nest)) [2011] NSWCA 63 and sheep shearing (Hill v Richards [2011] NSWCA 
291). 
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amend the Civil Liability Legislation to include factors that need to be taken into account in 
determining the standard of care, such as physical impairment. The legislation could also 
require a person with a neural interface device to acquire compulsory third party liability 
insurance.449 While such legislative amendments might be considered unlikely, these 
changes could be influenced by policy considerations such as the State or Territory 
government’s political initiatives which might be driven by both public and commercial 
interests in the use of neural interface devices.450 While legislative action in this area of 
innovation is possible, the complexity of a civil action where a party has a neural interface 
devices is such that standard of care and the factors to be considered in relation to breach 
of duty of care may be better addressed by the courts.  
 
Policy considerations, such as indeterminate liability451 and coherence of the law452 have 
been considered by the court in relation to the finding of a duty of care and the scope of that 
duty.453 These and other policy factors could be used by the court in determining the scope 
of the duty of care owed by the individual with a neural interface device and this could 
influence the standard of care and consequently breach of the duty of care. This will be 
important in ensuring that liability in negligence of a person with a neural interface device 
does not extend beyond that of a person without a neural interface device and that judicial 
decisions in these types of actions do not undermine the coherency of the law.  
 
It is unlikely that the scope of the duty of care for a person with a neural interface device will 
differ from a person without such a device. However, these policy factors may differ between 
                                            
449 See discussion under the heading ‘2 Compulsory Third Party Insurance‘ regarding Kirby J’s reference to 
compulsory third party liability insurance in Imbree. 
450 Tony Brown, ‘Legislative Capture: A Critical Consideration in the Commercial Determinants of Public 
Health’ (2019) 26 Journal of Law and Medicine 764, 766. 
451 Where the court is reluctant to find the existence of a duty of care when it is uncertain of the extent of the 
liability for the duty of care will extend. This has been expressed as ‘in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class’ in Ultrameres Corp v Touche 174 NE 441, 444 (1931). 
Indeterminate liability has been considered in many cases including Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The 
Dredge ‘Willamstad’ (1976) 136 CLR 529, Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159, Hardie Finance Corporation 
Pty Ltd v Ahern (No 3) [2010] WASC 403 and Carey v Freehills (2013) ALR 445. 
452 Where the court is reluctant to find the existence of a duty of care when it would interfere with the 
coherency of the law, that is, ‘the need to preserve the coherence of other legal principles, or of a statutory 
scheme which governs certain conduct or relationships’ as stated in Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 
580 [50] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ) when referring to Hill v Van Erp (1997) 
188 CLR 159, 231 (Gummow J). Coherency of the law has been considered in other cases including Tame v 
New South Wales 211 CLR 317 and Hunter and New England Local Health District v McKenna; Hunter and 
New England Local Health District v Simon (2014) 253 CLR 270. 
453 In addition to the cases provided in the previous two footnotes, other cases where policy considerations 
have been considered by the court include Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1, Gifford v Strang 
Patrick Stevedoring (2003) 214 CLR 269 and Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Limited (2005) 222 CLR 44 . 
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each member of the bench, as was the case in Cattanach v Melchior,454 so uncertainty in 
the scope of liability owed by an individual with a neural interface device will be addressed 
by the courts over time. 
 
Similar findings have occurred in the United States where, for example, the court in Galindo 
v TMT Transport, Inc.455 stated that the public is best served by applying the reasonable 
person standard of care to the facts of each case, rather than by fashioning various 
subjective tests to determine in retrospect what standard of care should have been applied 
to the facts and circumstances of each case.456 The Restatement (Third) of Torts §11(c)457 
confirms this but exceptions exist where, for example, a person who experienced sudden 
hallucinations while driving was found to owe a different standard of care from the 
reasonable prudent person.458 Decisions in the Canadian courts have gone in both 
directions. For example, the Alberta Court of Appeal in Wenden v Trikla459 found the 
standard of care of a reasonable person applied to a person with a psychiatric condition but 
the courts decided differently in Buckley v Smith Transport,460 Hutchings v Nevin,461 
Attorney-General of Canada v Connolly462 and Fiala v Cechmanek.463  
 
The uncertainty of legislative intervention in influencing the standard of care or breach of the 
duty of care of a person with a neural interface device will be determined in the future. 
Likewise, the possibility of the courts deciding on the scope of duty of care by including 
policy considerations such as indeterminate liability and coherence of the law, is yet to be 
determined. However, it is unlikely that amendment of the Civil Liability Legislation will occur 
unless inconsistency in court decisions arise. This could be as a result of uncertainty by 
members of the judiciary in relation to the interpretation and application of the Civil Liability 
Legislation. Amendment of the Civil Liability Legislation might also occur if the application of 
the current law produces results that raise public pressure on politicians to effect a change. 
                                            
454 (2003) 215 CLR 1. Six separate judgments were delivered: Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ, Kirby 
J, Callinan J, Hayne J (dissenting) and Heydon J (dissenting). 
455 152 Ariz. 434, 733 P.2d 631, 633. 
456 American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts §283, 20-21. 
457 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (American 
Law Institute, 2012). 
458 Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co., 45 Wis.2d 536, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970). 
459 (1993) 14 CCLT (2d) 225 (Alberta CA). 
460 [1946] 4 DLR 721 (Ontario CA). 
461 (1992) 12 CCLT 259 (Ontario General Division). 
462 (1989) 64 DLR (4th) 84 (SC). 
463 (2001) 201 DLR (4th) 680 (Alberta CA). 
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Likewise, policy considerations will assist the court to ensure the scope of duty of care of a 
person with a neural interface device does not differ from that of a person without such a 
device. 
 
(c) Perceived Differences from a Person Without a Neural Interface Device. 
 
Whether or not another person can recognise that the defendant has a neural interface 
device, the person with the neural interface device is expected and required to use due care 
and diligence. Members of the public could expect that the neural interface device is 
equivalent to a natural arm but this is not the case.464 This needs to be recognised when 
determining the appropriate standard of care as this could be different from the standard of 
care of a person in the same circumstances without a neural interface device. 
 
 
4 Whether the Inference of Negligence (res ipsa loquitur) Applies 
 
Recognising the complexity of the science behind the integration of mind and machine, 
outlined in chapter 2, it could be argued that a person with a neural interface device is ”an 
accident waiting to happen”. Res ipsa loquitur, ‘the matter speaks for itself’, is a legal maxim 
for ‘those special cases in which mere proof of an occurrence causing injury itself constitutes 
prima facie evidence of negligence.’465 
 
The maxim applies when the exact sequence of events leading to the accident is unclear or 
is not capable of proof.466 Evidence or common knowledge must establish that such an 
accident is unlikely to occur without negligence on the part of the defendant.467 
 
In Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings, Gleeson CJ and McHugh J stated that the authorities 
make it clear that: 
 
                                            
464 Ohnishi, Weir and Kuiken, above n 373, 43. 
465 Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 99, 112-117 [15]-[19] (Dixon CJ, Web, Fullagar and Taylor JJ). 
Their Honours discuss the application of this concept stating, at 114 [16] that it is a ‘general index to those 
special cases in which mere proof of an occurrence causing injury itself constitutes prima facie evidence of 
negligence’.  
466 Anchor Products Ltd v Hedges (1966) 115 CLR 493, 500 (Windeyer J). 
467 Piening v Wanless (1968) 117 CLR 498, 508 (Barwick CJ). 
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A plaintiff may rely on res ipsa loquitur even though he or she has also pleaded particular acts 
or omissions of negligence on the part of the defendant provided that the tribunal of fact 
concludes that:  
1. there is an "absence of explanation" of the occurrence that caused the injury; 
2. the occurrence was of such a kind that it does not ordinarily occur without negligence; and 
3. the instrument or agency that caused the injury was under the control of the defendant.468 
 
If the plaintiff pleads res ipsa loquitur, legal onus is not placed on the defendant to disprove 
the plaintiff’s claim,469 but adverse inferences might be drawn as a result.470 The onus 
remains on the plaintiff to provide evidence of negligence471 or ‘evidence from which 
negligence may be inferred’472 and ‘it is always necessary that the accident be of a kind 
which does not ordinarily occur without negligence’.473 
 
In Canada, res ipsa loquitur had become regarded as a separate component in negligence 
actions until the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Fontaine v British Columbia 
(Official Administrator).474 The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Major who 
stated that the appeal provided an opportunity for the Court ‘to consider the so-called maxim 
of res ipsa loquitur. What is it? When does it arise? And what effect does its application 
have?’475 
 
After considerable analysis, the Court concluded: 
 
Whatever value res ipsa loquitur may have once provided is gone. Various attempts to apply the 
so-called doctrine have been more confusing than helpful. Its use has been restricted to cases 
where the facts permitted an inference of negligence and there was no other reasonable 
explanation for the accident. Given its limited use it is somewhat meaningless to refer to that use 
as a doctrine of law. 
                                            
468 (2000) 200 CLR 121, 134 [25]. 
469 Davis v Bunn (1936) 56 CLR 246; Fitzpatrick v Walter E Cooper Pty Ltd (1936) 54 CLR 200; Mummery v 
Irvings Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 99. In Canada, this was stated in Fontaine v British Columbia (Official 
Administrator) [1998] 1 SCR 424, 426 [23] (Major J). 
470 Stickley, above n 369, 286 [11.104]. 
471 Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 493. 
472 Railway Commissioner v Corben [1939] SR (NSW) 55. See also Stickley, above n 369, 286 [11.106]. 
473 Stickley, above n 369, 286 [11.107]. 
474 [1998] 1 SCR 424. 
475 Fontaine v British Columbia (Official Administrator) [1998] 1 SCR 424, 426 [1]. 
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It would appear that the law would be better served if the maxim was treated as expired and no 
longer used as a separate component in negligence actions. After all, it was nothing more than 
an attempt to deal with circumstantial evidence. That evidence is more sensibly dealt with by the 
trier of fact, who should weigh the circumstantial evidence with the direct evidence, if any, to 
determine whether the plaintiff has established on a balance of probabilities a prima facie case 
of negligence against the defendant. Once the plaintiff has done so, the defendant must present 
evidence negating that of the plaintiff or necessarily the plaintiff will succeed.476 
 
The circumstance of each case must be considered before a determination of negligence 
can be made, despite the plaintiff pleading res ipsa loquitur.477 ‘Where there is direct 
evidence available as to how an accident occurred, the case must be decided on that 
evidence alone.’478 In this way, the application of res ipsa loquitur in Canada is in line with 
that of Australia, despite the legal maxim continuing to exist in Australia. 
 
In the United States of America, the application of res ipsa loquitur is provided in The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §17.479 The 
Background of the section states: 
 
Res ipsa loquitur is an appropriate form of circumstantial evidence enabling the plaintiff in 
particular cases to establish the defendant's likely negligence. Hence, the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine, properly applied, does not entail any covert form of strict liability. 
 
Indeed, the availability of res ipsa loquitur in one sense weakens the case on behalf of strict 
liability. One argument favoring strict liability is that the unavailability of evidence in some cases 
renders the plaintiff unable to establish what may well have been the defendant's actual 
negligence. By providing the plaintiff in such cases with an alternative method of proving the 
defendant's negligence, res ipsa loquitur reduces the need for strict liability. 
 
However, res ipsa loquitur is circumstantial evidence of a quite distinctive form. The doctrine 
implies that the court does not know, and cannot find out, what actually happened in the individual 
                                            
476 Ibid 435 [26]–[27]. 
477 Ibid 426 [20]. 
478 Ibid 426 [21]. 
479 Chapter 3 The Negligence Doctrine and Negligence Liability, §17 Res ipsa loquitur. 
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case. Instead, the finding of likely negligence is derived from knowledge of the causes of the type 
or category of accidents involved.480 
 
In a res ipsa case, the jury should be invited to compare those causes of the type of accident 
that suggest the negligence of the defendant with all other causes (whether negligent or not), 
and to find in favor of res ipsa if the former predominate.481 
 
The High Court considered the application of res ipsa loquitur in judgments from other 
jurisdictions and in Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings stated: 
 
The plaintiff contends that the application of res ipsa loquitur has accumulated a number of 
"encrustations" in the course of its judicial history that have hardened the maxim into a rigid 
rule of law, when it is merely a factor to be weighed "with the direct evidence to determine 
whether the plaintiff had established, on a balance of probabilities, a case." The plaintiff urged 
the Court to follow the Supreme Court of Canada in Fontaine v British Columbia (Official 
Administrator) and abolish the maxim "as a separate component in negligence actions". To 
do so, it was said, would be "consonant with the steps taken by this court to absorb isolated 
pockets of technical law into a context appropriate to its original rationale" as this Court did 
in Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna and Burnie Port Authority v General Jones 
Pty Ltd. 
 
In our opinion, this Court should not follow that course. The Court has affirmed time and again 
that res ipsa loquitur is merely a mode of inferential reasoning and is not a rule of law. The 
"encrustations" that the plaintiff alleges do not exist. The fact that a plaintiff falls outside the 
"proper scope" of the rule does not mean that he or she may not avail himself or herself of 
inferential reasoning. There is therefore no need to subsume the maxim into the general body 
of tort law: it is already fully consonant with it. 482 
 
It appears, therefore, that the use of res ipsa loquitur in the United States is similar to its 
application by the Australian courts. It could be argued that as a result of the inability for the 
neural interface device to interpret neural impulses as accurately as the natural body,483 the 
person with the neural interface device is more likely to make errors that cause damage to 
                                            
480 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Chapter 3 The Negligence Doctrine and Negligence 
Liability, §17 Res ipsa loquitur 1-2. 
481 Ibid 2-4. 
482 (2000) 200 CLR 121, 140-1 [46]-[47] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh). 
483 Ohnishi, Weir and Kuiken, above n 373, 43. 
143 
 
others. As a result, the court will not be required to determine the degree to which the neural 
interface device and the human body have contributed to the event, suffice to say the 
combination of both has caused the injury. Therefore, res ipsa loquitur could be raised by 
the plaintiff against a person with a neural interface device on the basis that the damage has 
occurred as a result of the combined negligence of the person and the neural interface 
device, without the need to determine the contribution of each. However, res ipsa loquitur is 
unlikely to be pleaded because inferential reasoning would, in most cases, eliminate one of 
the factors necessary, as outlined above in Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings.484 
 
This analysis of the element of breach of duty of care when a person has a neural interface 
device has identified the possibility that the standard of care expected of a person with a 
neural interface device will be different from that applied to a person without such a device. 
The concept of revolutionary science485 applied to this analysis highlights that recognition 
by the courts of a different standard of care to be applied to a defendant with a neural 
interface device than a defendant without the device could be regarded as anomalous to the 
current law.  
 
D Causation 
 
Damage is the gist of negligence,486 but there can be no liability unless the damage suffered 
by the plaintiff is caused by the defendant’s breach of duty of care. This involves 
consideration of both factual causation and scope of liability pursuant to the Civil Liability 
Legislation. For example, in the CLAQ: 
 
11 General principles  
(1) A decision that a breach of duty caused particular harm comprises the following 
elements—  
(a) the breach of duty was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm 
(factual causation);  
                                            
484 (2000) 200 CLR 121, 134 [25]. Those necessary factors to enable res ipsa loquitur to be pleaded are: 
1. there is an "absence of explanation" of the occurrence that caused the injury; 
2. the occurrence was of such a kind that it does not ordinarily occur without negligence; and 
3. the instrument or agency that caused the injury was under the control of the defendant. 
485 Kuhn, above n 2. 
486 Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52, 78 [78] (Kirby J); 102 [161] (Hayne J); 115 [218], 126 [251] 
(Crennan J). 
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(b) it is appropriate for the scope of the liability of the person in breach to extend to 
the harm so caused (scope of liability).487  
 
Section 11(1)(a) reflects the established principles at common law and application of the 
‘but for’ test488 while s 11(1)(b) extends the common law concept of remoteness in that, for 
the purpose of deciding the scope of liability, the court is to consider (among other relevant 
things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the party 
who was in breach of the duty.489 In the articulation of causation at common law, ‘the distinct 
nature of these two questions has tended to be overlooked’.490 ‘Causation at law is not so 
much a question of what caused the plaintiff’s loss but what specific conduct (i.e. an act or 
omission) of the defendant caused that loss.’491 Both factual causation and scope of liability 
are discussed below.  
 
In the Delphi Method research conducted and discussed in chapter 3, participants ranked 
causation 9th most importance out of the 23 legal issues identified by participants. A legal 
practitioner who participated in the Delphi Method research stated:  
 
I analyse it in this way. First, if there were perfect translation of the brain's instructions then one 
would be analysing the issues of any injury scenario in the usual way: primarily negligence and 
if there was a prosthetic arm by an examination of whether that made any difference. The only 
thing changed by the neural interface is the risk of imperfect translation. That won't affect the 
articulation of the existence of the duty or the identification of the standard of care, it will just 
affect assessment of risk and manner of causation.  And of course, difficulties of proof (because 
the question of whether, and if so, the degree of imperfect translation will be something entirely 
within the mind of the defendant). 
 
                                            
487 CLWACT s 45; CLANSW 5D; CLAS s 34; CLAT s 13; WAVIC s 51; CLAWA s 5C. There is no equivalent 
provision in the Northern Territory. 
488 March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 515-9 (Mason CJ). 
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490 Tony Bowen, ‘Section 5D of Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW): Causation’ (Speech delivered 22 March 2017) 
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CLR 375. 
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‘Duty of care is a thing written on the wind unless damage is caused by the breach of that 
duty: There is no actionable negligence unless duty, breach and consequential damage 
coincide’.492  
In addition, in Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal,493 the High Court decided that simply 
because a risk of harm exists, a failure to fulfil the duty of care is insufficient to establish 
liability in negligence. The breach of the duty of care must be ‘a necessary condition of the 
occurrence of the particular harm.’494 
 
Prior to the introduction of Civil Liability Legislation, Kirby J in Modbury Triangle Shopping 
Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil,495 said ‘causation in fact is a matter to be determined from all of the 
evidence and the inferences drawn from the evidence. As has been said many times, it is a 
question that requires the application of common sense’. Professor Jane Stapleton of the 
Australian National University College of Law, asserts that this ‘common sense’ causation 
means the court can ‘infer facts from common experience.’496 However, Stapleton argues 
that judgments, such as Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal:497  
 
highlight the danger of this, in that a court will elide proof of breach … and foreseeable result … 
with proof that the breach was a factual cause of that result … and fail adequately to consider 
whether there was, on the evidence, any “sufficient reason to the contrary”.498  
 
This use of ‘common sense principles of causation’ was promoted by Hart and Honoré499 
resulting in the blurring of the distinction between factual causation and scope of liability by 
the judiciary, especially when intervening acts were involved.500 Stapleton recognises that 
consequently: 
 
Some judges will be tempted to present their determinations relating to truncation [scope of 
liability] without adequate normative justification. Accompanying this is the risk that, so long as 
                                            
492 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Canny (1981) 148 CLR 210, 241 (Brennan J). 
493 (2008) 82 ALJR 870. 
494 Strong v Woolworths (2012) 246 CLR 182, 191 [20]. 
495 (2000) 205 CLR 254, [92] where his Honour cites as authority, March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 
171 CLR 506 and Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, [93]. 
496 Stapleton, Jane, ‘Factual Causation’ (2010) 38(3) Federal Law Review 467, 469. 
497 (2008) 82 ALJR 870. 
498 Stapleton, ‘Factual Causation’, above n 496, 469. 
499 Herbert L A Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law (Clarendon Press, 2nd edition, 1985), 11. 
500 Stapleton, ‘Factual Causation’, above n 496, 469-70. 
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both the factual issue of historical involvement and the normative issue of the truncation of liability 
are framed as ‘causal’ questions, a trial judge may not easily recognise whether statements in 
previous appellate cases concerning ‘causation’ relate to historical involvement or truncation.501 
 
This blurring of the distinction between factual causation and scope of liability was 
addressed but not resolved by the Ipp Report.502 Despite the Ipp Report acknowledging a 
need to clarify causation terminology by separating factual causation and the scope of 
liability: 
 
Bizarrely, however, the Ipp Report chose to retain the umbrella term of ‘causation’ to signify the 
amalgam of both issues. So it was that, at the very time the American Law Institute was stripping 
the truncation issue of its misleading causal label throughout the law of torts, the Ipp Report was 
entrenching that barrier to clarity of legal analysis in Australia: for all Australian States plus the 
Australian Capital Territory503 followed the Ipp Report recommendation and legislatively adopted 
the ‘causation’ umbrella term albeit only in the limited field covered by that Report, namely where 
the focus is on the ‘fault of a person (the “tortfeasor”),504 ‘negligence’505 or a ‘breach of duty’.506 
 
As Stapleton asserts: 
 
My view is that it is analytically more efficient if a single meaning for the notion of “cause” is 
adopted throughout the law, one that is a question of fact: In law it should be the case that either 
a “causal connection” exists between a breach and the result or it does not. This would lessen 
the second danger because, after resolution of this factual cause question, courts would then 
need to confront the complex normative issues that affect the “appropriate scope of liability for 
consequences of breach” without being tempted by the camouflage of vacuous causal 
assertions. Within this normative step of the analysis would fall the principles, rules and concerns 
traditionally labelled in terms of “remoteness of damage”, “mitigation of damages”, “proximate 
causation” and so on.507 
 
                                            
501 Ibid 471. 
502 Commonwealth of Australia, above n 355, 109 (footnote 6); 117-8 (Recommendation 29). 
503 CLWACT s 45; CLANSW s 5D; CLAQ s 11; CLAS s 34; CLAT s 13; WAVIC s 51; CLAWA s 5C. Neither 
the Northern Territory nor the Commonwealth has implemented any provision relating to 'causation'. 
504 CLAWA s 5C(1). 
505 CLWACT s 45(1); CLANSW s 5D(1); CLAS s 34(1); WAVIC s 51(1). 
506 CLAQ s 11(1); CLAT s 13(1); Stapleton, ‘Factual Causation’, above n 496, 471. 
507 Jane Stapleton, ‘Reflections on Common Sense Causation in Australia’ in Simone Degeling, James 
Edelman and James Goudkamp (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Thomsons, 2011) 331, 353. 
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The solution, suggests Stapleton, is for the Australian courts to quietly ignore the umbrella 
term both under the Civil Liability Legislation and elsewhere, resist ‘the temptation to refer 
to “common sense causation” and proceed directly to the analysis of the separate issues of 
factual causation and scope of liability.’508  
 
In summary, Stapleton argues for: 
  
an analytical structure that provides a clear separation between two questions: whether the 
defendant’s breach of the legal rule contributed in any way to the occurrence of the result of 
which the plaintiff complains (the “factual causation” question); and if so, whether in the context 
of the relevant legal rule the defendant should be legally responsible for this result of his breach 
(the normative “scope-of-liability-for-consequences-of breach” question).509 
 
Recognising the causation issues raised by Stapleton regarding the blurring of the distinction 
between factual causation and scope of liability, the following analysis of causation where 
the defendant has a neural interface device is undertaken. 
 
1 Factual Causation 
 
Six participants in the Delphi Method research considered that the issue of factual causation 
in the damage element of a negligence action against a person with a neural interface device 
will be of importance. This issue was centred around the technical aspects of the neural 
interface device and law academic A1 said ‘Factual challenges will likely arise in causation’ 
while participant P7 stated, ‘The questions of causation are likely to be difficult’. For factual 
causation to be satisfied under Civil Liability Legislation, the breach of the duty of care by 
the person with a neural interface device will need to be a necessary condition for the 
occurrence of the harm through the application of the ‘but for’ test.510 For example, CLAQ 
s 11(1)(a) provides that ‘the breach of duty was a necessary condition of the occurrence of 
the harm (factual causation).’ 
 
                                            
508 Stapleton, ‘Factual Causation’, above n 496, 471. 
509 Stapleton, ‘Reflections on Common Sense Causation in Australia’, above n 507, 350. 
510 Wallace v Kam [2012] NSWCA 82, Strong v Woolworths (2012) 246 CLR 182, 190 [18] and Adeels 
Palace v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420. Where there are multiple causes Zanner v Zanner (2010) 79 
NSWLR 702. CLWACT s 45, CLANSW s 5D, CLAQ s 11, CLAS s 34, CLAT s 13, WAVIC s 51 and CLAWA 
s 5C. There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. 
148 
 
In essence, the test establishes whether, “but for” the breach of duty of care of the defendant, 
the plaintiff would not have suffered the harm.511 In the context of the person with a neural 
interface device being a defendant in a negligence action, the test would be applied to the 
person with the neural interface device but the court would need to determine whether the 
person’s negligence was a necessary condition of the harm.512 The determination of 
causation under the legislation ‘is nothing more or less than a determination on the balance 
of probabilities that the harm that in fact occurred would not have occurred absent the 
negligence’.513 Proving that it is a necessary condition of the harm is ‘entirely factual, turning 
on proof by the plaintiff of relevant facts on the balance of probabilities’.514 Where there are 
a number of circumstances that could have caused the harm, the High Court has recognised 
that the ‘defendant’s negligent act or omission which is necessary to complete a set of 
conditions that are jointly sufficient to account for the occurrence of harm will meet the test 
of factual causation within’ the civil liability provision for factual causation.515 
 
The High Court in Strong v Woolworths516 acknowledged March v Stramare517 when 
considering the statutory statement of the ‘but for’ test.518 Despite this, the High Court of 
Australia, in Strong v Woolworths, applied the established principles from March v Stramare 
to the ‘but for’ test. Prior to the introduction of Civil Liability Legislation, the dangers of 
applying the ‘but for’ test with the exclusion of common sense was considered by Mason CJ 
                                            
511 ‘The determination of factual causation under s 5D(1)(a) is a statutory statement of the “but for” test of 
causation: the plaintiff would not have suffered the particular harm but for the defendant’s negligence.’ In 
Strong v Woolworths (2012 246 CLR 182, 190 [19] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
512 Strong v Woolworths (2012) 246 CLR 182, 191 [20]. 
513 Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 383 [16]. 
514 Ibid 383 [14]. 
515 Strong v Woolworths (2012) 246 CLR 182, 191 [20]. The provision referred to in this case was CLANSW 
s 5D(1)(a): 
5D General principles  
(1) A determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises the following elements:  
(a) that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm ("factual 
causation"), and  
(b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to the harm so 
caused ("scope of liability").  
Equivalent provisions: CLWACT s 45(1)(a), CLAQ s 11(1)(a), CLAS s 34(1)(a), CLAT s 13(1)(a), WAVIC 
s 51(1)(a) and CLAWA s 5C(1)(a). 
516 (2012) 246 CLR 182, 190 [18]. 
517 (1991) 171 CLR 506, 515-516 (Mason CJ). 
518 For a discussion on the use of the common law ‘but for’ test in the application of the statutory ‘but for’ test, 
see Greg Williams and Sheena McKie, But for Still a Necessary Condition for Causation (5 December 2012) 
<https://www.claytonutz.com/knowledge/2012/december/but-for-still-a-necessary-condition-for-causation>. 
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in March v Stramare.519 When applying the ‘but for’ test in circumstances where two or more 
acts or events would each be sufficient to cause injury to the plaintiff, Mason CJ stated that 
these circumstances, ‘demonstrate the lesson of experience, namely, that the test, applied 
as an exclusive criterion of causation, yields unacceptable results and that the results which 
it yields must be tempered by the making of value judgments and the infusion of policy 
considerations.’520 Mason CJ said: 
 
In similar fashion, the “but for” test does not provide a satisfactory answer in those cases in 
which a superseding cause, described as a novus actus interveniens, is said to break the 
chain of causation which would otherwise have resulted from an earlier wrongful act.521  
 
In conclusion, Mason CJ said: 
 
As a matter of both logic and common sense, it makes no sense to regard the negligence of 
the plaintiff or a third party as a superseding cause or novus actus interveniens when the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct has generated the very risk or injury resulting from the 
negligence of the plaintiff or a third party and that injury occurs in the ordinary course of 
things. In such a situation, the defendant’s negligence satisfies the “but for” test and is 
properly to be regarded as a cause of the consequence because there is no reason in 
common sense, logic or policy for refusing to so regard it.522 
 
The High Court in Strong v Woolworths restated the two limitations of the ‘but for’ test: 
 
First, it produces anomalous results in particular cases, exemplified by those in which there 
is more than one sufficient condition of the plaintiff’s harm. Second, it does not address the 
policy considerations that are bound up in the attribution of legal responsibility for harm (32). 
 
32 Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1 at 6-7 per Deane, Dawson, 
Toohey and Gaudron JJ; Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 at 255-256 [62]-[63] per Gummow J; 
Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (t/as R Tambree & Associates) (2005) 224 CLR 627 at 639 
[28] per Gleeson CJ; Roads and Traffıc Authority v Royal (2008) 82 ALJR 870 at 878 [32]; 245 ALR 
653 at 662-663 per Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ; at 896; 687 [135] per Kiefel J.523 
                                            
519 (1991) 171 CLR 506, 515-9. 
520 March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 516. 
521 Ibid 517. 
522 Ibid 518-9. 
523 (2012) 246 CLR 182, 190-1 [18] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
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Therefore, when considering factual causation, these limitations also apply to the statutory 
‘but for’ test. To assist, the High Court stated: 
 
Under the statute, factual causation requires proof that the defendant’s negligence was a 
necessary condition of the occurrence of the particular harm (37). A necessary condition is a 
condition that must be present for the occurrence of the harm. However, there may be more 
than one set of conditions necessary for the occurrence of particular harm and it follows that 
a defendant’s negligent act or omission which is necessary to complete a set of conditions 
that are jointly sufficient to account for the occurrence of the harm will meet the test of factual 
causation within s 5D(1)(a) (38). In such a case, the defendant’s conduct may be described 
as contributing to the occurrence of the harm. 
 
37 As McHugh J points out in March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 at 529-530, 
the concept of a condition that is necessary to an occurrence is the lawyers’ adaptation of John 
Stuart Mill’s theory that the cause of an event is the sum of the conditions which are jointly sufficient 
to produce it. See also Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd ed (1985), pp 68-69, 109-114. 
 
38 Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed (1998), p 219; March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 
CLR 506 at 509 per Mason CJ. See also Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd ed (1985), 
p 18.524 
 
Delphi Method research participant, legal practitioner L2, stated that a technical issue of 
primary importance will be an evaluation of the risk caused by the imperfect translation of 
the brain's instructions:  
 
I analyse it in this way. First, if there were perfect translation of the brain's instructions then 
one would be analysing the issues of any injury scenario in the usual way: primarily 
negligence and if there was a prosthetic arm by an examination of whether that made any 
difference. The only thing changed by the neural interface is the risk of imperfect translation. 
That won't affect the articulation of the existence of the duty or the identification of the 
standard of care, it will just affect assessment of risk and manner of causation.  And of course, 
difficulties of proof (because the question of whether, and if so, the degree of imperfect 
translation will be something entirely within the mind of the defendant). 
 
Therefore, to assist with analysis of factual causation, the following scenario is provided. 
 
                                            
524 Strong v Woolworths (2012) 246 CLR 182, 191-2 [20]. Section 5D(1)(a) can be viewed at footnote 515 
and equivalent provisions are identified. 
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(a) The Scenario 
 
In the context of an event involving a person with a neural interface device, factual causation 
will be difficult to determine. For example, a person with neuroprosthetic legs (NID driver) is 
driving a regular motor car along a side street and fails to stop at an intersection that has a 
‘Give Way’ sign facing the NID driver. As they move through the intersection, a vehicle that 
has right of way passes in front of the NID driver and the NID driver’s car collides with the 
side of the other car. The NID driver has an established duty of care to drive with due care 
and attention to avoid harming other drivers or those alongside the road.525 Failing to give 
way, together with other factors such as the NID driver acting with regard to the limitations 
of the neuroprosthetic legs, may enable to the Court to find a breach of the duty of care. For 
the purposes of discussing causation, it has been determined that the NID driver has 
breached their duty of care. When it comes to the final element damage, the court will need 
to determine whether the NID driver’s breach was a necessary condition for the harm to 
have occurred, that is, the harm would not have occurred absent the breach. 
 
If the breach of duty of care of the NID driver is a condition that must be present for the 
occurrence of the damage to the other car, then it will be a necessary condition that will 
satisfy the Civil Liability Legislation ‘but for’ test of causation.526 However, any of the 
following may be alleged to have also occurred, in relation to the limitations of neural 
interface technology as discussed in chapter 2:527 
 
• The neural impulse sent from the brain to apply the brakes before the intersection 
was not detected by the decoder. 
• The neural impulse sent from the brain to apply the brakes before the intersection 
was misinterpreted by the decoder as an instruction to apply the assistive device, that 
is, the neuroprosthetic leg, to the accelerator. 
• The neural impulse sent from the brain to apply the brakes before the intersection 
was correctly communicated by the decoder to the neuroprosthetic leg but there was 
                                            
525 Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296, Loveday v Paddison [1965] Qd R 535, Manley v Alexander (2005) 
223 ALR 228 and Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510. 
526 CLWACT s 45; CLANSW s 5D; CLAQ s 11; CLAS s 34; CLAT s 13; WAVIC s 51; CLAWA s 5C. There is 
no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. 
527 See analysis under the heading ‘D Limitations of Neural Interface Device Technology’. 
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insufficient time for the neuroprosthetic leg to respond before entering the 
intersection. 
• The neural impulse sent from the brain to apply the brakes before the intersection 
was correctly communicated by the decoder to the assistive device but insufficient 
pressure was applied to brakes. 
• Sensing information sent from the neuroprosthetic leg to the decoder that the 
neuroprosthetic leg had not made contact with the brake pedal was not 
communicated to the brain. 
• Sensing information sent from the neuroprosthetic leg to the decoder that contact had 
been made with the brake pedal was communicated to the brain but was 
misinterpreted by the person as failure to make contact with the brake pedal. 
• Sensing information sent from the neuroprosthetic leg to the decoder regarding the 
pressure being applied to the brake pedal was communicated to the brain but 
insufficient pressure was applied to brakes. 
• Power within the decoder was less than necessary for normal speed of processing 
and this interfered with the speed of decoding neural impulse, delaying instructions 
being sent to the neuroprosthetic leg. 
• The computing capacity of the neuroprosthetic leg could not enable the device to act 
as quickly as a biological leg, so the application of pressure to the brake pedal was 
not as effective. 
 
It could be argued that it is one of these events that satisfies the ‘but for’ test of factual 
causation for the harm that occurred and not the breach of the duty owed by the NID driver 
to the other driver. If this is the case, the complexity of any of these events, incorporating 
the communication between the human brain and the neuroprosthetic legs, is such that the 
court will find it extremely difficult to determine whether liability should fall solely on the NID 
driver, solely on the manufacturer of the neural interface device or shared between the two 
of them. This dilemma is discussed below under the heading ‘3 Liability of Neural Interface 
Device Manufacturer and the NID Driver’. 
 
However, in relation to factual causation, determination of whether it was an incorrect 
command from the brain or incorrect decoding of the neural impulse, will also be incredibly 
difficult for the court to determine. The court will look at the actions of the defendant and 
what a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have done. Intention of the 
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defendant does not play a role but in these circumstances, the command from the brain 
needs to be known to determine what happened and who should be liable. Several problems 
may exist in relation to the scenario above, including the defendant asserting that the 
command was to apply the brake but the neuroprosthetic leg did not do that or did not apply 
the brake with the force intended by the command. If the decoder records show that the 
command was not what the defendant says it was, who is the court to believe? To what 
extent will the evidence of the decoder be admissible? If the decoder records are admissible, 
what probity will be applied to that evidence? Chapter 6 briefly discusses this evidentiary 
dilemma.528 
 
As discussed in chapter 2,529 the decoding of neural impulse is extremely complicated and 
not 100 per cent accurate. In addition, the knowledge of how the human brain functions is 
still being acquired, so it is arguable that the science enabling the melding of mind and 
machine is not completely understood and the court may be unable to disentangle the 
specific roles the individual and the neural interface device played in causing the car 
accident. As a result of the difficulty in determining exactly what occurred in the 
communication between the mind and the neural interface device, it might be argued that 
this creates an evidentiary gap that precludes the NID driver’s negligence in relation to an 
accident from satisfying the ‘but for’ test of causation. This evidentiary gap may give rise to 
what has been recognised in tort law as an exceptional case, as provided for in Civil Liability 
Legislation.530  
 
Referring to the Ipp Report, the majority in the High Court decision, Strong v Woolworths,531 
stated the circumstances in which an exceptional case might arise: 
 
The Ipp Report instanced two categories of such cases. The first category involves the 
cumulative operation of factors in the occurrence of the total harm in circumstances in which 
the contribution of each factor to that harm is unascertainable.532 Bonnington Castings533 was 
                                            
528 See chapter 6 under the heading ‘3 Neuroscientific Evidence’ located under the heading ‘G Further 
Research Opportunities’. 
529 See analysis under the heading ‘D Limitations of Neural Interface Device Technology’. 
530 CLWACT s 45(2), CLANSW s 5D(2), CLAQ s11(2), CLAS s 34(2), CLAT s 13(2), WAVIC s 51(2), CLAWA 
s 5C(2) provide for tests other than the ‘but for’ test but do not call these exceptional cases. There is no 
equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. 
531 (2012) 246 CLR 182, 194 [25] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
532 Ipp Report, 109 [7.28]. 
533 [1956] AC 613 but the citation for this case was not footnoted in this paragraph of the judgment. 
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said to exemplify cases in this category. The second category involves negligent conduct that 
materially increases the risk of harm in circumstances in which the state of scientific or 
medical knowledge makes it impossible to prove the cause of the plaintiff’s harm.534 Fairchild 
v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd535 was said to exemplify cases in this category.  
 
The majority536 then discussed material increase in risk and materially contributes: 
 
Whether negligent conduct resulting in a material increase in risk may be said to admit of 
proof of causation in accordance with established principles under the common law of 
Australia has not been considered by this Court.537 Negligent conduct that materially 
contributes to the plaintiff’s harm but which cannot be shown to have been a necessary 
condition of its occurrence may, in accordance with established principles,538 be accepted as 
establishing factual causation, subject to the normative considerations to which s 5D(2) 
requires that attention be directed.539 
 
In some cases, although the relative contribution of two or more factors to the particular 
harm cannot be determined, it may be that each factor was part of a set of conditions 
necessary to the occurrence of that harm.540 
 
In relation to the first category of exceptional cases and the damage to the car by the NID 
driver, it is feasible that the individual contribution of the human neural impulses and the 
neural interface device is unascertainable. This outcome is caused by the difficulty in 
                                            
534 Ipp Report, 110 [7.30]. 
535 [2003] 1 AC 32. 
536 French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ. 
537 Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis (2010) 240 CLR 111 at 123 [12]; Roads and Traffıc Authority v Royal (2008) 82 
ALJR 870 at 888-889 [94]; 245 ALR 653 at 677 per Kirby J. 
538 March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 at 514 per Mason CJ. 
539 Strong v Woolworths (2012) 246 CLR 182, 194 [26]. CLANSW s 5D(2) states: 
(2) In determining in an exceptional case, in accordance with established principles, whether negligence that 
cannot be established as a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm should be accepted as establishing 
factual causation, the court is to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility 
for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party.  
(3) If it is relevant to the determination of factual causation to determine what the person who suffered harm 
would have done if the negligent person had not been negligent:  
(a) the matter is to be determined subjectively in the light of all relevant circumstances, subject to 
paragraph (b), and  
(b) any statement made by the person after suffering the harm about what he or she would have done 
is inadmissible except to the extent (if any) that the statement is against his or her interest.  
Equivalent provisions: CLWACT s 45(2), CLAQ s 11(2), CLAS s 34(2), CLAT s 13(2), WAVIC s 51(2) and 
CLAWA s 5C(2). 
540 Strong v Woolworths (2012) 246 CLR 182, 194 [27]. 
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determining exactly what occurred in the communication between the brain and the neural 
interface device. 
 
In relation to the second category of exceptional cases, the negligent conduct of either the 
NID driver failing to send the correct command to the neural interface device or incorrect 
instructions being sent from the neural processor to the neuroprosthetic leg, it is possible 
that the present state of scientific or medical knowledge makes it impossible to prove which 
of the two acts caused the damage to the plaintiff’s vehicle. 
 
Alternatively, in circumstances where ‘the damage is the result of the simultaneous 
operation of two or more separate and independent events each of which was sufficient to 
cause the damage’,541 the ‘but for’ test is replaced with a sufficiency requirement.542 In these 
circumstances ‘it may sometimes be helpful for courts or commentators to be able to refer 
to an algorithm that represents the notion of contribution. The act or occurrence being 
considered ‘contributes to the outcome if it is a Necessary Element for the Sufficiency of a 
Subset of the facts.’543 This is known as the NESS test’.544 If the ‘but for’ test cannot be 
applied to the circumstances involving a person with a neural interface device, the NESS 
test could be used. For example, in South Australia v Ellis,545 Steytler P and McLure JA of 
the Western Australia Court of Appeal stated: 
 
Thus, a contribution is material if it is something more than de minimis. It follows that satisfaction 
of the 'but for' test of factual causation is not required when a factor makes a material cumulative 
contribution to the contraction of an indivisible disease. Neither does the 'but for' test apply to 
multiple sufficient causes. Moreover, a material cumulative contribution does not cease to be 
such simply because another contributing factor was itself sufficient and would have caused the 
disease. 
 
                                            
541 March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 534 (McHugh J). 
542 David Hamer, ‘Mind the “Evidential Gap”: Causation and Proof in Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis’ (2009) 31 Sydney 
Law Review 465, 476. 
543 Ibid 479. 
544 Stapleton, ‘Factual Causation’, above n 496, 479. 
545 (2008) 37 WAR 1, [309]. 
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Steytler P and McLure JA disagreed with the dissenting judgment of Martin CJ, stating:  
 
We also respectfully disagree with the view of the Chief Justice that if Mr Cotton would have 
suffered lung cancer irrespective of the consequences of the appellants' breaches of duty in 
exposing him to asbestos, it cannot be said the breaches relating to asbestos materially 
contributed to Mr Cotton's disease. First, it is inconsistent with the conventional principle of 
common law causation that a breach can materially contribute to an outcome notwithstanding 
there are other sufficient causes of that outcome. Secondly, it is inconsistent with the 
conventional principle that conduct which accelerates the contraction of a disease materially 
contributes to that outcome.546 
 
As the operation of the neural interface device is not independent of the neural impulse from 
the brain, the actions of both the person and the neural interface device contribute to the 
outcome so it is unlikely the NESS test will be required. However, whether or not 
communication between the mind and neural interface device could be regarded as an 
intervening act could also be considered. If it was established that the NID driver sent a 
neural command to the decoder to instruct the neuroprosthetic leg to apply the brakes but 
the pressure applied to the brake was not adequate to stop the vehicle, then both events 
have contributed to harm. However, if the decoder misinterpreted the neural command and 
instructed the neuroprosthetic leg to apply pressure to the accelerator instead of the brake, 
it could be argued that the actions of the decoder and neuroprosthetic leg were intervening 
acts that break the chain of causation between the person’s neural actions and the harm.  
 
However, there would be difficulty sustaining such an argument for the reasons discussed 
above regarding factual causation, that is, the inability of the evidence to fully distinguish 
between the command from the brain and the decoding of the command. For this reason 
and the fact that the neural interface device is so fully integrated with the human body, the 
court is unlikely to regard the operation of the neural interface device as being an intervening 
act or omission. The action of the neural interface device was not voluntary, deliberate or 
negligent but based on the command from the human brain. ‘A supervening act which 
breaks the chain of causation must be a separate and independent act which intervenes 
after the negligent conduct complained of.’547 The action of the neural interface device is not 
subsequent to the NID driver’s negligence, but intimately connected to it.  
                                            
546 South Australia v Ellis (2008) 37 WAR 1, [233]. 
547 Ibid 1 [324] (Staytler P and McLure JA). 
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In addition, it might also be the case that the action of the neural interface device is a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the NID driver’s negligence. The NID driver’s 
negligence could be as a result of the NID driver understanding the possibility that the 
decoder could misinterpret the neural impulse and the NID driver then fails to take 
rectification steps within an appropriate time. The difficulty in separating the actions of the 
NID driver from those of the neural interface device creates problems in the application of 
each of these factors. These factors would act against the finding that the action of the neural 
interface device was an intervening act. 
 
For these reasons, the court may decide that the NID driver moving through the Give Way 
sign, the mind sending neural impulses to the decoder, the decoder interpreting the 
command and instructing the neuroprosthetic leg to operate and any communication from 
the neuroprosthetic leg to the brain are part of a set of conditions necessary for the 
occurrence of the collision with the other vehicle and so factual causation is established. 
When considering how the causation difficulties might be resolved, legal practitioner L3 in 
the Delphi Method research said: 
 
Given the technology, I would have thought there might be data available to identify causation 
with some additional precision than contemplated above -- sort of like 'black box data' which 
could, for example, identify whether the instruction from the brain was turn left but the arm 
turned right, or not brake (pull instead of push). The availability of something like that would be 
very helpful in the determination of causation. 
 
Such a mechanism could assist the court and once factual causation has been established, 
the court will need to consider the scope of the defendant’s liability as the final step in 
determining the damage element of negligence. 
 
2 Scope of Liability 
 
Scope of liability rated 14th out of 23 in importance for members of the judiciary while legal 
practitioners rated it 13th out of 23 in importance and law academics rated it 21st out of 23 in 
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importance. The Civil Liability Legislation provides for this.548 For example, the CLAQ s 
11(1)(b) provides that ‘it is appropriate for the scope of the liability of the person in breach 
to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability)’. 
 
Determination of the scope of the defendant’s liability ‘is not a question of fact or “common 
sense” but of normative judgment on which reasonable minds might differ.’549 However, as 
discussed above, the blurring of the distinction between factual causation and scope of 
liability was not resolved by the Ipp Report.550 Indeed, Stapleton argues that it is regrettable 
that the question of scope of liability was framed in causal terms and as a consequence:  
 
It might suggest that the fundamental notion of a “cause” may differ in different areas of the 
law. Another danger is that it may lead a judge merely to assert that the context of the relevant 
legal rule requires the connection between breach and result to possess a particular feature 
without explaining why this is so, a particularly serious state of affairs in the commercial 
context where typically both sides to a dispute are repeat players who require clear guidance 
from the courts so they can plan future conduct.551  
 
This normative approach required by the legislation does not displace the common law 
methodology of the application of precedent and ‘a policy choice once made is maintained 
unless confronted and overruled.’552 Stapleton warns that scope of liability ‘cannot be 
reduced to some formula’ but it ‘contains some internal structure’.553  
 
For example, we can say that a consequence will fall outside the appropriate scope of liability 
for negligence unless it at least: can plausibly be said to fall within the ‘perimeter rule’ of 
‘foreseeability of the type of harm’;554 is ‘damage’ relative to the normal expectancies of the 
                                            
548 CLWACT ss 45(1)(b), (4); CLANSW ss 5D(1)(b), 4; CLAQ ss 11(1)(b), (4); CLAS ss 34(1)(b), (4), CLAT 
ss 13(1)(b), (4); WAVIC ss 51(1)(b), (4); CLAWA ss 5C(1)(b), (4). There are no equivalent provisions in the 
Northern Territory. 
549 Stapleton, ‘Reflections on Common Sense Causation in Australia’, above n 507, 352. 
550 109 (footnote 6); 117-8 (Recommendation 29). 
551 Stapleton, ‘Reflections on Common Sense Causation in Australia’, above n 507, 353. 
552 Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 385 [22]. 
553 Stapleton, ‘Factual Causation’, above n 496, 484. 
554 Derived from Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co [1961] AC 388 ('Wagon Mound 
(No 1) Case') and Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837. 
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plaintiff absent torts;555 is not a coincidental consequence;556 and is the result of one of the 
risks that made the conduct careless.557 
 
Applying this ‘perimeter rule’ in the context of the scenario above, the NID driver’s liability 
for the damage to the other vehicle is appropriate as the damage is reasonably foreseeable, 
the damage would not have occurred absent the NIDs breach of the duty of care, it is not a 
coincidental consequence, that is, driving through a Give Way sign without ensuring the 
intersection was clear increases the chance of damaging another driver’s car, and the 
resulting collision is one of the risks that made the conduct careless. ‘On the conventional 
definition a consequence of a factor is only coincidental if, as a general matter, that type of 
factor does not increase the rate of occurrence of that type of result.’558 As Stapleton 
explained: 
 
where a speeding bus is struck by lightning the speeding was a factual cause of the bus 
being struck but this consequence of the breach of duty was coincidental because, as a 
general matter, speeding does not increase the rate of occurrence of such lightning strikes.559 
 
Policy and value judgments will also be considered when the court is determining the scope 
of liability of the NID driver. As discussed above,560 there will be many policy or value 
judgments that will influence a decision in a negligence action. In relation to scope of liability, 
value judgments must be made to ensure that an absurd, unjust or unacceptable result that 
                                            
555 Jane Stapleton, 'Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly 
Review 388, 401, 412–17. Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627 runs counter to the 
usual judgment that if, but for the breach of an obligation of care, the plaintiff would have suffered an 
equivalent loss in a different transaction, it lies outside the appropriate scope of liability. 
556 Jane Stapleton, ‘Occam’s Razor Reveals an Orthodox Basis for Chester v Afshar (2006) Law Quarterly 
Review 426, 438ff. 
557 Jane Stapleton, ‘The Risk Architecture of the Restatement (Third) of Torts’, (2009) 44 Wake Forest Law 
Review 1309, 1324-5; Jane Stapleton, ‘Factual Causation’, above n 496, 484. 
558 Stapleton, ‘Reflections on Common Sense Causation in Australia’, above n 507, 355. 
559 Ibid 355. 
560 Under the heading ‘3 Application of the Factors Determining Standard of Care’. 
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would ‘prevent the law concluding that the negligence caused the harm’561 does not occur. 
However, Stapleton warns:  
 
In my view, appeals to “common sense causation” or assertions about the “scope of the duty” 
not only obscure the task of identifying that it is this normative scope question that is in 
dispute but also hinder how clearly courts communicate their answers to it.562 
 
To this extent, the NID driver’s actions, regardless of whether the communication between 
the NID driver’s brain and neural interface device can be scientifically determined, was the 
legally significant cause of the harm to the other vehicle. To assert otherwise would 
undermine the law that every driver has an established duty of care to other drivers to drive 
with such care and attention to avoid harming others. Whilst the facts of every negligence 
action involving a person with a neural interface device will be unique, the principles 
underlying the determination of scope of liability will apply to ensure that an absurd, unjust 
or unacceptable result that prevents the law concluding that the negligence caused the 
harm563 will be avoided. For example, it is likely that the scope of liability in negligence will 
extend to cover many who engage in careless acts, such as the person in the Delphi Method 
stimulus who drops a box of books that causes harm to another person.564  
 
3 Liability of Neural Interface Device Manufacturer and the NID Driver 
 
A list of possible events that involved communication between the NID driver’s mind and the 
NID driver’s neuroprosthetic leg were outlined in the scenario above.565 It was argued that it 
may have been any one of those events and that the event satisfied the ‘but for’ test of 
causation. Also raised in the scenario was the issue of attribution of liability between the NID 
driver and the manufacturer of the neuroprosthetic legs as this will be a very difficult task for 
the court because of the complexity of the neural interface device technology.  
 
This technology was discussed in chapter 2. Briefly, the human mind sends a command in 
the form of neural impulses to the decoder that records and interprets the neural impulse 
                                            
561 Wallace v Kam [2012] NSWCA 82, [12]-[13]. 
562 Stapleton, ‘Reflections on Common Sense Causation in Australia’, above n 507, 360. 
563 Wallace v Kam [2012] NSWCA 82, 13. 
564 See Appendix 3.2 The Delphi Method Research Stimulus. 
565 See (a) The Scenario. 
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command and then sends instructions to the assistive device to operate as the neural 
impulse has commanded. The assistive device can send information back to the brain. In 
the NID driver scenario, the neural interface device includes an assistive device that is a 
neuroprosthetic leg. While the intended commands from the person’s mind constitute one 
part of the communication, the interpretation of those commands, the instructions sent to 
the assistive device and the information sent from the assistive device back to the brain, 
constitute the other parts of the complex puzzle, not to mention any other factors external to 
these elements, such as the sound of a warning mechanism like a car horn. 
 
In the context of the NID driver scenario, there might not have been a breach of the NID 
driver’s duty of care but a combination of communication issues between the mind and the 
neural interface device. It must be established that ‘but for’ the negligent communication 
between mind and machine, the harm would not have occurred. It will need to be proven by 
the plaintiff what the person’s brain intended to be done, what instruction the decoder 
interpreted, what instruction was sent to the assistive device, what information was sent by 
the assistive device to the decoder then the brain and how the brain responded. As 
discussed in chapter 2566 and under the heading 1 Factual Causation above, current 
scientific expertise is unlikely to be able to determine definitive answers to these questions.  
 
The facts of each case and attribution of liability between parties will differ but legislation 
provides the mechanism for determining such apportionment. In essence, the contribution 
recoverable is what is just and equitable, having regard to the extent of that party’s 
responsibility for the damage.567 This includes not only the defendant but attribution of 
liability for contributory negligence. It will be the conduct of each party in the circumstances 
that will enable the court to determine liability. 
 
Dependant on the facts, many factors in relation to factual causation, as discussed above, 
will be very difficult, or impossible, to determine. Therefore, attribution of liability between 
the NID driver and the manufacturer of the neural interface device will also be difficult. There 
may be additional factors such as accreditation of the neural interface device discussed in 
                                            
566 Under the heading ‘D Limitations of Neural Interface Device Technology’. 
567 CLWACT ss 20, 21(2), (3), 102(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) ss 5, 5(2), 
9(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT) ss 12, 13, 16(1); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) ss 
6, 7, 10(1); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors Contribution) Act 2001 (SA) ss 12, 6(5), 
(7), 7(1), (2); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas) ss 3, 3(2), 4(1); WAVIC ss 24AA, 24(2), 26(1); Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors Contribution) Act 1947 (WA) ss 7, 7(2), 4(1). 
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chapter 5 and compulsory third party insurance discussed in chapter 1 that might also play 
a role in enabling the court to be just and equitable when attributing liability.  
 
E Defences 
 
Defences were identified by the participants of the Delphi Method research as eighth out of 
23 in importance of the legal issues that will arise. The importance of defences rated 
differently between the professional categories in the research. Law academics rated it as 
the third most important issue, members of the judiciary rated defences 11th most important 
and legal practitioners rated it 14th. 
 
1 Contributory Negligence 
 
It would be reasonable for the NID driver to plead contributory negligence should there be 
material facts in support of that defence. For example, if the other driver was not driving with 
due care and attention and could have otherwise avoided the accident enabling the NID 
driver to prove contributory negligence, the NID driver’s liability will be reduced.568  
 
2 Volenti Non Fit Injuria 
 
The common law defence of volenti non fit injuria requires the plaintiff to have accepted total 
consequence for the defendant’s neglect for the plaintiff’s safety, in effect, the defendant 
owed the plaintiff no duty of care.569 The Civil Liability Legislation has included this defence 
in circumstance where a person suffering harm is deemed to have been aware of an obvious 
risk unless they can prove otherwise.570 
 
For example, CLAQ s 14 states: 
 
14 Persons suffering harm presumed to be aware of obvious risks 
(1) If, in an action for damages for breach of duty causing harm, a defence of voluntary 
assumption of risk is raised by the defendant and the risk is an obvious risk, the plaintiff 
                                            
568 Ibid. 
569 Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510, 536 [81]. 
570 CLANSW s 5G; CLAQ s 14; CLAS s 37; CLAT s 16; WAVIC s 54; CLAWA s 5N. There is no equivalent 
provision in Australian Capital Territory or the Northern Territory. 
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is taken to have been aware of the risk unless the plaintiff proves, on the balance of 
probabilities, that he or she was not aware of the risk. 
Editor’s note— 
‘Voluntary assumption of risk’ is sometimes stated as ‘volenti non fit injuria’. 
(2) For this section, a person is aware of a risk if the person is aware of the type or kind of 
risk, even if the person is not aware of the precise nature, extent or manner of occurrence 
of the risk. 
 
It might be argued that it is dangerous for the public to interact with a person who has a 
neural interface device and that anyone who does so should be made aware of the danger 
of such a device not operating as a biological limb. This would presume that, like a normal 
prosthetic limb, the neural interface device is easily identified as being different from the 
biological limb. In turn, it could be argued that the presumption of knowledge of obvious risks 
of engaging with a person who has a neural interface device would exist. Such a 
presumption of knowledge of obvious risks571 currently exists in Civil Liability Legislation as 
outlined above. This defence is unlikely to arise where the person with the neural interface 
device is interacting with the public unless the shortcomings of neural interface devices 
become regarded as obvious risks, are known by the public and the person injured is aware 
that they are interacting with a person with a neural interface device.572 The specific activity 
that is being engaged in is not important because it is the risk of engaging with the person 
with the neural interface device that will need to be obvious for the volenti defence to be 
sustained. 
 
In the Delphi Method research,573 participants ranked volenti 20th in importance out of 23. 
Similarly, the materialisation of an inherent risk absolves a person. 
 
3 Inherent Risk 
 
When considering what constitutes an inherent risk or danger at common law, McHugh J 
stated, ‘The only risks or dangers that are inherent in activities are those that cannot be 
avoided by the exercise of reasonable care’.574 Now, under Civil Liability Legislation, the NID 
                                            
571 See, for example, CLAQ s 14. 
572 Ibid. 
573 See III chapter 3 Legal Analysis Using the Delphi Method. 
574 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, [50]. 
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defendant will not be liable for the materialisation of an inherent risk.575 For example, 
CLANSW s 5I states: 
 
5I No liability for materialisation of inherent risk  
(1) A person is not liable in negligence for harm suffered by another person as a result of 
the materialisation of an inherent risk.  
(2) An “inherent risk” is a risk of something occurring that cannot be avoided by the 
exercise of reasonable care and skill.  
(3) This section does not operate to exclude liability in connection with a duty to warn of a 
risk. 
 
In Nair-Smith v Perisher Blue Pty,576 Perisher Blue sought the application of the defence of 
no liability pursuant to CLANSW s 5I.  Beech-Jones J considered whether or not the 
respondent’s injuries were the result of the materialisation of an inherent risk involved in the 
act of boarding a chairlift at a ski resort: 
  
Perisher contended that the fact that ‘the safety bar was down, and that it had to be rectified in 
0.8 of a second ... [meant] that urgent remedial action, and the spectacle of that action being 
taken by the load lift attendant, was an inherent risk of the loading procedure in which [Dr Nair-
Smith] was engaged’ within the meaning of s 5I. However, the findings that I have made to this 
point are to the effect that the risk that was presented by the safety bar being down was one that 
could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and skill on the part of the lift 
operator. I reject Perisher's defence under s 5I.577 
 
The NSW Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, stating: 
 
In order for there to be no liability for the materialisation of an inherent risk it must be proven, 
inter alia, that the risk “cannot be avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and skill”. The 
relevant risk in this case is that a skier may sustain physical injury as a result of his or her reaction 
to the manner in which a lift operator responds to a down bar situation. As stated at [137] above, 
this risk could have been avoided had Mr Lofberg observed the state of chair as it left the 
                                            
575 CLANSW s 5I; CLAQ s 16; CLAS 39; WAVIC s 55; CLAWA s 5P. There is no equivalent provision in 
Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. 
576 [2013] NSWSC 727. 
577 Nair-Smith v Perisher Blue Pty [2013] NSWSC 727, [173] 
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bullwheel. The relevant risk is therefore not of the character described in s 5I. We agree with the 
primary judge.578 
 
In the context of the NID driver scenario, it could be argued that misinterpretation of neural 
impulse by the decoder cannot be avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and skill by 
the NID driver. For this reason, the legislative defence of inherent risk may well be available 
to a person with a neural interface device. However, the court could determine that the risk 
presented by the neural interface device could have been avoided by the exercise of 
reasonable care and skill on the part of the NID driver in seeking to apply the brakes at a 
time that would enable adequate response to neural misinterpretation to avoid the accident. 
Product accreditation may play role in determining an acceptable error rate, however, this 
might only reinforce the inherent risks that exist with these types of devices. Chapter 5 
discusses product accreditation under standards set by the government authority, in 
Australia, the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA).579 
 
F Summary 
 
The above analysis reveals that the standard of care, determined by the application of Civil 
Liability Legislation, should be that of a reasonable person with the same, or similar, neural 
interface device in the same, or similar, circumstances. This variation of the standard of care 
might result in a lower standard of care than that of the standard of care of a person without 
a neural interface device. Factors supporting this include: 
 
1. A neural interface device is not a biological limb; 
2. Communication between the brain and the neural interface device is not as accurately 
interpreted by the device as the communication between the brain and the biological 
limb;580 
3. The impulses from the device may alter the workings of the brain in ways identified, for 
example, when deep brain stimulation is used for treatment of Parkinson’s Disease;581 
and 
                                            
578 Ibid [167] (Barrett JA; Gleeson JA; Tobias AJA). 
579 See analysis under the heading ‘1 TGA Approval’. 
580 Ohnishi, Weir and Kuiken, above n 373, 43. 
581 Carter A, Bell E, Racine E and Hall W, ‘Ethical Issues Raised by Proposals to Treat Addiction Using Deep 
Brain Stimulation’ (2011) 4 Neuroethics 129, 134. 
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4. Policy considerations, such as the benefit to society for its citizens in need to be able to 
have these neural interface devices, justify the increased risk of harm to the public. 
 
Alternatively, the analysis above also supports the argument that the standard of care should 
be higher than that of the person without a neural interface device if a person with a neural 
interface device is required to do one or more of the following: 
 
1. Undergo a specified training program to facilitate competence in operating the neural 
interface device; 
2. Undergo specific training to recognise and anticipate adverse outcomes; 
3. Take necessary precautions to minimise adverse outcomes;  
4. Acknowledge that the abilities of the neural interface device are an enhancement of 
human attributes; or 
5. Obtain compulsory insurance against damage or injury caused to another’s property or 
person, like the compulsory third party insurance required of motor vehicle owners. 
Delphi Method research participant P6 said: 
 
It would seem to me that any user of such a device would be well advised to take out 
insurance to cover the possibility of imperfect performance of the device, as such a 
precaution might well be considered to be the appropriate (and therefore 'reasonable') 
response to such potential incidents. 
 
When applying the concept of revolutionary science582 to this analysis, the tension that 
neural interface devices will have on the existing standard of care may give rise to a variation 
resulting in a different standard of care to be applied to a defendant with a neural interface 
device.  
 
The risks apparent to the defendant, his or her capacity to meet those risks and the 
circumstances under which he or she must act will also be considered by the court. The 
precautions undertaken by the person to minimise the chance of injury to another will 
generally be expected, therefore, the standard of care to be applied is uncertain, However, 
consideration of a different standard of care for this new class of person on the application 
of the Civil Liability Legislation appears inevitable. As stated by Braidotti: 
                                            
582 See Kuhn, above n 2. 
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At their most ambitious, efforts to compensate for damaged or destroyed sensory organs have 
come to involve the invention, manufacture and implantation of bionic counterparts for eyes and 
ears. These connect the conscious mind and the vibrant, colourful, noisy external world – with 
life changing consequences for recipients. 
 
Once the stuff of science fiction, the bionic enterprise of today is built on a realisation that has 
transformed human innovation during the past decade; that no single discipline in science, 
engineering or medicine is up to the task. Instead, each specialist field has mastered some of 
the components needed to solve an overall problem, whether related to vision, hearing or any 
other among a spectrum of healthcare challenges.583 
 
The specialist field of law will also need to prepare for the incorporation of neural interface 
devices with the human body. The human brain will communicate with these neural interface 
devices through efferent and afferent communication584 between the device and the brain.585 
This melding of mind and machine challenges the law in determining where civil liability for 
injury, damage or loss should lie.  
 
Factual causation will be of critical importance in determining a negligence action against a 
person with a neural interface device but the court will be faced with the difficulty of acquiring 
knowledge and understanding of the specific roles the individual and the neural interface 
device played in causing the harm. This will impact on attribution of liability between the 
person with the neural interface device and the manufacture of the device. As a legal 
practitioner who participated in the Delphi Method research presented in chapter 3 said: 
 
The real issue will be breach, causation, foreseeability all of which will involve understanding the 
extent of the risk of imperfect translation and what should have been the reaction of the user and 
the person who enabled the user to use the device. 
 
Neural interface devices and their incorporation into the human body is so radically different 
or unique from any other circumstance previously considered by the courts, that the law 
should recognise a different or unique application of the law of negligence. The analysis of 
the current law in this chapter has highlighted a possible variation of the objective standard 
                                            
583 Braidotti, above n 154, 10. 
584 Information flowing from both the brain to the device and from the device back to the brain, respectively. 
585 IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society, above n 124, 19. 
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of care applied to the reasonable person because this may better recognise this new class 
of person whose biological body part has been replaced with a neural interface device. 
Therefore, the standard of care should be that of a reasonable person with the same, or 
similar, neural interface device in the same, or similar, circumstances. Any challenges 
regarding neural interface devices that the court might experience, could be addressed in 
the way Justice McHugh recommended in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd, ’[w]hile stare decisis is a 
sound policy because it promotes predictability of judicial decision and facilitates the giving 
of advice, it should not always trump the need for desirable change in the law’.586 The 
anomalies revealed in this chapter’s analysis will, over time, become fully congruent within 
the re-evaluation and adaptation of the law of negligence.587 
 
 
 
  
                                            
586 (1999) 198 CLR 180, 216 [92]. 
587 See Kuhn, above n 2, 77-8. 
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V CHAPTER 5 MANUFACTURER LIABILITY 
 
A Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 analysed the law of negligence as applied to a defendant who has a neural 
interface device. It was stated that liability for harm could be attributed to the manufacture 
of the neural interface device, so the purpose of chapter 5 is to examine factors a court 
should consider when determining the extent to which a neural interface device 
manufacturer could be held liable for the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Technical analysis 
of neural interface devices in chapter 2588 noted that the degree to which a neural interface 
device is incorporated into the human body varies considerably. A neuroprosthetic device 
might be strapped to the body in a similar way as a traditional prosthetic limb and is provided 
with commands from the brain through the recording and decoding of neural impulses to 
nerve bundles in what remains of the person’s limb. Some devices currently available, like 
the cochlear implant, are inserted into an orifice of the human body, sending information to 
the brain via the adjacent nervous system. Neural interface devices, such as BrainGate, are 
surgically attached to, or implanted in, the human body interpreting neural impulses to 
instruct an artificial assistive device and relay information to the brain directly via the nervous 
system.589  
 
If a person with a neural interface device is a defendant in a negligence action for recovery 
of compensation for property damage or personal injury, the varying degrees of interface of 
the device with the human body will be of importance. The operation of neural interface 
devices replicates that of a biological body part so, arguably, go beyond being simply a tool. 
These devices are so closely incorporated into the human body that the court may have 
difficulty determining causation, as analysed in chapter 4,590 hence, liability for the injury or 
damage sustained. Under these circumstances, the law regarding manufacturer liability may 
play an important role.  
 
                                            
588 See analysis under the heading ‘C Neural Interface Device Technology’. 
589 BrainGate Co, above n 61. 
590 See analysis under the heading ‘D Causation’. 
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The importance of manufacturer liability was raised by participants in the Delphi Method 
research analysed in chapter 3. The Delphi Method research stimulus591 eliminated 
malfunction of the neural interface device to ensure that product liability would not determine 
liability of the manufacturer. Part VA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was inserted in 
1992 establishing strict liability of manufacturers and importers for defective products.592 
 
The purpose of this Bill is to introduce into Australia a strict product liability regime based on 
the 1985 European Community Product Liability Directive by way of amendment of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974. It provides a regime of strict liability, whereby a person who is injured or 
suffers property damage as a result of a defective product has a right to compensation 
against the manufacturer without the need to prove negligence on the part of the 
manufacturer.593 
 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was amended to become Schedule 2 of the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), known as the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), so Part VA 
became Part 3-5 (sections 138-150) of the ACL.594 Pursuant to the ACL if the neural 
interface device is acquired by a consumer595 the manufacturer of a good with a safety defect 
is liable to compensate the consumer for loss, injury or damage suffered because of the 
safety defect.596 In 2017, following an overview of the ACL, Consumer Affairs Australia and 
New Zealand proposed that there be an increase of the $40,000 threshold in the definition 
of ‘consumer’ to $100,000.597 However, this financial threshold will not apply if the neural 
interface device is regarded as a good of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic 
or household use or consumption.598 As a result, product liability was not examined in the 
analysis of manufacturer liability. 
 
                                            
591 The information upon which the participants in the Delphi Method research responded. Appendix 3.2 
provides a copy of the stimulus. 
592 Trade Practices Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) s 4. 
593 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1991 (Cth) 2 [1]. 
594 Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 1) 2010 (Cth). 
595 Australian Consumer Law s 3. 
596 Ibid s 138. 
597 Consumer Affairs Australia and New Zealand, Australian Consumer Law Report, Final Report (2017) 74-
5. 
598 Australian Consumer Law s 3(1)(b). 
171 
 
This chapter considers the accreditation of neural interface devices, the labelling and 
information requirements and the legal challenges in determining liability of manufacturers 
in a negligence action if the neural interface device is considered to be more than just a tool.  
 
B Device Accreditation  
 
A number of the neural interface devices discussed in chapter 2,599 such as BrainGate and 
the LUKE arm, have been developed in the United States where the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) has developed regulatory control of these devices. Class III medical 
devices include those products that create the gravest risk of injury from failure.600 Eric Chan 
believes that the FDA should develop a new Class IV and IV-E accreditation for new 
‘neuroelectronic interface (also known as brain-computer interface)’ devices.601 Class IV 
would be used for treating disability and disease and Class IV-E for accrediting devices used 
for enhancement of human abilities.602 In relation to therapeutic purposes and enhancement, 
Warwick argues that there is no ‘clear and present line which divides the two’603 so defining 
these two new categories will be difficult. Likewise, Karpin and Mykitiuk believe that the 
distinction is inadequate and unhelpful in guiding regulatory decision-making.604 
 
1 TGA Approval 
 
In Australia, the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA)605 under the Commonwealth 
Department of Health is the governmental body responsible for accreditation of medical 
devices. The TGA regulates therapeutic goods by examining and evaluating evidence of 
                                            
599 Under the heading ‘B Neural Interface Systems and Devices’. 
600 US Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Learn if a Medical Device 
Has Been Cleared by FDA for Marketing (29 December 2017) 
<https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Consumers/ucm142523.htm>. 
601 Eric D Chan, ‘The FDA and the Future of the Brain-Computer Interface: Adapting FDA Device Law to the 
Challenges of Human-Machine Enhancement’ (2007) 25 John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information 
Law 117, 120. 
602 Ibid 156-7. The FDA has not introduced these suggested classes. 
603 Kevin Warwick, ‘The Promise and Threat of Modern Cybernetics’ (2007) 100(1) Southern Medical Journal 
112, 112. 
604 Isabel Karpin and Roxanne Mykitiuk, ‘Going Out on a Limb: Prosthetics, Normalcy and Disputing the 
Therapy/Enhancement Distinction’ (2008) 16 Medical Law Review 413, 414. 
605 Australian Government Department of Health, Therapeutic Goods Administration 
<http://www.tga.gov.au/>. 
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their risks and benefits.606 All regulatory decisions are made in accordance with the 
legislation as set out in the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth), Therapeutic Goods 
Regulations 1990 (Cth) and the Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 
(Cth).607 Guidelines for accreditation are provided in the Australian Regulatory Guidelines 
for Medical Devices (ARGMD).608 Part 1 of the ARGMD provides the classification of medical 
devices and outlines the differences between the Australian and European Union regulatory 
requirements. Medical devices are defined in the ARGMD to be those devices that are used 
for humans, have therapeutic benefits and generally have a physical or mechanical effect 
on the body or are used to measure or monitor functions of the body.609 Neural interface 
devices are clearly included by this definition. 
 
Within the TGA is the Office of Devices Authorisation (ODA) that is responsible for the pre-
market regulation of medical devices and the Office of Product Review (OPR) that is 
responsible for post-market regulation of all therapeutic goods.610 ‘Medical devices range 
from bandages that would be put on a scratch to high-risk products such as pacemakers 
that are implanted in the body.’611 The regulatory requirements vary, depending on what the 
device is and how it is to be used and this is done before a new medical device can be 
supplied to the market in Australia.612 The classification levels for all medical devices, 
outlined in Table 5.1, are Class I, I – supplied sterile (Is), I – incorporating a measuring 
function (Im), IIa, IIb, III and active implantable medical devices (AIMD).613 The risks 
associated with using medical devices can range from Class I where there is little or low 
potential risk to patients and users to Classes III/AIMD where there are significant potential 
risks.614 Regulatory requirements increase from Class I through Classes Is, Im and IIa then 
Class IIb to the highest regulatory requirement for Classes III/AIMD.615 The classification of 
medical devices is provided in Division 3.1 Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) 
                                            
606 Australian Government, Department of Health, Product regulation according to risk, 2 
<http://www.tga.gov.au/file/5338/download>. 
607 Australian Government, Australian Regulatory Guidelines for Medical Devices 
<http://www.tga.gov.au/publication/australian-regulatory-guidelines-medical-devices-argmd>. 
608 Australian Government, Department of Health, Australian Regulatory Guidelines for Medical Devices 
(May 2011) <http://www.tga.gov.au/sites/default/files/devices-argmd-01.pdf>. 
609 Ibid 20. 
610 Ibid. 
611 Ibid. 
612 Ibid. 
613 Australian Government, Product regulation according to risk, above n 606, 3. 
614 Ibid. 
615 Australian Government, Australian Regulatory Guidelines for Medical Devices, above n 608, 21. 
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Regulations 2002 (Cth) and the classification rules are in Schedules 2 and 2A of those 
regulations. 
 
Table 5.1 Classification of Medical Devices616 
Classification(s) Risk level Examples 
Class I Low Crutches  
Hospital beds 
Class I - supplied sterile 
Class I - with a measuring 
function Class IIa 
Low to 
Medium 
Sterile surgical gloves 
Clinical thermometer measuring body 
temperature  
Dental drills or ultrasound machines 
Class IIb Medium to 
High 
Surgical lasers 
Diagnostic X-ray 
Class III High Prosthetic heart valves 
Absorbable surgical sutures 
Active implantable medical 
devices (AIMD) 
High Pacemakers 
Artificial heart 
 
Table 5.2 Classification Rules for Medical Devices617 
If the device  then apply 
Classification 
Rule 
Some examples are: 
is invasive—that is, 
the device 
penetrates the body 
through a body 
orifice or is inserted 
into the body during 
surgery 
3—
classifications 
vary depending 
on intended 
purpose 
surgical eye probe, ophthalmic knife, eye 
cannula, ear/nose/throat forceps, internal 
tympanostomy tube, tongue depressor, 
intraoral x-ray sensor, oral gag, oral suction 
unit, thermometer, vaginal speculum, urethral 
bougie, anoscope, proctoscope, colonoscope, 
stomal peg, tracheostomy tube. 
is active—that is, the 
device depends on a 
source of energy for 
4—
classifications 
vary depending 
diagnostic x-ray sources, MRI, air driven 
surgical drills and saws, patient monitors, 
electronic blood pressure measuring devices, 
diagnostic ultrasound, electronic 
                                            
616 Australian Government, Product regulation according to risk, above n 606, 3. 
617Australian Government, Australian Regulatory Guidelines for Medical Devices, above n 608, 81-2. 
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If the device  then apply 
Classification 
Rule 
Some examples are: 
its operation and 
converts energy 
on intended 
purpose 
stethoscopes/thermometers, software, gas 
regulators, radioactive seeds, mechanical 
infusion systems. 
contains a medicine  5.1—these 
devices are 
Class III 
antibiotic bone cements, condoms with 
spermicide, heparin coated catheters, 
dressings incorporating an antimicrobial agent. 
is for contraception 
or preventing 
sexually transmitted 
diseases 
5.2—
classifications 
vary depending 
on intended 
purpose 
condoms, contraceptive diaphragms, 
contraceptive intrauterine devices (IUDs), 
surgically implanted contraceptive devices. 
is for disinfecting, 
cleaning, rinsing or 
hydrating  
5.3—
classifications 
vary depending 
on intended 
purpose 
contact lens solutions, comfort solutions, 
disinfectants for haemodialysis devices and 
endoscopes, sterilisers to sterilise medical 
devices, washer disinfectors. 
not active and is 
intended to record x-
ray diagnostic 
images 
5.4—these 
devices are 
Class IIa 
x-ray films, photostimulable phosphor plates. 
contains non-viable 
animal tissues or 
derivatives  
5.5—these 
devices are 
Class III 
biological heart valves, porcine xenograft 
dressings, catgut sutures, implants and 
dressings made from collagen, intra-ocular 
fluids, meniscul joint fluid replacement, anti-
adhesion barriers, tissue fillers based on 
hyaluronic acid derived from bacterial 
fermentation processes. 
is a blood bag 5.6—these 
devices are 
Class IIb 
blood bags (including those containing or 
coated with an anticoagulant). 
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If the device  then apply 
Classification 
Rule 
Some examples are: 
is an active 
implantable medical 
device 
5.7—these 
devices are 
Class AIMD  
implantable pacemakers, defibrillators and 
nerve stimulators,  
is an active device to 
control, monitor, or 
directly influence the 
performance of an 
active implantable 
medical device  
5.7—these 
devices are 
Class III 
clinician’s programming devices for 
pacemakers, patient control devices for nerve 
stimulation devices. 
for export only 5.8—these 
devices are 
Class I 
 
is a mammary 
implant 
5.9—these 
devices are 
Class III 
mammary implants. 
is not covered by any 
of the previous rules 
in this table 
2—
classifications 
vary depending 
on intended 
purpose 
devices intended to: 
collect body liquid where a return flow is 
unlikely  
immobilise body parts and/or to apply force or 
compression 
channel or store substances that will eventually 
be delivered into the body 
treat or modify substances that will be 
delivered into the body 
dress wounds. 
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Table 5.3 Conformity Assessment for Medical Devices618 
Class of Medical 
Device 
Most commonly used conformity 
assessment procedures  
Declaration 
of 
Conformity 
legislative 
reference 
Class I Part 6 (Declaration of Conformity Procedures 
Not Requiring Assessment by the Secretary) 
Schedule 3, 
Part 6, clause 
6.6 
Class I (measuring) 
and 
Class IIa (non-sterile) 
Part 6 (Declaration of Conformity Procedures 
Not Requiring Assessment by the Secretary) 
+  
Part 5 (Product Quality Assurance 
Procedures) 
Schedule 3, 
Part 6, clause 
6.6 
Class I (sterile) 
and 
Class IIa (sterile) 
Part 6 (Declaration of Conformity Procedures 
Not Requiring Assessment by the Secretary) 
+  
Part 4 (Production Quality Assurance 
Procedures) 
Schedule 3, 
Part 6, clause 
6.6 
Class IIb Part 1 excluding Clause 1.6 (Full Quality 
Assurance Procedures) 
Schedule 3, 
Part 1 clause 
1.8 
Class III 
and 
Class AIMD 
Part 1 (Full Quality Assurance Procedures) + 
Clause 1.6 (Examination of Design) 
Schedule 3, 
Part 1 clause 
1.8 
Systems or Procedure 
Packs 
Part 7 (Procedures for Medical Devices Used 
for a Special Purpose) 
Schedule 3, 
Part 7, clause 
7.5 
 
Classification rules 3, 4 and 5.7, identified in Table 5.2 above, are of particular importance 
to the accreditation of neural interface devices. In addition, conformity assessment for neural 
interface devices as Class III and Class AIMD medical devices is identified in Table 5.3 
above. 
                                            
618 Ibid 113. 
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Schedule 2, Part 2 of the regulations provides rules for non-invasive medical device while 
Part 3 provides rules for invasive medical devices and implantable medical devices. Invasive 
medical devices are not surgically invasive but are be used to penetrate a body orifice of a 
patient.619 If the neural interface device is designed to be placed on the body of a person 
and interpret neural impulses solely from the neural impulses sent to nerve bundles, then it 
will be a non-invasive medical device that will be classified as Class I unless it is falls within 
Parts 4 or 5.620 It will fall within Part 4 if the device is to give or receive energy from the 
person, in which case it will be Class IIa or IIb.621 It will fall within Part 5 if it is an active, 
implantable medical device, in which case it would be a Class AIMD.622 An active medical 
device for therapy means: 
 
An active medical device that is intended by the manufacturer to be used on a human being, 
either alone or in combination with another medical device, to support, modify, replace or 
restore biological functions or structures for the purpose of treating or alleviating an illness, 
injury or handicap.623  
 
Many of the neural interface devices that exist, or may one day exist, could be considered 
as an active medical device for therapy but may also be regarded as simply an active 
medical device that will be classified depending on whether or not it is surgically invasive or 
implantable. 
 
If the neural interface device was to be inserted into a body orifice of a person, such as an 
ear, on a long-term basis, that being continuously for more than thirty days,624 it would be a 
Class IIa or IIb.625 If the neural interface device is a surgically invasive or an implantable 
medical device that is to be used on a long-term basis, it will be a Class IIa, IIb or III, 
depending on the intended location of the device.626 For example, if the device is to be the 
total or partial replacement of the shoulder, hip or knee, it will be a Class III device.627 A 
                                            
619 Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) Schedule 2, Part 3, Clause 3.1. 
620 Ibid Part 2, Clause 2.1. 
621 Ibid Part 4, Clause 4.2. 
622 Ibid Part 5, Clause 5.7.  
623 The Dictionary in the Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth). 
624 Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) Schedule 2, Part 1, Clause 1.1(c).  
625 Ibid Part 3, Clause 3.1(2)(c).  
626 Ibid Clause 3.4. 
627 Ibid Clause 3.4(4)(f).  
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cochlear implant is registered as a Class III device.628 It is unlikely that a neural interface 
device would be regarded as an in vitro diagnostic (IVD) medical device because the 
purpose for which it is created is not for pathological testing.629 
 
Therapeutic goods that have been approved by the TGA are listed on the Australian Register 
of Therapeutic Goods (ARTG)630 and this is the ‘central point of control for the legal supply 
of medical devices in Australia’.631 For Class III medical devices, including devices such as 
total and partial hip, knee or shoulder joint implants, the TGA has stringent pre-market 
safety, quality and performance assessment. Class III medical devices are individually 
registered on the ARTG to enable them to be monitored on their safety, quality and 
performance.632  
 
The Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth)633 provides that the regulations can specify the 
requirements for medical devices known as ‘Essential Principles’. The devices must comply 
with six Essential Principles that are specified in Schedule 1, Part 1 Therapeutic Goods 
(Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) and nine other Essential Principles regarding 
design and construction, which apply to devices on a case-by-case analysis, that are 
provided in Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) Schedule 1, 
Part 2: 
 
General principles 
1. Use of medical devices not to compromise health and safety. 
2. Design and construction of medical devices to conform to safety principles. 
3. Medical devices to be suitable for intended purpose. 
4. Long-term safety. 
5. Medical devices not to be adversely affected by transport or storage. 
6. Benefits of medical devices to outweigh any side effects. 
 
                                            
628 ARTG Entry 230668 MED-EL Implant Systems Australasia Pty Ltd - MAX Programming Interface - 
Cochlear implant assessment system. 
629 The Dictionary in the Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) defines IVD medical 
device. 
630 Australian Government, Department of Health, Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods 
<http://www.tga.gov.au/australian-register-therapeutic-goods>. 
631 Australian Government, Australian Regulatory Guidelines for Medical Devices, above n 608, 22. 
632 Australian Government, Department of Health, Reclassification of hip, knee and shoulder joint implants, 
(7 July 2015) <http://www.tga.gov.au/medical-devices-reforms>. 
633 Section 63. 
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Principles about design and construction 
1. Chemical, physical and biological properties. 
2. Infection and microbial contamination. 
3. Construction and environmental properties. 
4. Medical devices with a measuring function. 
5. Protection against radiation. 
6. Medical devices connected to or equipped with an energy source. 
7. Information to be provided with medical devices. 
8. Clinical evidence. 
9. Principles applying to IVD medical devices only. 
 
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) ss 41CB, 41CC and 41CD provide for the creation and 
application of standards for medical devices. Paragraphs 41CC(2)(a)-(f) list the 
organisations from which standards may be specified.634 
 
Assessment of Conformity with the Essential Principles for each of the classes is provided 
under the Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) Part 3, Division 3.2. 
The Conformity Assessment Procedures are set out in Therapeutic Goods (Medical 
Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) Schedule 3. This would include, for Class III devices, full 
quality assurance procedures, the type of examination procedures, the verification 
procedures, or the production quality assurance procedures.635 Devices in each of the other 
classes will require a number of Conformity Assessment Procedures.636 
 
The TGA monitors the devices that have been approved, collecting data from product 
sponsors, health professionals, patients and consumers.637 The TGA periodically prepares 
reports on adverse events involving the devices and requires a yearly report from sponsors 
of devices that are Class III, Class AIMD and implantable Class IIb medical devices.638  
                                            
634 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) 41CC(2)(a)-(f): 
(a) Standards Australia; 
(b) the International Organisation for Standardization; 
(c) the International Electrotechnical Commission; 
(d) the European Committee for Standardization; 
(e) the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization; 
(f) any other organisation declared by the Minister by notice published in the Gazette or on the Department’s 
website. 
635 Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) Part 3, Division 3.2, Regulation 3.6. 
636 Ibid Part 3, Division 3.2. 
637 Australian Government, Product regulation according to risk, above n 606, 5. 
638 Ibid. 
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In conclusion, the existing legislative framework for medical device accreditation can 
accommodate neural interface devices, despite the different forms they take. The extent to 
which emergency safety mechanisms and acceptable error margins are required will depend 
on the accreditation class allocated to the neural interface device. For example, the 
conformity assessment procedures for a neural interface device that is safety critical, and 
classified as a Class III or AIMD medical device, will be required to have full quality 
assurance procedures in compliance with the Australian Regulatory Guidelines for Medical 
Devices.639 The extent of quality assurance procedures will be guided by the magnitude of 
harm that could occur if the system fails to operate as it should. In addition, data information 
storage in the neural processor or decoder could be similar to the ‘black box’ of an aircraft 
in order to protect the information if an accident occurs.640  
 
2 Product Information 
 
Conditions attached to the granting of TGA accreditation include the provision of information 
to the users of the therapeutic medical devices.641 This will play a major role in establishing 
the neural interface device user’s knowledge of the limitations of the device which in turn 
will impact on the reasonable steps the individual must take to avoid harming the person or 
property of another. The need to take reasonable steps to avoid harm to another was raised 
by participants in the Delphi Method research642 and discussed in chapter 4 in relation to a 
negligence action.643  
 
Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) Schedule 1, Part 2, Essential 
Principle 13 specifies the information that must be provided with medical devices. Some of 
the information will be of importance in determining manufacturer liability.  
 
Regulations 13.3 and 13.4 are provided below in Figure 5.1. 
 
                                            
639 Australian Government, Department of Health, above n 608, Schedule 3, Part 1 clause 1.8. 
640 Tony Bailey, ‘Flight Data Recorders Built to Survive’ (2006) Avionics News 38, 38; Office of Research and 
Engineering, Flight Data Recorder Handbook for Aviation Accident Investigations (National Transportation 
Safety Board, 2002). 
641 Schedule 1, Part 2, Essential Principle 13 Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth). 
642 See Delphi Method research results in III chapter 3 Legal Analysis Using the Delphi Method. 
643 See analysis under the heading ‘3 Application of the Factors Determining Standard of Care’. 
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Figure 5.1 Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) 
13.3  Information to be provided with medical devices—particular requirements 
  The information mentioned in the following table must be provided with a medical 
device. 
 
Item Information to be provided 
1 The manufacturer’s name, or trading name, and address 
2 The intended purpose of the device, the intended user of the device, and the kind of 
patient on whom the device is intended to be used (if this information is not obvious) 
3 Sufficient information to enable a user to identify the device, or if relevant, the 
contents of packaging 
4 Any particular handling or storage requirements applying to the device 
5 Any warnings, restrictions, or precautions that should be taken, in relation to use of 
the device 
6 Any special operating instructions for the use of the device 
7 If applicable, an indication that the device is intended for a single use only 
8 If applicable, an indication that the device has been custom-made for a particular 
individual or health professional and is intended for use only by that individual or 
health professional 
9 If applicable, an indication that: 
(a) if the device is a medical device other than an IVD medical device—the device is 
intended for pre-market clinical investigation; or 
(b) if the device is an IVD medical device—the device is intended for performance 
evaluation only 
10 For a sterile device, the word ‘STERILE’ and information about the method that was 
used to sterilise the device 
11 The batch code, lot number or serial number of the device 
12 If applicable, a statement of the date (expressed in a way that clearly identifies the 
month and year) up to when the device can be safely used 
13 If the information provided with the device does not include the information 
mentioned in item 12—a statement of the date of manufacture of the device (this may 
be included in the batch code, lot number or serial number of the device, provided 
the date is clearly identifiable) 
14 If applicable, the words ‘for export only’ 
Note: In addition to the information mentioned in the above table, regulation 10.2 
requires certain information to be provided with a medical device. 
13.4  Instructions for use 
 (1) Instructions for the use of a medical device must be provided with the device. 
 (2) However, instructions for the use of a medical device need not be provided with the 
device, or may be abbreviated, if: 
 (a) the device is a Class I medical device, a Class IIa medical device or a Class 1 
IVD medical device; and 
 (b) the device can be used safely for its intended purpose without instructions. 
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 (3) Instructions for the use of a medical device must include information mentioned in the 
following table that is applicable to the device. 
 
Item Information to be provided 
1 The manufacturer’s name, or trading name, and address 
2 The intended purpose of the device, the intended user of the device, and the kind of 
patient on whom the device is intended to be used 
3 Information about any risk arising because of other equipment likely to be present 
when the device is being used for its intended purpose (for example, electrical 
interference from electro-surgical devices or magnetic field interference from 
magnetic resonance imaging devices) 
4 Information about the intended performance of the device and any undesirable side 
effects caused by use of the device 
5 Any contra-indications, warnings, restrictions, or precautions that may apply in 
relation to use of the device 
6 Sufficient information to enable a user to identify the device, or if relevant, the 
contents of packaging 
7 Any particular handling or storage requirements applying to the device 
8 If applicable, an indication that the device is intended for a single use only 
9 If applicable, an indication that the device has been custom-made for a particular 
individual or health professional and is intended for use only by that individual or 
health professional 
10 If applicable, an indication that: 
(a) if the device is a medical device other than an IVD medical device—the device is 
intended for pre-market clinical investigation; or 
(b) if the device is an IVD medical device—the device is intended for performance 
evaluation only 
11 For a sterile device, the word ‘STERILE’ and information about the method that was 
used to sterilise the device 
12 For a device that is intended by the manufacturer to be supplied in a sterile state: 
(a) an indication that the device is sterile; and 
(b) information about what to do if sterile packaging is damaged; and 
(c) if appropriate, instructions for resterilisation of the device 
13 For a medical device that is intended by the manufacturer to be sterilised before 
use—instructions for cleaning and sterilising the device which, if followed, will ensure 
that the device continues to comply with the applicable provisions of the essential 
principles 
14 Any special operating instructions for the use of the device 
15 Information to enable the user to verify whether the device is properly installed and 
whether it can be operated safely and correctly, including details of calibration (if any) 
needed to ensure that the device operates properly and safely during its intended life 
16 Information about the nature and frequency of regular and preventative maintenance 
of the device, including information about the replacement of consumable 
components of the device during its intended life 
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Item Information to be provided 
17 Information about any treatment or handling needed before the device can be used 
18 For a device that is intended by the manufacturer to be installed with, or 
connected to, another medical device or other equipment so that the device can 
operate as required for its intended purpose—sufficient information about the 
device to enable the user to identify the appropriate other medical device or 
equipment that will ensure a safe combination 
19 For an implantable medical device—information about any risks associated with 
its implantation 
20 For a reusable device: 
(a) information about the appropriate processes to allow reuse of the device 
(including information about cleaning, disinfection, packaging and, if 
appropriate, resterilisation of the device); and 
(b) an indication of the number of times the device may be safely reused 
21 For a medical device that is intended by the manufacturer to emit radiation for 
medical purposes—details of the nature, type, intensity and distribution of the 
radiation emitted 
22 Information about precautions that should be taken by a patient and the user if 
the performance of the device changes 
23 Information about precautions that should be taken by a patient and the user if it 
is reasonably foreseeable that use of the device will result in the patient or user 
being exposed to adverse environmental conditions 
24 Adequate information about any medicinal product that the device is designed to 
administer, including any limitations on the substances that may be administered 
using the device 
25 Information about any medicine (including any stable derivative of human blood 
or blood plasma) that is incorporated, or is intended to be incorporated, into the 
device as an integral part of the device 
25A For a medical device, other than an IVD medical device, information about any 
tissues, tissue derivatives, cells or substances of animal origin that have been 
rendered non-viable, or tissues, cells or substances of microbial or recombinant 
origin that are included in the device 
26 Information about precautions that should be taken by a patient and the user if 
there are special or unusual risks associated with the disposal of the device 
27 Information about the degree of accuracy claimed if the device has a measuring 
function 
28 Information about any particular facilities required for use of the device or any 
particular training or qualifications required by the user of the device 
29 For an IVD medical device, information (including, to the extent practicable, 
drawings and diagrams) about the following: 
(a) the scientific principle (the ‘test principle’) on which the performance of the 
IVD medical device relies; 
(b) specimen type, collection, handling and preparation; 
(c) reagent description and any limitations (for example, use with a dedicated 
instrument only); 
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Item Information to be provided 
 (d) assay procedure including calculations and interpretation of results;  
(e) interfering substances and their effect on the performance of the assay; 
 (f) analytical performance characteristics, such as sensitivity, specificity, 
accuracy and precision; 
(g) clinical performance characteristics, such as sensitivity and specificity; 
(h) reference intervals, if appropriate; 
(i) any precautions to be taken in relation to substances or materials that present 
a risk of infection 
 
Regulation 13.4, Items 3, 15, 23 and 27 would be of particular importance in relation to 
express statement of the device limitations. This could also include the reasonable steps 
the person with the neural interface device must take to avoid harm or device malfunction. 
Items 14, 22 and 28 would be of importance in relation to the training a person with the 
device must undertake. These requirements under Regulations 13.3 and 13.4 would impact 
on liability of the manufacturer in a civil action in negligence as discussed in chapters 3 and 
4. 
 
C Manufacturer Liability  
 
It could be argued that in the context of harm caused by a person with a neural interface 
device, the difficulty of ascertaining whether the cause was solely that of the individual or of 
the neural interface device is so complex that the inference of negligence (res ipsa loquitur) 
might apply, as discussed in chapter 4.644 However, in determining attribution of liability of 
the person with the neural interface device and the manufacturer of the device, the particular 
acts or omissions of each of them will be considered in order for the court to make a decision 
regarding liability in negligence.  
 
In considering liability, the courts will have difficulty establishing the degree to which the 
neural interface device can be attributed to the harm because of its integration with the 
person’s body and mind.645 As a result, traditional manufacturer liability will play a role. This 
was raised by the legal experts in the Delphi Method research conducted and is discussed 
                                            
644 See analysis under the heading ‘4 Whether the Inference of Negligence (res ipsa loquitur) Applies’. 
645 See analysis in chapter 4 under the heading ‘D Causation’. 
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in chapter 3.646 The technical sophistication of neural interface devices arguably means 
these devices will carry with them the increased possibility of failure to interpret neural 
impulses with 100% accuracy.647 This shortcoming was identified and discussed in chapter 
2.648  
 
1 Neural Interface Device When Regarded as a Tool 
 
Clausen considered brain-machine interface (BMI) as a ‘highly sophisticated case of tool 
use’,649 while Søren Holm and Teck Chuan Voo considered a brain-machine interfaced 
prosthetic arm represented a tool that individuals used. Holm and Voo’s theory makes it 
possible to distinguish between actions initiated by the individual as opposed to the 
technology, thereby enabling continued reliance on the existing legal frameworks.650 The 
duty of care that normally exists would prevail so the responsibility for obtaining an 
operator’s licence or insurance may rest on the person with the neural interface device.651  
 
Moreover, humans are often in control of dangerous and unpredictable tools such as cars 
and guns. Brain–machine interfaces represent a highly sophisticated case of tool use, but 
they are still just that. In the eyes of the law, responsibility should not be much harder to 
disentangle.652  
 
However, neural interface device could be regarded as more than just a tool.  
 
2 Neural Interface Device Beyond Being a Tool 
 
It could be argued that neural interface devices, move beyond being simply a “tool” as a 
result of the integration with, and incorporation into, the human body and brain.653 The 
melding of the mind and machine moves the use of the neural interface device beyond 
                                            
646 See under the heading ‘2 Round 1 Research Outcomes’. 
647 Ohnishi, Weir and Kuiken, above n 373, 43. 
648 See analysis under the heading ‘D Limitations of Neural Interface Device Technology’. 
649 Clausen, above n 4, 1080. 
650 Holm and Voo, above n 67, 62. 
651 Ibid. 
652 Clausen, above n 4, 1080. 
653 Holm and Voo, above n 67, 6. 
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traditional ‘tool use’.654 The scenario presented in chapter 4 involved an individual with 
neuroprosthetic legs.655 In this instance the interaction between the neural interface device 
and the brain is so difficult to determine that this creates challenges for the courts in applying 
the existing law to determine liability in cases where harm occurs. Where an individual acts 
to the detriment of another person, there exists law to determine liability for misuse of the 
tool, such as a gun, where the manufacturer of the gun is not liable for the injury caused. 
Where there is melding of mind and machine with, for example, the integration of a 
neuroprosthetic arm or hand, efferent and afferent communication between the neural 
interface device and the human brain occurs. That is, neural impulses are sent from the 
brain, recorded and decoded by the neural interface device and the device sends 
information to the brain to assist the individual in the facilitation of the desired action. Under 
these circumstances, the neuroprosthetic arm or hand is arguably no longer simply a ‘tool’ 
when the courts are determining who should be held responsible for the damage caused to 
the property or person of another.  
 
Holm and Voo considered manufacturer liability for such products and concluded that ‘the 
“changed nature of human action” brought about by brain-machine interface technology 
does not quite change the very nature of responsibility for our actions’.656 That is, despite 
the fact that the neural interface device is operating as a result of commands from the 
person’s mind, this does not transfer all liability from the person to the neural interface 
device. Liability for wrongful acts will be determined in compliance with the legal principles 
relevant to the cause of action being pursued. For example, in a negligence action, factual 
causation will be assessed in the damage element of the action. Attribution of liability of the 
person with the neural interface device and the neural interface device manufacturer will 
then be decided by the court. Causation and liability implications are analysed in chapter 
4.657 However, the neural interface device will need to comply with the regulatory 
requirements discussed above. 
 
Clausen believes that ‘[m]elding brain and machine makes the latter an integral part of the 
individual’.658 Holm and Voo believe that legal issues arise if it becomes impossible to 
                                            
654 Ibid. 
655 See in the analysis of factual causation under the heading ‘(a) The Scenario’. 
656 Ibid. 
657 See analysis under the heading ‘D Causation’. 
658 Clausen, above n 4, 1080. 
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distinguish between the will of the person and the operation of the technology, where the 
natural neural system assimilates with the technology.659 This was analysed in chapter 4.660 
If this occurs, Holm and Voo question whether the person will be held liable or just simply 
culpable to an appropriate standard and whether the person could plead the defence that it 
was ‘the machine rather (or more) than I who did it’.661  
 
Incidents that result in damage to a person or property in this situation will involve 
manufacturer liability. For example, an angry person responds subconsciously with a 
general thought of violence. The brain sends the impulse to the neural decoder that relays 
instructions to the neuroprosthetic arm to make violent contact with the victim’s face. In the 
meantime, the angry person’s knowledge of the inappropriate action has countered the 
desire to hit the other person, but it is too late for the neuroprosthetic limb to stop. The neural 
interface device has operated correctly. The dilemma for the medical personnel, insurers 
and lawyers is to determine where the responsibility should lie.  
 
Determining manufacturer liability when the neural interface device has operated correctly 
will involve the court’s examination of the manufacturer’s obligations with respect to the 
provision of information, including warnings, as discussed above662 together with the 
obligations that attach to the design, construction, manufacture and maintenance of the 
device. Evidence will be required to ascertain the commands that were sent from the brain 
to the signal processor and the instructions sent from the signal processor to the assistive 
device, as discussed in chapters 4.663 However, every judicial decision will be dependent 
upon the particular circumstances of each dispute. Manufacturers of neural interface devices 
could benefit from research being undertaken in robotics and include operational steps that 
may impact on manufacturer liability. 
 
For example, the development of robots to engage in military combat presents challenges 
in the robot’s decision-making processes. Professor Ronald Arkin of the Georgia Institute of 
Technology is leading the research in this area to enable robots to self-determine when and 
                                            
659 Holm and Voo, above n 67, 6. 
660 See analysis under the heading ‘D Causation’. 
661 Ibid 2-3. 
662 See analysis in chapter 5 under the heading ‘1 TGA Approval’. 
663 See analysis under the heading ‘1 Factual Causation’. 
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who to attack and the appropriate weapon to use.664 The actions of the robot would be 
guided by, what Arkin calls, an ‘ethical governor’ that checks a set of pre-programmed 
constraints based on the rules of engagement and the laws of war,665 together with an 
‘ethical adapter’ used to restrict the robot’s weapon choices.666 However, the ‘responsibility 
governor’ allows military personnel ‘to override the conservatively programmed ethical 
governor if he or she decides the robot is too hesitant or is overreaching its authority.’667  
 
If similar mechanisms were incorporated in the operation of neural interface devices, these 
would help to minimise unwanted neural interface operations. This research in robotics used 
in warfare provides avenues for neural interface device manufacturers to determine a 
degree of autonomous operation of neural interface devices by pre-programming 
prohibitions based on legal constraints, enabling the device to determine what action is 
appropriate and then finally enabling the individual to override these constraining 
mechanisms.668 For example, the decoded neural impulse is commanding the 
neuroprosthetic arm to punch another person. The algorithms within the neural processor 
or decoder recognise this command to be in conflict with the law (ethical governor). The 
decoder then signals back to the brain that the command will not be fulfilled. The decoder 
chooses an appropriate gesture, holding up the hand to request behaviour to stop (ethical 
adapter). However, if the subsequent neural impulse sent back to the decoder is to punch 
regardless of the legal impediment (responsibility governor) effectively overriding the ethical 
governor, the decoder will send instructions to the neuroprosthetic arm to conduct the punch. 
                                            
664 Carroll, above n 10, 80. 
665 International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions and Commentary (27 December 2017) 
<https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions>. The law or rules of war 
are incorporated in the Geneva Conventions which comprise of the following: 
1. The First Geneva Convention "for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field";  
2. The Second Geneva Convention "for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea";  
3. The Third Geneva Convention "relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War"; and 
4. The Fourth Geneva Convention "relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War".  
666 Carroll, above n 10, 84. 
667 Ibid. The method of machine governance incorporating similar steps that could be adapted for neural 
interface devices was discussed in Ron Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid 
Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture Part 3: Representational and Architectural Considerations (Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of Technology in Wartime Conference, Palo Alto, CA, 26 January 2008) 8-9 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f4fa/da9d369957944b11f834a4e7e9cbef6af4d8.pdf?_ga=2.142305586.10
63339984.1528353891-1535200378.1528353891>; Ronald Arkin, Patrick Ulam and Brittany Duncan, ‘An 
Ethical Governor for Constraining Lethal Action in an Autonomous System (2009) CSE Technical reports 
163, 163-5. 
668 Carroll, above n 10, 80. 
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The ability for such incorporation of an ethical governor, ethical adapter and responsibility 
governor could be considered in neural interface research and development. The 
incorporation of an ethical governor, ethical adapter and responsibility governor by the 
manufacturer of the neural interface devices could prevent a person inappropriately hitting 
another and this could assist in more accurately determining liability. That is, if the person 
overrode the ethical governor component of the neural interface device, arguably the 
manufacturer’s liability will be reduced. 
 
Other dimensions of neural interface device operation might play a role in the court’s 
determination of manufacturer liability. For example, if the device can react spontaneously 
in a reflex action like parts of the natural human body can, or operate from the neural 
impulses without deliberate intent, the degree to which the manufacturer can be held liable 
goes beyond conscious mind control. When determining liability in these situations of 
unconscious, reflex reaction, or sane automatism669 the courts will need to consider the 
ability for manufacturers to guard against or minimise the chance for the neural interface 
device to act in such a way. The neural interface device is responding solely to the neural 
impulses in the same way as a biological limb moves in a reflex reaction.  
 
As discussed in chapter 2,670 continuing research in order to better understand the 
functioning of the brain will assist in overcoming these challenges. For example, Professor 
Ross Cunnington, of the Queensland Brain Institute’s Cunnington Laboratory, leads a group 
of neuroscientists who are researching how the brain processes sensory information 
including the ‘fine circuitry of the basal ganglia, which are crucial for higher-order planning 
and control of voluntary movements.’671  
 
Outcomes from research on how the brain functions will assist with the accuracy of neural 
decoding and the operation of the neural interface device. It is likely that the command from 
the brain will need to be much more certain than a subconscious response. In the scenario 
above involving the desire to punch another person, the biological arm would not have 
moved as a result of the unintentional emotional response to hit the other person. A 
                                            
669 ‘Automatism that does not arise from a disease of the mind’ Peter Butt and David Hamer (eds), Concise 
Australian Legal Dictionary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th edition, 2011), 521. ‘Sane automatism includes 
actions committed while sleepwalking, during a fit, as a reflexive response to (e.g.) a bee sting’ in Trischa 
Mann (ed), Australian Law Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2010), 53-4. 
670 See analysis under the heading ‘B Neural Interface Systems and Devices’. 
671 Ross Cunnington, Brain and Action <https://qbi.uq.edu.au/cunningtongroup>. 
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conscious command was not sent from the brain, so the decoder would not have instructed 
the assistive device to operate. However, this would be dependent on the type of neural 
sensor operating. For example, if the sensor is an implant sitting on the motor cortex of the 
brain, a command to injure or attack the other person might have been sensed. This is highly 
unlikely because the brain will be controlling the actions of the body, ensuring deliberate 
acts are facilitated, and not simply an intuitive, emotional response. It will be imperative that 
neural interface device manufacturers ensure that the neural sensor only senses definitive 
neural commands of movement, not the background ‘noise’ of mere thoughts or desires. 
That is, action solely on conscious, intentional commands. 
 
In the application of the current law of negligence, liability of the manufacturer of a neural 
interface device could be considered in the following way. 
 
The duty of care owed by the manufacturer was established in Donoghue v Stevenson672 
and subsequently applied in Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd673and Suosaari v 
Steinhardt674. The scope of the duty requires the manufacturer to take reasonable care in 
the manufacture of the product to prevent the product causing injury or loss to the 
consumer.675 
 
The duty of a care of a manufacturer is an issue to be determined at common law. In the 
context of the NID driver scenario,676 the manufacturer of the NID driver’s neuroprosthetic 
legs (NID manufacturer) owes a duty of care to the NID driver. That duty is to take 
reasonable care in the manufacture of the neuroprosthetic legs to avoid reasonably 
foreseeable and real risk of injury.  
 
As discussed above, determination of breach of the duty of care is no longer under common 
law but is now pursuant to the Civil Liability Legislation.677 The standard of care of the NID 
manufacturer is that of reasonably competent manufacturer of neural interface devices and 
                                            
672 [1932] AC 562, 599.This finding was discussed in chapter 1 under the heading ‘2 The Chosen Theory for 
Hypothesis Determination’. 
673 [1936] AC 85. 
674 [1989] 2 Qd R 477. 
675 Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317, 328 [29] (McHugh J). 
676 See chapter 4 under the heading ‘(a) The Scenario’. 
677 See chapter 4 under the heading ‘B Statutory Modification of the Common Law’. 
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breach of the duty of care is determined by the application of the Civil Liability Legislation.678 
For example, the relevant provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) state: 
 
9 General principles 
(1) A person does not breach a duty to take precautions against a risk of harm unless— 
 
(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought 
reasonably to have known); and 
(b) the risk was not insignificant; and 
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the person would have 
taken the precautions. 
 
(2) In deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of 
harm, the court is to consider the following (among other relevant things)— 
 
(a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken; 
(b) the likely seriousness of the harm; 
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm; 
(d) the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm. 
 
Breach of that duty of care is a question of fact.679 In applying CLAQ s 9(1)(a) when 
determining breach of duty of care,680 the risk of injury to the NID driver, or the class to which 
the NID driver belongs (that is, consumers who require neuroprosthetic legs) is reasonably 
foreseeable if the NID manufacturer fails to ensure the neuroprosthetic legs operate 
correctly. This would be supported by the TGA guidelines for accreditation681 that mandate 
the taking of precautions. For example, the conformity assessment procedures for the 
neuroprosthetic legs if they are classified as a Class III or AIMD medical device, will be 
required to have full quality assurance procedures in compliance with the Australian 
Regulatory Guidelines for Medical Devices.682 It is highly probable that the accuracy of the 
neural processor, or decoder, is such that correct interpretation will result in correct 
                                            
678 CLWACT s 43; CLANSW s 5B; CLAQ s 9; CLAS s 32; CLAT s 11; WAVIC s 48; CLAWA s 5B.  
679 CLWACT s 43; CLANSW s 5B; CLAQ s 9; CLAS s 32; CLAT s 11; WAVIC s 48; CLAWA s 5B; Wyong 
Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40. 
680 CLWACT s 43(1)(a); CLANSW s 5B(1)(a); CLAS s 32(1)(a); CLAT s 11(1)(a); WAVIC s 48(1)(a); CLAWA 
s 5B(1)(a). 
681 See discussion above under the heading ‘1 TGA Approval’. 
682 Australian Government, Department of Health, above n 608, Schedule 3, Part 1 clause 1.8. 
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instructions to the neuroprosthetic legs. Evidence of breach of statutory provisions or 
regulatory guidelines is not conclusive breach of the duty of care, but will be an influential 
factor to be considered by the court.683 This might also include the NID manufacturer 
requiring the recipient of the neuroprosthetic legs to undertake training in order to develop 
operational proficiency and understand device limitations. 
 
In applying CLAQ s 9(1)(b),684 it could be argued that the risk of injury, that is, the NID driver 
having a motor vehicle accident, is not insignificant. When seen from the perspective of the 
NID manufacturer, the NID driver is clearly at risk. Failure of the neuroprosthetic legs to 
operate as commanded by the NID’s neural impulses could result in a motor vehicle 
accident, a fact which a reasonable person in the position of the defendant should be aware.  
 
In applying CLAQ ss 9(1)(c) and (2),685 to determine whether there has been a breach of 
standard of care and subsequently the duty of care, the court is to consider the following 
(among other relevant things):  
 
Under CLAQ s 9(2)(a),686 the probability of injury occurring is arguably high. That is, if the 
decoder does not interpret the neural impulse correctly, it is highly probable that action or 
inaction will result in injury, identified in the NID driver scenario above.687 As neuroprosthetic 
legs become available and used, probability based on statistics will assist in evaluation. 
 
Under CLAQ s 9(2)(b),688 seriousness of the harm must be considered. In the context of the 
NID driver scenario, the gravity of injury occurring as a result of an alleged breach is arguably 
serious because the result could be serious/permanent injury or death.689 
 
                                            
683 Tucker v McCann [1948] VLR 222. 
684 CLWACT s 43(1)(b); CLANSW s 5B(1)(b); CLAS s 32(1)(b); CLAT s 11(1)(b); WAVIC s 48(1)(b); CLAWA 
s 5B(1)(b). 
685 CLWACT s 43(1)(c) and (2); CLANSW s 5B(1)(c) and (2); CLAS s 32(1)(c) and (2); CLAT s 11(1)(c) and 
(2); WAVIC s 48(1)(c) and (2); CLAWA s 5B(1)(c) and (2). 
686 CLWACT s 43(2)(a); CLANSW s 5B(2)(a); CLAS s 32(2)(a); CLAT s 11(2)(a); WAVIC s 48(2)(a); CLAWA 
s 5B(2)(a). 
687 See chapter 4 under the heading ‘(a) The Scenario’. 
688 CLWACT s 43(2)(b); CLANSW s 5B(2)(b); CLAS s 32(2)(b); CLAT s 11(2)(b); WAVIC s 48(2)(b); CLAWA 
s 5B(2)(b). 
689 Road Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 324 CLR 330, 340 [27]. 
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Under CLAQ s 9(2)(c),690 the practicability of, or burden of taking precautions must be 
considered. It would be relatively easy, not overly inconvenient and inexpensive (in 
comparison to the risk of injury) to carefully check the neuroprosthetic legs, follow the TGA 
guidelines and simply stop the devices that are not functioning correctly from reaching the 
market.691 Another precaution could be the inclusion of a physical override mechanism to 
enable the NID driver to instruct the neuroprosthetic legs using hand operated controls 
rather than neural impulse. The court will consider expense, convenience and similar factors 
to determine if this, or other steps, are reasonable.692 Other factors the court may consider 
include the following. 
 
As neural interface devices develop, customary standards, such as neural interface device 
industry guidelines, from organisations like the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers,693 might eventuate. These industry guidelines may require specific tasks to be 
undertaken in the manufacture of neural interface devices. Compliance with these guidelines 
will be a factor the court will consider, however, non-compliance will be regarded as 
evidence of breach of the duty of care but will not be conclusive.694  
 
The NID manufacturer should also anticipate the negligent conduct (or inadvertence) of the 
NID driver.695 For example, there is a real possibility that the NID driver will not command 
the neuroprosthetic leg to apply pressure to the car brakes within time for the device to 
accomplish the command before colliding with the other vehicle. There may be no 
reasonable steps the NID manufacturer can take to guard against the NID driver’s conduct. 
However, considering these types of negligent conduct or inadvertence and taking 
reasonable steps to counter such conduct will be a factor the court will consider in 
determining whether the NID manufacturer has breached the duty of care. 
 
                                            
690 CLWACT s 43(2)(c); CLANSW s 5B(2)(c); CLAS s 32(2)(c); CLAT s 11(2)(c); WAVIC s 48(2)(c); CLAWA 
s 5B(2)(c). 
691 Road Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 324 CLR 330, 407 [275]. 
692 Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431, 446-7 [24]-[25] (Brennan CJ); 454-6 [50]-
[56] (Toohey and Gummow JJ); 480-1 [128]-[129] (Kirby J). 
693 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc (IEEE), (2019) https://www.ieee.org/. 
694 Tucker v McCann [1948] VLR 222. 
695 Roche v Kigetzis (2015) 72 MVR 67; 76 [31]; [2015] VSCA 207, [31]. 
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Finally, under CLAQ s 9(2)(d),696 social utility of the NID manufacturer’s conduct requires a 
comparison between the threat of injury to the NID driver versus some overall benefit to the 
community. It could be argued that the social utility of the neuroprosthetic legs which create 
the risk of harm serves a useful social purpose for a considerable number of people.697  
 
Undertaking this application of the Civil Liability Legislation to the facts of a dispute will 
provide the court with the ability to decide whether or not, on the balance, the NID 
manufacturer breached the duty of care owed to the NID driver. This decision will impact on 
the liability of the NID manufacturer with respect to the damage caused to the car that was 
hit by the car being driven by the NID driver. However, as discussed above, factual causation 
may still present a problem as a result of the neuroprosthetic legs being so integrated with 
the human being.698 
 
D Conclusion 
 
Attribution of liability when the neural interface device operates correctly will be difficult to 
determine due to the complex interaction between the brain and the neural interface device. 
Aspects of operation including neural impulse decoding will play a role. In chapter 4699 it was 
shown that accurate determination of what the neural impulse command actually was, will 
create difficulty for the court to assess liability. Chapter 5 examined three factors a court 
would consider when determining the extent of liability of a neural interface device 
manufacturer, for the harm suffered by the plaintiff. These factors were neural interface 
device accreditation, information provided by manufacturers to the recipients of neural 
interface devices and whether the device could be regarded as more than a tool.700  
 
Requirements under therapeutic goods legislation701 will be applied to determine 
accreditation of neural interface devices. In relation to functionality of the neural interface 
                                            
696 CLWACT s 43(2)(d); CLANSW s 5B(2)(d); CLAS s 32(2)(d); CLAT s 11(2)(d); WAVIC s 48(2)(d); CLAWA 
s 5B(2)(d). 
697 Harris v Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd (2006) Australian Tort Reports ¶81-838, [60]. 
698 See chapter 4 under the heading, ‘1 Factual Causation’. 
699 See analysis under the heading ‘1 Factual Causation’. 
700 See analysis above under the headings ‘1 TGA Approval’, ‘2 Product Information’ and ‘2 Neural Interface 
Device Beyond Being a Tool’, respectively.  
701 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) and Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth). 
Guidelines for accreditation are provided in the Australian Regulatory Guidelines for Medical Devices 
(ARGMD). 
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device, manufacturers will need to take reasonable steps to minimise unwanted actions that 
might contribute to the harm to another. Those steps could include mechanisms such as the 
ceasing of functionality if the neural impulse cannot be decoded with sufficient clarity, 
communication from the decoder to the brain for confirmation of command by the brain and 
mechanisms that incorporate an ethical governor, ethical adapter and responsibility 
governor.  
 
While the melding of mind and machine moves the use of an active implantable medical 
device beyond traditional ‘tool use’, device accreditation is well placed to meet the demands 
of civil litigation. The degree to which manufacturers of neural interface devices will be held 
liable for damage to property or person as a result of the interaction of the device with the 
recipient will depend on the facts of each matter. The accreditation process will undoubtedly 
reduce the chance of holding the manufacturer liable, however, the more sophisticated 
devices that will interpret neural impulses directly from the brain will test the limits of the law 
in determining attribution of liability.  
 
When applying revolutionary science, there is no crisis created by neural interface devices 
in the application of the law regarding manufacturer liability. The current law will apply 
without difficulty in both the regulation of neural interface devices and the imposition of 
obligations on manufacturers. Working together to facilitate movement, the brain and neural 
interface device will become as interrelated as the brain and a biological part of the human 
being. The acceptable error rate of the device might help shield the device manufacturer 
from liability but the court’s determination of the role the device played in causing the 
damage may be otherwise. 
 
Having analysed the framework of neural interface devices in chapter 2, gathered insight 
from legal experts using Delphi Method research in chapter 3 and analysed both negligence 
and attribution of liability between the recipient of a neural interface device and the 
manufacturer in chapters 4 and 5, recommendations are made in chapter 6 that will assist 
with the re-evaluation and adaptation of the current law when resolving a negligence action. 
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VI CHAPTER 6 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
A Terms of Reference 
 
The earlier chapters of this thesis explored the impact that neural interface devices will have 
on the current law as they become more integrated into the human body. The research 
hypothesis analysed was that when a person who has a neural interface device is involved 
in circumstances where harm to another person or another person’s property occurs, the 
Australian law will require re-evaluation and adaptation to resolve the subsequent civil 
action.  
 
B List of Recommendations 
 
These recommendations are based on analysis in previous chapters. 
 
Negligence 
 
Recommendation 1 
In the application of the Civil Liability Legislation, the fact that the defendant has a neural 
interface device must be considered when determining the standard of care that should be 
applied.702 
 
Recommendation 2 
The operation by a person of a neural interface device is not to be regarded in the same 
way as the operation of a car or any other device that is independent of direct neural impulse 
from the individual.  
 
Recommendation 3 
Information contained within the neural interface device in relation to neural impulse 
recording and interpretation, together with the instructions that were sent to the assistive 
                                            
702 CLWACT s 43; CLANSW s 5B; CLAQ s 9; CLAT s 11; CLAS s 32; WAVIC s 48; CLAWA s 5B. There is 
no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. 
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device and communication back to the brain, be retained for a set minimum period of time 
and is required to be disclosed to all parties during legal proceedings.703 
 
Recommendation 4 
Discussion of the public policy issues, including those in chapter 4,704 should be undertaken 
by the governments, members of the judiciary and legal practitioners to assist in 
development of the law surrounding neural interface devices.705 
 
Manufacturer Liability 
 
Recommendation 5 
The TGA’s neural interface device accreditation process should ensure that the error rate of 
neural impulse decoding by the device is not substantially different from normal motor errors 
of the corresponding biological part.706  
 
Recommendation 6 
The conditions and assessment of conformity of neural interface devices must comply with 
the Australian Essential Principles.707 . 
 
 
Recommendation 7 
The TGA requires manufacturers to provide product information for consumers, including 
the activities that should not be engaged in by the recipient of the device, in plain English.  
 
                                            
703 This would be best achieved as obligations under the rules of the court. This will be important in assisting 
with determination of causation, as discussed in chapter 4. 
704 Including indeterminate liability and coherence of the law. See chapter 4 analysis under the heading ‘(b) 
Policy Considerations’. 
705 This will assist in determining an appropriate balance between public benefit of neural interface devices 
and public risk. 
706 This will assist in determining an appropriate balance between public benefit of neural interface devices 
and public risk. See discussion in chapter 4 under the heading ‘(b) Policy Considerations’. 
707 The analysis of manufacturer liability in chapter 5 determined that neural interface devices must comply 
with six Essential Principles and nine other Essential Principles regarding design and construction, which 
apply to devices on a case-by-case analysis, all of which are specified in Schedule 1, Part 1 and Part 2 
Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth), respectively. 
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Recommendation 8 
Manufacturers incorporate in neural interface devices governance processes, such as an 
ethical governor,708 ethical adapter and responsibility governor709 to prevent misuse or 
inappropriate use of the devices.  
 
C Introduction 
 
Research for the thesis centred on the research hypothesis, when a person who has a neural 
interface device is involved in circumstances where harm to another person or another 
person’s property occurs, the Australian law will require re-evaluation and adaptation to 
resolve subsequent civil action. It was important to engage with legal experts who identified 
the most significant legal issues associated with neural interface devices.  
 
Chapter 1 provided an overview of this research area and the methodology that was 
employed to determine the research hypothesis. The significance of the research 
emphasised the original and substantial contribution to knowledge that this thesis provides 
as neural interface devices are still being developed and a civil action against a person with 
a neural interface device has yet to come before the courts.  
 
Many issues were identified, however, the analysis of every issue was beyond the scope of 
this thesis. It was in these circumstances that the collection of data from legal experts was 
utilised by adopting the Delphi Method research methodology. The Delphi Method research 
methodology undertaken was outlined in chapter 1710 and the following is a summary of the 
steps: 
 
1. Development of the Research Question.  
2. Designing the Research – The Delphi Method was used to collect the judgments and 
opinions of legal experts in the judiciary, legal profession and academia.  
                                            
708 Arkin, Ulam and Duncan, above n 667, 163-5. 
709 Carroll, above n 10, 80. The method of machine governance incorporating similar steps that could be 
adapted for neural interface devices was discussed in chapter 5 under the heading ‘2 Neural Interface 
Device Beyond Being a Tool’; Arkin, above n 667, 8.  
710 The methodology was based on the Delphi methodology as used and reported in Skulmoski and 
Hartman, above n 51, 3-5. See chapter 1 under the heading ‘(b) The Delphi Method Research’. 
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3. Research Sample – The selection of research participants.711  
4. The Stimulus – The stimulus was developed and tightly defined to provide the 
information to participants.712  
5. Delphi Preliminary Studies –  
a. Pre-test of the Stimulus.  
b. Pilot of online Research Instrument. 
6. Release Round 1 Research Instrument and Analyse Responses.  
7. Development of Round 2 Research Instrument.  
8. Release Round 2 Research Instrument and Analyse Responses.  
9. Document Research Results. 
 
The results of the Delphi Method research determined the structure of the chapters that 
followed. This was the analysis of the predominate legal issues identified by the participants 
in the Delphi Method research, namely negligence and manufacturer liability, which were 
conducted in chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
 
However, before undertaking the Delphi Method research, an understanding of the technical 
aspects of neural interface devices was required. Chapter 2 provided a brief overview of the 
technical framework upon which neural interface systems are being developed. This 
included a simplified version of the way in which the human brain communicates with the 
human body. The recording and interpretation of neural impulses by the neural processor 
within the neural interface system was outlined including the interface with the assistive 
device.713 The device might include a computer, robot, robotic arm or artificial body part that 
is either placed on the outside of the human body or is incorporated within the body. While 
interfacing with an external computer or robot is advanced technology, the focus of the thesis 
was on neural interface devices that are integrated into the human body to the extent that 
they no longer exist as a separate and independent device but become an integral part of 
the human being. It is upon this basis that existing law regarding tool use cannot be 
adequately or appropriately applied without re-evaluation or adaptation. 
                                            
711 Ziglio, above n 326, 14. Ziglio acknowledges on this page that ‘the definition of “experts” varies according 
to the context and field of interest in which the Delphi Method is going to be applied. Being and expert entails 
the acquisition of experience, special skill in or knowledge of a particular subject.’  
712 The stimulus was information provided to participants to ensure the legal experts would understand the 
research questions sufficiently to accurately address the issues. 
713 See chapter 2 under the heading ‘A Introduction’ regarding the explanation that neural interface devices 
are synonymous with neural interface systems where neural activity is sensed to provide command signals 
to computers, machines and devices.  
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Chapter 2 made it clear that our understanding of how the human brain functions is 
incomplete and the technology that records and interprets neural impulse is far from perfect. 
Neural interfacing is not a perfect science and so the neural interface systems that provide 
the ability for people who have physiological and neurological injuries or developmental 
problems to interact in the world with greater freedom of movement, have their 
shortcomings. Accordingly, should a civil matter come before the court, experts will be 
required to provide the court with an understanding of the operation of the neural interface 
system and the limitations that must be considered. The predominant civil action likely to be 
brought against a person with a neural interface device is negligence and this was identified 
by legal experts in the Delphi Method research. The Delphi Method research outcomes were 
provided and examined in chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 3 discussed the Delphi Method research undertaken and examined the insight of 
the Australian legal experts who participated in the research. Those experts identified the 
potential civil legal issues with neural interface devices and stated how the current law will 
apply to resolve those issues. Within negligence, the experts identified breach of duty of 
care (incorporating standard of care) and causation as major issues the current law will have 
difficulty applying to a defendant with a neural interface device. Manufacturer liability was 
also raised by the experts as a substantial legal issue. It was on the basis of this research 
that chapters 4 and 5 provided an analysis of negligence and manufacturer liability, 
respectively. The significance of using the Delphi Method is based on its ability to more 
accurately predict, examine and discuss legal issues. As there is yet to be a negligence 
action involving a person with a neural interface device, prediction of the different legal 
issues is much better achieved by enabling legal experts to collaborate.  
 
Of particular interest was the assertion made by a number of experts that the common law 
is resilient enough to deal with the complexities that will arise with neural interface devices 
and that legislation should be avoided.714 However, many of the experts considered that the 
current law will need to change. The tension between the common law and legislation was 
                                            
714 For example, Participant P6 stated: 
‘I would suggest that the complexities of these questions are such that they would be best left to the 
common law to resolve, and that interested parties should be very cautious about seeking 
legislation, as this will “freeze” the flexible development of appropriate laws.’ 
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discussed in chapter 1715 with the conclusion that to some degree there will be trial and error, 
as is often the case in terms of the development of new technology. The case law will evolve. 
It is highly likely that with this new technology, Federal and State governments will pursue a 
light touch regulatory approach to avoid interfering with the application of the current Civil 
Liability Legislation by the court. Many of the experts expressed the view that existing 
consumer protection legislation and Civil Liability Legislation was already able to be applied 
to a civil dispute in which a person with a neural interface device is involved. 
 
Chapter 4 analysed negligence law and its application where the defendant has a neural 
interface device. While the defendant owes a duty of care to take reasonable care or to 
exercise reasonable skill identical to that of a fully able person, difficulty arises in determining 
the appropriate standard of care to be applied. Chapter 4 raised and analysed the many 
factors that the court should consider in determining breach of the duty of care, however, it 
was argued that for a person with a neural interface device the standard of care may be 
different from that of person without a neural interface device. The analysis in chapter 4 
highlighted the possibility that the court may determine that individuals with neural interface 
devices form a new class of individual upon which a different standard of care should be 
applied. That standard of care, as determined by the application of Civil Liability 
Legislation,716 would be the objective assessment of the actions of a reasonable person of 
ordinary prudence with the same or similar neural interface device in the same or similar 
circumstances. It is highly probable that the courts will need to address this in the near 
future.  
 
Chapter 4 highlighted that factual causation will be of critical importance in determining a 
negligence action against a person with a neural interface device.717 The specific role the 
individual and the neural interface device played in allegedly causing the harm will need to 
be determined and this will impact on attribution of liability between the person with the 
                                            
715 See discussion under the heading ‘E Application of this Thesis’. 
716 CLWACT s 43; CLANSW s 5B; CLAQ s 9; CLAS s 32; CLAT s 11; WAVIC s 48; CLAWA s 5B. There is 
no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. 
717 See chapter 4 under the heading ‘1 Factual Causation’. 
202 
 
neural interface device and the manufacture of the device. In the Delphi Method research, 
legal practitioner L2 stated: 
 
The only thing changed by the neural interface is the risk of imperfect translation. That won't 
affect the articulation of the existence of the duty or the identification of the standard of care, 
it will just affect assessment of risk and manner of causation. 
 
Participant P7 believed ‘The questions of causation are likely to be difficult.’ 
 
Legal practitioner L3 said: 
 
The real issue will be breach, causation, foreseeability all of which will involve understanding 
the extent of the risk of imperfect translation and what should have been the reaction of the 
user and the person who enabled the user to use the device.  
 
Given the technology, I would have thought there might be data available to identify causation 
with some additional precision than contemplated above -- sort of like 'black box data' which 
could, for example, identify whether the instruction from the brain was turn left but the arm 
turned right, or not brake (pull instead of push). The availability of something like that would 
be very helpful in the determination of causation. 
 
Law Academic A2 said: 
 
It does not seem to me that there is anything particularly special about this context for the 
application of duty of care and causation principles though there will clearly be factual 
challenges in the latter. 
 
While liability in negligence may fall upon the person with a neural interface device, liability 
might also be attributed to the manufacturer of the neural interface device. 
 
Chapter 5 analysed liability of the manufacturer of neural interface devices. This included 
the need for device accreditation in Australia by the TGA or similar organisations in countries 
where the devices are manufactured or sold. As the neural interface devices cannot interpret 
neural impulses as accurately as the biological body part and the assistive device is not 
identical to the human body part, an acceptable margin of error should be incorporated into 
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the accreditation process.718 Just how imperfect the neural interface device can be will 
provide the courts with constraints on the application of the objective standard of care. That 
margin of error required by the TGA may be extremely low for neuroprosthetic limbs if they 
are regarded as safety critical devices. Manufacturer liability where the neural interface 
device does not operate correctly presents less of a problem for the law.719 The court will 
have difficulty determining liability between the individual and the neural interface device 
manufacturer where the device is operating correctly and a negligence claim is brought 
against the person with a neural interface device and the manufacturer.  
 
Of particular concern to both an individual and the manufacturer of a neural interface device 
involved in a civil action is the communication that occurred between the brain and the neural 
processor. The recording of neural impulse and its interpretation will be contained within the 
neural processor and, like a black box in an aircraft,720 this can provide courts with data upon 
which an understanding of the actions of the individual can occur. However, chapter 2 
provided technical analysis that confirms that the recording and interpretation of neural 
impulse by the neural processor is not perfect.721 Therefore, the admissibility of such 
evidence will need to be assessed. While evidentiary issues are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, a brief discussion of neuroscientific evidence is below722 because parties to an action 
in negligence will seek to rely on neuroscientific evidence.  
 
Recommendations that flow from the analysis conducted in this thesis are provided under 
the following broad headings of negligence and manufacturer liability. Determination of the 
thesis hypothesis is then considered. Just as chapter 1 identified other areas of inquiry 
regarding neural interface devices that are beyond the scope of this thesis, chapter 6 
concludes with a brief discussion of further research opportunities that provide insight for 
those working on the application of the law to neural interface devices. These are 
neuroethics, neurolaw and neuroscientific evidence. The purpose of concluding in this way 
is to highlight the impact neural interface devices will have, recognising that this thesis seeks 
to contribute to the knowledge of this developing field of inquiry. 
 
                                            
718 See chapter 5 under the heading ‘1 TGA Approval’. 
719 See chapter 5 under the heading ‘A Introduction’ regarding consumer protection against safety defects. 
720 Bailey, above n 640. 
721 See analysis under the heading ‘C Neural Interface Device Technology’. 
722 See discussion under the heading ‘G Further Research Opportunities’. 
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In summary, chapters 3, 4 and 5 provided identification and analysis of the legal issues that 
are anticipated to arise with respect to neural interface devices. Chapter 3 provided the 
outcomes of the Delphi Method research undertaken where legal experts identified the legal 
issues and considered how the law would address these issues. The predominant civil 
liability issue identified and discussed by participants in the Delphi Method research was 
negligence and chapter 4 provided analysis of negligence in the context of neural interface 
devices. Chapter 5 analysed manufacturer liability that was also identified as a major legal 
issue that arises with neural interface devices. The principal recommendations that flow from 
the analysis conducted in chapters 3 through 5 are as follows. 
 
D Negligence 
 
The melding of the human mind and a neural interface device makes the latter an integral 
part of the individual so legal issues will arise if it becomes impossible to distinguish between 
the will of the person and the operation of the technology, where the natural neural system 
assimilates with the technology.723 Analysis of negligence in chapter 4 identified challenges 
in the application of the current law. The standard of care that would be applied to the 
defendant with a neural interface device through application of Civil Liability Legislation 
could result in a different standard of care from that of person without a neural interface 
device. This would be an objective test through the application of Civil Liability Legislation in 
respect of a person with a neural interface device, being that of a reasonable person with 
the same, or similar, neural interface device in the same, or similar, circumstances. The 
court will be faced with the difficulty of acquiring knowledge and understanding of the specific 
roles the individual and the neural interface device played in the circumstances where harm 
to another person or another person’s property occurred. The difficulty in separating the 
actions of the person from those of the neural interface device creates problems in 
determining factual causation.724 This will impact on attribution of liability between the person 
with the neural interface device and the manufacture of the device.  
 
                                            
723 Clausen, above n 4, 1080. 
724 See chapter 4 under the heading ‘1 Factual Causation’. 
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Recommendation 1 
In the application of the Civil Liability Legislation, the fact that the defendant has a neural 
interface device must be considered when determining the standard of care that should be 
applied.725  
 
It is the ability of the person to act in unison with the neural interface device that enables 
action, not the person’s physical control over a tool. The neural interface device is an integral 
part of the human body. 
 
Recommendation 2 
The operation by a person of a neural interface device is not to be regarded in the same 
way as the operation of a car or any other device that is independent of direct neural impulse 
from the individual.  
 
Recommendation 3 
Information contained within the neural interface device in relation to neural impulse 
recording and interpretation, together with the instructions that were sent to the assistive 
device and communication back to the brain, be retained for a set minimum period of time 
and is required to be disclosed to all parties during legal proceedings.726  
 
Recommendation 4 
Discussion of the public policy issues, including those in chapter 4,727 should be undertaken 
by the governments, members of the judiciary and legal practitioners to assist in 
development of the law surrounding neural interface devices.728  
 
 
                                            
725 CLWACT s 43; CLANSW s 5B; CLAQ s 9; CLAS s 32; CLAT s 11; WAVIC s 48; CLAWA s 5B. There is 
no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. 
726 This would be best achieved as obligations under the rules of the court. This will be important in assisting 
with determination of causation, as discussed in chapter 4. 
727 Including indeterminate liability and coherence of the law. See analysis in chapter 4 under the heading 
‘(b) Policy Considerations’. 
728 This will assist in determining an appropriate balance between public benefit of neural interface devices 
and public risk. 
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E Manufacturer Liability 
 
Chapter 5 provided an analysis of manufacturer liability and device accreditation, 
recognising that the melding of mind and machine moves the use of an active implantable 
medical device beyond traditional ‘tool use’. Determination of a civil action may involve not 
only questions of fact but questions of law in relation to manufacturer liability.729 The error 
rate of decoding of the neural impulse by the decoder will play a role in determining liability 
for harm to the property or person of another. An acceptable error rate might be higher than 
that of the corresponding biological part, but it will be important to accurately quantify the 
acceptable error rate as this will be a critical factor in a civil action. This will also assist in 
defending allegations of manufacturer liability. The court’s determination of the role the 
device played in causing the damage will be based on the combination of many factors, as 
examined in chapter 4.730 
 
Product accreditation by the TGA, as examined in chapter 5,731 requires an understanding 
of this integration of mind and machine to appreciate the interaction between the device and 
the brain of the individual. Manufacturers should be required to provide product and 
operational information about the neural interface device732 and neural interface devices will 
be required to conform with the Essential Principles in the Therapeutic Goods (Medical 
Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth).733 In chapter 5,734 the use of an ‘ethical governor’ (set of 
pre-programmed constraints), ‘ethical adapter’ (programmed choices) and ‘responsibility 
governor’ (human override) from the research undertaken by Ronald Arkin was discussed 
and considered in relation to neural interface devices. These mechanisms will assist in 
preventing undesirable or unintended neural interface device movement. 
 
                                            
729 See also analysis in chapter 4 under the heading ‘D Causation’. 
730 See analysis under the heading ‘1 Factual Causation’. 
731 See analysis under the heading ‘1 TGA Approval’. 
732 Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth) Schedule 1, Part 2, Essential Principle 13. 
733 Sch 1, Pts 1 and 2. 
734 See analysis under the heading ‘2 Neural Interface Device Beyond Being a Tool’. 
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Recommendation 5 
The TGA’s neural interface device accreditation process should ensure that the error rate of 
neural impulse decoding by the device is not substantially different from normal motor errors 
of the corresponding biological part.735  
 
Recommendation 6 
The conditions and assessment of conformity of neural interface devices must comply with 
the Australian Essential Principles.736  
 
 
Recommendation 7 
The TGA requires manufacturers to provide product information for consumers, including 
the activities that should not be engaged in by the recipient of the device, in plain English.  
 
Recommendation 8 
Manufacturers incorporate in neural interface devices governance processes, such as 
ethical governor,737 ethical adapter and responsibility governor738 to prevent misuse or 
inappropriate use of the devices.739  
 
F Determination of Thesis Hypothesis 
 
Determination of the thesis hypothesis, tested by the research questions assessed 
throughout the thesis, was considered using the concept of revolutionary science developed 
by Thomas Samuel Kuhn, as discussed in chapter 1.740 Analogous with science, the courts 
                                            
735 This will assist in determining an appropriate balance between public benefit of neural interface devices 
and public risk. See discussion in chapter 4 under the heading ‘(b) Policy Considerations’. 
736 The analysis on manufacturer liability in chapter 5 determined that neural interface devices must comply 
with six Essential Principles and nine other Essential Principles regarding design and construction, which 
apply to devices on a case-by-case analysis, all of which are specified in Schedule 1, Part 1 and Part 2 
Therapeutic Goods (Medical Devices) Regulations 2002 (Cth), respectively. 
737 Arkin, Ulam and Duncan, above n 667, 163-5. 
738 Carroll, above n 10, 80. The method of machine governance incorporating similar steps that could be 
adapted for neural interface devices was discussed in chapter 5; Arkin, above n 667, 8.  
739 See analysis in chapter 5 under the heading ‘2 Neural Interface Device Beyond Being a Tool’. 
740 See chapter 1 under the heading ‘2 The Chosen Theory for Hypothesis Determination’. 
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apply established principles741 in legal actions. As anomalous results occur,742 the 
application of the current legislation or common law principles require re-evaluation and 
adaptation, which incorporates past decisions together with the anomalous results. This will 
enable the courts to better resolve civil liability proceedings that involve a party with a neural 
interface device.743 
 
The possibility of anomalous results have been illustrated throughout the thesis in relation 
to the application of the current law in resolving a civil action,744 most prominently in 
negligence. Legal experts in the Delphi Method research identified a need for the current 
law to change and the analysis in chapter 4 highlighted difficulties in the determination of 
the standard of care that will be applied to a person with a neural interface device745 and 
challenges with causation.746 Recommendations have been made in this chapter to assist 
with the transition towards a modification of the current law to better resolve difficulties in 
the application of the current law. The need for adaptation of the current law was also 
highlighted in the Delphi Method research by the participants who considered how the 
existing law would resolve the legal issues they had identified in relation to neural interface 
devices. Approximately half of the participants in the Delphi Method research stated that 
application of the current legal principles would be adequate while the other half of the 
participants stated that the current law would need to change to better resolve the legal 
issues arising.747  
 
The integration of the neural interface device with the human mind creates a situation that 
goes beyond simple tool use which requires the law to consider a new and complex 
individual. It is not uncommon for there to be opposing views regarding the application of 
the law to a factual situation and this provides a foundation for the adversarial legal system 
that exists in Australia. Analysis throughout the thesis supports the conclusion that there is 
the potential for inconsistent application of the current law arising from the use of neural 
interface devices and this will result in uncertainty. Ultimately, the legislature or the High 
                                            
741 That is, common law principles or legislation such as Civil Liability Legislation.  
742 For example, decisions that go beyond the existing law, as was discussed in relation to Donoghue v 
Stevenson [1932] AC 562 in chapter 1. 
743 Kuhn, above n 2. 
744 For example, chapter 4 under the heading ‘F Summary’. 
745 See analysis in chapter 4 under the heading ‘1 Standard of Care’. 
746 See analysis in chapter 4 under the heading ‘D Causation’. 
747 See chapter 3 under the headings ‘1 The Current Law’ and ‘2 Development of Current Law’. 
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Court of Australia, as the final appellate court in Australia, will determine the resolution of 
this uncertainty.748 This change in the current law will be primarily in the negligence cause 
of action where the standard of care to be applied to the person with a neural interface 
device will need to be considered carefully to ensure the most appropriate standard of care 
is applied in these new circumstances. The current law in relation to causation in the 
negligence element of damage will most likely be challenged also. The re-evaluation or 
adaptation of the current law to better resolve disputes where a party has a neural interface 
device will occur over time.  
 
The re-evaluation or adaptation of the law is not a paradigm shift but the acceptance of such 
a change is similar and is captured by Kuhn who stated: 
 
This is not to suggest that new paradigms triumph ultimately through some mystical aesthetic. 
On the contrary, very few men desert a tradition for these reasons alone. Often those who do 
turn out to have been misled. But if a paradigm is ever to triumph it must gain some first 
supporters, men who will develop it to the point where hardheaded arguments can be produced 
and multiplied. And even those arguments, when they come, are not individually decisive. 
Because scientists are reasonable men, one or another argument will ultimately persuade 
many of them. But there is no single argument that can or should persuade them all. Rather 
than a single group conversion, what occurs is an increasing shift in the distribution of 
professional allegiances.749 
 
At the start a new candidate for paradigm may have few supporters, and on occasions the 
supporters’ motives may be suspect. Nevertheless, if they are competent, they will improve it, 
explore its possibilities, and show what it would be like to belong to the community guided by 
it. And as that goes on, if the paradigm is one destined to win its fight, the number and strength 
of the persuasive arguments in its favour will increase. More scientists will then be converted, 
and the exploration of the new paradigm will go on. Gradually the number of experiments, 
instruments, articles, and books based upon the paradigm will multiply. Still more men, 
convinced of the new view’s fruitfulness, will adopt the new mode of practicing normal science, 
until at last only a few elderly hold-outs remain. And even they, we cannot say, are wrong. 
Though the historian can always find men—Priestley, for instance—who were unreasonable 
to resist for as long as they did, he will not find a point at which resistance becomes illogical or 
                                            
748 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 35A Criteria for granting special leave to appeal. 
749 Kuhn, above n 2, 158. 
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unscientific. At most he may wish to say that the man who continues to resist after his whole 
profession has been converted has ipso facto ceased to be a scientist.750 
 
G Further Research Opportunities 
 
Beyond the resolution of civil liability disputes, chapter 1 identified some of the many legal 
issues that arise with neural interface devices but are beyond the scope of this thesis. These 
issues include wireless interception and unauthorised communication with the neural 
interface device that may be a factor the court will consider should this be alleged by the 
defendant. Access and use of data collected and stored by the neural interface system may 
give rise to an action for breach of privacy legislation or breaches of contractual obligations 
in relation to data protection.751 The requirement for an individual with a neural interface 
device to obtain compulsory third party insurance is also a matter that will need to be 
determined by the legislature and if such insurance is compulsory, this may impact on the 
decisions of the court as it did in Imbree.752  
 
Amendment of existing legislation or enactment of new legislation may be necessary to 
address these issues and to better resolve disputes. While the legislature should consider 
the regulatory issues that could arise from the use of neural interface devices, legislative 
intervention was discouraged by the participants in the Delphi Method research examined 
in chapter 3,753 as this could inhibit the development and supply of neural interface devices. 
Further research could be undertaken to determine whether or not the legislature should 
introduce or amend legislation in relation to neural interface devices and if so, how and  
when. Legislation might be necessary only if there are insurmountable gaps in the common 
law so government could pursue a light touch regulatory approach. In chapter 4, it was 
determined that strict liability is unlikely to be applied to a person with a neural interface 
device unless it is in unison with compulsory third party liability insurance, as is the case 
with motor vehicles.754 
 
                                            
750 Ibid 159. 
751 See discussion under the heading ‘4 Data Protection/Privacy’. 
752 (2008) 236 CLR 510. See discussion in chapter 1 under the heading ‘2 Compulsory Third Party 
Insurance’. 
753 See chapter 3 under the heading ‘2 Development of Current Law’. 
754 See chapter 4 under the heading ‘4 Whether the Inference of Negligence (res ipsa loquitur) Applies’ and 
Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510, [129], [130], [180] and [181] (Kirby J). 
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In the same way that chapter 1 identified issues beyond the scope of this thesis, the following 
discussion of neuroethics, neurolaw and neuroscientific evidence identifies other research 
opportunities beyond the scope of this thesis. This discussion is important because it 
highlights the enormity of issues that will arise with the use of neural interface devices and 
challenges to the current legislation, common law and beyond. This thesis seeks to provide 
a contribution to knowledge in the field of neural interface devices and promote further 
discussion and analysis.  
 
1 Neuroethics 
 
Ethical challenges exist and more will arise as neural interface devices become readily 
available and their capabilities increase. Neuroethics should be considered by researchers, 
manufacturers, government and the legal professionals as it provides a framework within 
which civil legal issues, such as those discussed below, could arise. Clausen believes that 
‘brain–machine interfaces promise therapeutic benefit and should be pursued.’755 While 
Clausen admits that these new technologies may pose ethical challenges, he believes that 
‘these are conceptually similar to those that bioethicists have addressed for other realms of 
therapy. Ethics is well prepared to deal with the questions in parallel to, and in cooperation 
with, the neuroscientific research.’756 Ienca argues that neural interface devices are of 
particular importance to neuroethics ‘as their capacity to establish a direct connection 
pathway between human neural processing and artificial computation has been described 
as “qualitatively different” by experts, hence believed to raise “unique concerns”.’757 Ienca 
recognises privacy risks that ‘neurorights’, which are composed of a right to mental privacy, 
psychological continuity and cognitive liberty, could address.758  
 
Kevin Warwick considers the issues that might arise in the future relating to intelligent robots 
and human/machine mergers, known as cyborgs, by identifying science fiction movies such 
as The Terminator, The Matrix, Blade Runner and I, Robot.759 Warwick believes that 
                                            
755 Clausen, above n 4, 1080. 
756 Ibid. 
757 Ienca, above n 106. See also Rafael Yuste et al, ‘Four ethical priorities for neurotechnologies and AI’, 
(2017) 551(7679) Nature News 159, 161; Jens Clausen et al, ‘Help, hope, and hype: Ethical dimensions of 
neuroprosthetics’ (2017) 356(6345) Science 1338, 1338. 
758 Ienca, above n 106. 
759 Kevin Warwick, ‘Future Issues with Robots and Cyborgs’ (2010) 4(3) Studies in Ethics, Law, and 
Technology Article 6. 
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scientific developments are raising issues that were not only contemplated in science fiction 
but go far beyond these.760 Discussing four different experiments, Warwick identifies 
particular issues. The use of Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID) implants to 
convey our personal identity raises ethical issues when used by children, the aged or 
prisoners.761 As robots with biological brains, possibly developed using human neurons, 
continue to be pursed in research, a range of social and ethical questions will arise, including 
the extent to which such a cyborg will be entitled to human rights.762 With greater use of 
brain-computer interfaces, issues such as mental side effects and liability for unlawful 
actions of the human recipient exist and the debate over therapy versus enhancement also 
arises.763  
 
However, Ruth Chadwick questions whether the issues raised by Warwick are new 
questions or only old questions in a new guise.764 Chadwick focuses on the issues of 
enhancement involving human thought transfer termed synthetic telepathy, a mechanism 
that transfers motor cortex instructions to an artificial device and informed consent for deep 
brain stimulation and brain-machine interface. In relation to enhancement, Chadwick 
stresses the need to distinguish between ‘enhancement’ (capabilities that humans do not 
have) and ‘improvement’ and concludes that despite the fact that the ability to transfer 
human thought is an enhancement, criteria are required, possibly moral judgement, to 
determine whether or not it is an improvement.765  
 
Where there has been a device developed to assist humans with a particular ailment, such 
as deafness, the community for which the device has been created might resist use of the 
device. Some within the deaf community regard the cochlear implant ‘as an enhancement 
beyond normal functioning’.766 ‘What is enhancement and what is treatment depends on 
defining normality and disease, and this is notoriously difficult.’767 Anita Silvers has 
described the use of prostheses such as corrective lenses, artificial limbs and hearing aids 
                                            
760 Ibid. 
761 Ibid. 
762 Ibid. 
763 Ibid. 
764 Ruth Chadwick, ‘New Questions, or Only Old Questions in a New Guise’ (2010) 4(3) Studies in Ethics, 
Law, and Technology Article 8. 
765 Ibid. 
766 Clausen, above n 4, 1080. 
767 Ibid. 
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as a ‘tyranny of the normal’ designed to alter a person’s level of functioning to a normal 
mode of functioning which compromises, rather than equalises, their opportunities.768  
 
Chadwick considered brain-machine interface used for deep brain stimulation, drawing 
analogies with mind-altering drugs and transplantation of neural tissue.769 The core issue, 
according to Chadwick, appears to be ‘the description of the machine’s job as ”out think the 
human brain”.’770 This conflicts with the evolving area of cognitive computing discussed in 
chapter 2.771 However, Chadwick argues that drugs and neural tissue transplants do not 
operate in this way, they are not innately intelligent.772 ‘The fact that an intelligent machine 
is preventing my brain from doing what it ”wants” to do is something I may accept because 
my natural brain is not doing what ”I” want it to do’. 773 This threat to the “I”, states Chadwick, 
‘is certainly not a new philosophical puzzle’.774 Complications in legal responsibility, such as 
alteration of personality including mood, memory function and speech control, might arise 
where the machine changes the brain.775 However, ‘side effects are common in most 
medical interventions’, Clausen argues, so ‘this does not illustrate a new ethical problem’.776 
That is, of course, based on what is regarded as the appropriate motivation for obtaining 
such change. 
 
For these reasons, researchers proposing to engage in neural interface device research 
within, or in collaboration with, the higher education sector will need to ensure that the 
relevant neuroethics issues are being addressed. Researchers should also consider 
whether or not the release of research outcomes should be avoided or restricted if 
misappropriation of the research outcomes could pose a serious threat to the public.777  
 
Further research could also be undertaken to determine whether or not research funding 
bodies should consider grant terms that specify the appropriate use of the neuroscientific 
                                            
768 Anita Silvers, ‘A Fatal Attraction to Normalizing: Treating Disabilities as Deviations from Species-Typical 
Functioning’ in E Parens (ed), Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications, (Georgetown 
University Press, USA, 1998) 95, 114. 
769 Chadwick, above n 764. 
770 Ibid. 
771 See analysis under the heading ‘3 Inaccurate Recording and Decoding of Neural Impulses’. 
772 Ibid. 
773 Ibid 3. 
774 Ibid 4. 
775 Clausen, above n 4. 
776 Ibid. 
777 Lawrence O Gostin, Global Health Law (Harvard University Press, 2014) 378-80. 
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research outcomes and expressly prohibit uses that conflict with established codes or rules, 
such as the European Parliament Civil Law Rules on Robotics.778 This could include analysis 
of the impact of increased government funding for organisations that provide ‘responsible, 
ethical and scientifically sound translation of neuroscience into the legal arena,’ as is the 
focus of the work done at the Massachusetts General Hospital Center for Law, Brain, and 
Behavior.779 
 
2 Neurolaw  
 
Aligned with neuroethics is the developing field of neurolaw that will also influence the law 
in its application to neural interface devices. 
 
Less than three decades ago, the fields of cognitive psychology and neuroscience joined 
forces to form cognitive neuroscience. More recently, neuroscience has combined with social 
psychology and with economics to produce social neuroscience and neuroeconomics. Each 
of these amalgamations has been revolutionary in its own way. Neurolaw extends this 
trend.780 
 
The term ‘neurolaw’ was first used in 1991 by J. Sherrod Taylor, a lawyer who was 
describing ‘the converging courses of neuropsychology and the legal system’.781 Erickson 
argues that the term was ‘adopted to explain the growing influence of expert testimony by 
neuropsychologists in brain-injury civil suits’ which resulted in its primary focus being the 
securing of ‘financial remedies for people with traumatic brain injuries’.782 ‘But the allure of 
neurolaw from its conception was its ability to describe personhood by reference to structural 
and functional aspects of the brain’.783 The availability of neuroscientific information on how 
the human brain operates has increased through the development of technological 
                                            
778 European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with Recommendations to 
the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)) (16 February 2017) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2017-
0051+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>. 
779 Massachusetts General Hospital, above n 309. 
780 Annabelle Belcher and Water Sinnot-Armstrong, ‘Neurolaw’ (2010) WIREs Cognitive Science 1(1), 18, 18. 
781 Steven K Erickson, ‘Blaming the Brain’, (2010) 11(1) Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 
27, 35. In support of this conclusion, Erickson cites the following article: J. Sherrod Taylor et al., 
Neuropsychologists and Neurolawyers, (1991) 5 Neuropsychology 293, 293. Taylor’s collaborators were J. 
Elliott and J. A. Harp. 
782 Erickson, above n 781, 35. 
783 Ibid. 
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sophistication784 and research funding.785 ‘The consequence of this overflow of information 
means that the nuances of scientific explanations when applied to legal questions are often 
in tension with the established precedents of legal doctrine’.786 
 
Today, neurolaw now involves researchers from the social sciences, mind and brain 
sciences, law and philosophy examining the social and legal implications of neuroscientific 
discoveries in addressing legal and social problems.787 Outcomes and recommendations 
that have come from this field of research include the unreliability of lie detection tests,788 
‘the potential of direct brain interventions to treat anti-social behaviour instead of punishing 
criminals’789 in the traditional ways, the limits of free choice790 and the ability to predict future 
criminal behaviour.791 Neurolaw is developing as a recognised area of legal practice ‘as the 
need for lawyers with specialized knowledge in the field of brain injury has become 
apparent’.792 The research that has been undertaken in this thesis will integrate with 
neurolaw as the discoveries in neuroscience enhance the ability for the neural interface 
devices to better interpret the neural impulses correctly. Future analysis, discussion and 
recommendations regarding the challenges to the current law by the development of neural 
interface devices could be promoted within the field of neurolaw. 
 
3 Neuroscientific Evidence 
 
Neuroscientific research outcomes are influencing both the legislature and the judiciary. 
Justice Bryer of the US Supreme Court stated that cutting-edge neuroscience has shown 
‘virtual violence in video game playing results in those neural patterns that are considered 
                                            
784 Ibid 35-6. 
785 National Institutes of Health, BRAIN 2025: A Scientific Vision, above n 276. 
786 Erickson, above n 781, 35, 36. 
787 The Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, Neurolaw in Australia Revealing the Hidden Impact of 
Neuroscience and Behavioural Genetics on Australian Law (2011) 
<https://www.assa.edu.au/event/neurolaw-in-australia-revealing-the-hidden-impact-of-neuroscience-and-
behavioural-genetics-on-australian-law/>. 
788 The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience, fMRI and Lie Detection (2016) 
<http://lawneuro.org/LieDetect.pdf>. 
789 The Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, above n 787.   
790 David M Eagleman, ‘The Brain on Trial’ (2011) July/August The Atlantic 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/07/the-brain-on-trial/8520/>. 
791 Jeffrey Rosen, ‘The Brain on the Stand’, The New York Times Magazine (online), 11 March 2007, 1 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html?_r=1>. 
792 Charles G Monnett III, Neurolaw: The Basics, HG.org <https://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=7464>. 
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characteristic for aggressive cognition and behavior’.793 Neuroscientific evidence will be of 
great importance in a civil dispute where a party has a neural interface device and the factors 
that lead to the incident in dispute, including communication between the brain and the 
decoder, must be determined. 
 
A number of cases reinforce the admissibility of evidence comprising of CT scans and 
diagnostic MRI scans require expert witnesses to provide the court with assurances of the 
reliability of the evidence in supporting the conclusions proposed by the parties. The factual 
basis upon which expert opinion is admissible has been established in the Australian courts 
for these types of neuroscientific evidence.794 New forms of neuroscientific evidence, 
including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans, Electroencephalography 
(EEG), quantitative EEG (QEEG), single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) 
and positron emission tomography (PET) scans, must achieve such recognition otherwise 
the court will declare it inadmissible. These new forms of evidence may have profound 
impact on aspects of the litigious process, such as factual causation examined in chapter 
4.795 
 
The introduction of new forms of neuroscientific evidence may encounter similar rejection 
as was the case in R v Tang796 in relation to facial and body mapping797 but the role of expert 
witnesses in being able to provide reassurance to the court on the validity of conclusions 
drawn from the evidence will be paramount. However, the way in which these conclusions 
are communicated to the court must be considered carefully to ensure legal reliability. 
 
Owen Jones believes that ‘There are two primary ways that neuroscience can be relevant 
to law: 1) it can pose new problems; and 2) it can offer aid in solving existing problems.’798 
                                            
793 Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association 564 U.S. 08-1448 (27 June 2011), 13. 
794 For example, R v Jeong Ming Foo [2008] NSWSC 587; R v KT [2007] NSWSC 83; Tabet v Gett [2010] 
HCA 12; Burgess v Leech [2007] NSWSC 700; and R v Coleman [2010] 9 NSWSC 177. 
795 See analysis under the heading ‘1 Factual Causation’. 
796 (2006) 65 NSWLR 681. 
797 “Facial mapping” is concerned with identification of a person in a visually captured image (in this case a 
videotape) on the basis of facial characteristics. “Body mapping” is concerned with the identification of a 
person in a visually captured image (in this case a videotape) on the basis of physical characteristics of other 
parts of their body and of posture. 
798 Owen Jones, 'Seven ways neuroscience aids law' in A Battro, S Dehaene, and W Singer (eds), 
Neurosciences and the human person: new perspectives on human activities (2013) Pontifical Academy of 
Sciences, Vatican City, Scripta Varia 121, 124. 
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Jones has suggested seven general functions which neuroscientific data might serve in 
litigation, including:  
 
• To provide buttressing for other evidence. That is, ‘neuroscientific evidence 
collaterally supports, and further strengthens, something that already stands 
independently (or nearly so)’.799 
• To identify and combat bias. 
• To detect the existence of a legally relevant fact (such as the existence of pain 
or of an addiction). 
• To assist in determining the likelihood of future behaviour.800  
 
In Clinton Tuite v The Queen,801 the issue that the Victorian Court of Appeal was to 
determine was the reliability of DNA evidence which utilises a relatively new statistical 
methodology.802 The Court applied R v Tang803 in relation to determining the admissibility of 
the evidence804 and then considered the evidentiary reliability. Citing the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the Court said that: 
  
The dangers of “junk science” are obvious, as that Court had pointed out: Dressed up in 
scientific language which the jury does not easily understand and submitted through a 
witness of impressive antecedents, this evidence is apt to be accepted by the jury as being 
virtually infallible and as having more weight than it deserves.805 
 
In the view of the Victorian Court of Appeal, ‘the touchstone of reliability for scientific 
evidence must be trustworthiness, and trustworthiness depends on validation. We would 
respectfully adopt what the US Supreme Court said in Daubert, as follows’:806 
 
We note that scientists typically distinguish between "validity" (does the principle support 
what it purports to show?) and "reliability" (does application of the principle produce 
                                            
799 Ibid. 
800 Ibid 124-8. 
801 [2015] VSCA 148. 
802 Clinton Tuite v The Queen [2015] VSCA 148, [1]. 
803 (2006) 65 NSWLR 681. 
804 Clinton Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148, [58]. 
805 Ibid [89]. The Supreme Court of Canada judgment cited was R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9, 21. 
806 Clinton Tuite v The Queen [2015] VSCA 148, [101]. 
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consistent results?). Although "the difference between accuracy, validity, and reliability 
may be such that each is distinct from the other by no more than a hen's kick," ... our 
reference here is to evidentiary reliability -- that is, trustworthiness. In a case involving 
scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.807 
 
Buckholtz and Faigman assert that if scientifically valid conclusions cannot be drawn from 
the neuroscientific evidence, then the evidence should not be considered by the law 
because ‘it gives the false appearance of rigor and certainty.’808 They call for the 
‘development of a neuro-legal lingua franca’ to enable the law to align with science by 
ensuring that the standards applied by the law are based on meaningful, scientific criteria.809 
This will ensure that legal principles involving the ‘human mind and mental function’ will be 
grounded in quantifiable and testable concepts of mind and brain,’810 providing expert 
witnesses with improved credibility in the courtroom. Research undertaken by Ware, Jones 
and Schweitzer, revealed that ‘the mere presence of neuroscientific information can have 
an unduly influential effect on decision-makers.’811 
 
As new forms of neuroscientific evidence reach the courts, the established evidentiary 
procedure will work to ensure the careful consideration of these conclusions in combination 
with the observations of behaviour.812 Maxwell ACJ, Redlich and Weinberg JJA have 
expressed this clearly: 
 
The obvious risk in a criminal trial when expert evidence is led from a forensic scientist is that 
a jury will give the evidence more weight than it deserves. To prevent unfair prejudice of that 
kind, it is essential that the reliability of expert evidence be established to the court's 
satisfaction (under s 137)813 before it is led. We have concluded that the touchstone of 
                                            
807 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc (1993) 509 US 579, 590 n 9 (emphasis added). 
808 Joshua W Buckholtz and David L Faigman, ‘Promises, promises for neuroscience and law’ (2014) 24(18) 
Current Biology, R861, R866; Jennifer Kulynych, ‘Psychiatric neuroimaging evidence: a high-tech crystal 
ball?’ (1997) 49 Stanford Law Review, 1249, 1251. 
809 Ibid. 
810 Ibid. 
811 Jillian Ware, Jessica Jones and NJ Schweitzer, ‘Neuroimagery and the Jury’, (20 August 2014) The Jury 
Expert, 2 <http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2014/08/neuroimagery-and-the-jury/>. 
812 Owen Jones, Anthony Wagner, David Faigman and Marcus Raichle, ‘Neuroscientists in Court’ (2014) 14 
Nature Reviews: Neuroscience 730, 731 and 735. 
813 Evidence Act 2008 (Vic). 
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reliability for this purpose is proof of appropriate validation, both of the underlying science 
(where necessary) and of the particular methodology being employed.814 
 
It is clear that the legal reliability of neuroscientific evidence must be based upon scientific 
validity. Also, recognising that terms in law differ from those in science,815 further research 
could be undertaken to assess the feasibility of developing a neuro-legal lingua franca to 
enable the law to align with science, removing ambiguity and uncertainty. 
 
H Conclusion 
 
The development of neuroprosthetics enabling the human mind to instruct and control these 
neural interface devices is occurring. This melding of mind and machine challenges the law 
in determining where civil liability for injury, damage or loss should lie. This provided an 
exciting opportunity for legal research and analysis to facilitate the re-evaluation of the 
applicable law. It has been shown that the extent to which technological advancement in 
neural interface devices will impact on the law will be substantial. The ability for the law to 
address this currently unique situation will have a fundamental impact on the parties involved 
and society at large. The central theme of this thesis was that when a person who has a 
neural interface device is involved in circumstances where harm to another person or 
another person’s property occurs, the Australian law will require re-evaluation and 
adaptation to resolve subsequent civil action.  
 
The laws addressing negligence and manufacturer liability are well entrenched in the 
existing legal systems. Approximately half of the participants in the Delphi Method research 
undertaken for this thesis and discussed in chapter 3 stated that the current legal framework 
will be sufficient for resolving the legal issues identified by participants.816 However, the other 
half of the participants stated otherwise, that the legal principles will need to change to more 
adequately resolve the legal issues.817 Therefore, the certainty of dispute resolution through 
the direct application of existing law in circumstances where a party has a neural interface 
                                            
814 Clinton Tuite v The Queen [2015] VSCA 148, [11]. Footnote 6 in the judgment is the following: Murphy v 
R (1989) 167 CLR 94, 130-1; R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9, 21; Hannes v DPP (Cth) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151, 
226 [289]-[290]. 
815 David Hodgson, ‘Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility’ (Paper presented at the National Judicial 
College of Australia, Conference on the Australian Justice System in 2020, Sydney, 25 October 2008) 10. 
816 See analysis under the heading ‘1 The Current Law’. 
817 See analysis under the heading ‘2 Development of Current Law’. 
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device is not absolute. Recommendations in this chapter will assist in resolving the 
challenges of neural interface devices on the common law and legislation to support the use 
of these innovative devices. 
 
In conclusion, these highly sophisticated, technically advanced and promising capabilities in 
neural interface devices are an exciting evolution of human development. Legislation and 
the common law must play an integral role in ensuring the safety of both consumers and the 
public while enabling individuals with neural interface devices to move freely in Australia 
without legal constraints beyond those of individuals without neural interface devices. For a 
quadriplegic person to don an exoskeleton and move through the world as they had before 
their injury, provides both the developers and the recipients hope and encouragement. 
Legislation and the common law should not restrict such development and freedom of 
movement. The quality of life for individuals who require the neural interface devices will be 
enhanced. Forethought by the judiciary, legal practitioners and the legislature should enable 
a legal framework that will support and encourage the development of these devices for the 
good of society. 
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